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FOREWORD**
Recent events in the world have heightened the importance of this
study of the personality of law. Never before have conquering nations set
about deliberately to destroy the language, the culture and the law of
subject peoples on such a scale as we have witnessed in this present
generation. In the past the acquisition of sovereignty over another people
has usually stopped far short of this, subject peoples have generally
retained their laws, and if in time these were replaced by those of the
conquerors, this was the gradual result of long peaceful contact and
interaction rather than of force. We have many modern illustrations of
this in the principle of extra-territoriality and in the retention of their
* Professor of History, Ferkauf Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences,
Yeshiva University.
** Author: The American Revolution (1958); Constitutionalism, Ancient & Modern
(1947); The Growth of Political Thought in the West (1932) ; The High Court of Parliament
and Its Supremacy (1962).
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native law, for example, by the French in Canada or the Boers in South
Africa under the sovereignty of Great Britain. However, such modem
instances are for the most part the retention of a law that is itself terri-
torial in character now that the principle of territoriality has become all
but universal.
Dr. Guterman's study deals with an earlier formative period in
the history of the law of the western world, before men's status had
come to be determined generally by the feudal tenure of land or by their
domicile as now. It is an obscure period in the cultural development of
our race, "dark" so far at least as our knowledge of it goes, in which the
contemporary materials are slight, scattered and difficult to evaluate. In
his study Dr. Guterman has made a careful examination, not only of
these surviving materials consisting mainly of the so-called leges bar-
barorum and the chronicles of the time, but also of the modern accounts
contained in widely scattered papers and the histories of the laws of the
various nations of Europe. From modern accounts roughly three main
theories emerge as to the source of the principle of the personality of
law: that it is a Germanic inheritance; that it is the practical result of the
peculiar political conditions existing at the time; or that it is a con-
scious adoption of the old jus gentium of the Roman law sources. The
author's preference, in agreement with Brunner, seems to be decidedly in
favor of the second of these, and he gives convincing reasons for his
choice.
On this obscure but important phase in the development of our
public and private law, which precedes and makes clear the origins of
feudalism, this study is of fundamental importance.
In his concluding chapter Dr. Guterman sums up another of his
most important conclusions when he says, "The importance placed on
legal practice rather than doctrine in linking the personal law and feudal
periods has important implications for the theory of the survival of
Roman law." The few blundering remnants of Roman jurisprudence
arising from the period covered by this study indicate that it is not to
medieval legal science that we must look as the preserver to our time
of the law of Rome; rather, its survival is owing to this principle of
personality under which Romans in certain parts of western Europe
were allowed to live by their own law instead of the law of their con-
querors.
The subject treated in this monograph has often attracted the at-
tention of historians of the legal systems of Europe, but, so far as I
know, this study is the first comprehensive account of this important





Territoriality is the dominant rule of the law courts today. It has
been called a western conception differing from the non-European sys-
tems of the past in which personal status was determined by religion
or nationality.2 In reality modern territoriality, which has been pushed
furthest in English law' and has been modified everywhere by doctrines
of private international law,4 only goes back to the feudal period and
was preceded by a long era in which personal law was the rule, and
territoriality the exception.5 This era followed the barbarian invasions of
Western Europe and was marked by the existence of nations without
territories and of laws without states.
The term personality, as applied to the early Middle Ages, covers
several relations. From the point of view of municipal law, medieval
systems bound members of a tribe or nation wherever they resided in-
dependently of domicile. As private international law they governed
relations among members of diverse tribes. In the latter role state-
enacted law represented by the capitularies played a more important
part than in the former, represented by the leges barbarorum (barbarian
laws). "Public" law, so far as it existed during the period, lay outside
the scope of the personal law rule, but a good part of what we should
today call criminal law, as well as private law, fell under the principle.
If we compare these arrangements with modern systems of private
law, whether municipal or international, we may note that, though the
latter distinguish among personal, real, and mixed "statutes," they are
nonetheless largely governed by territorial principles. They are also en-
tirely state-enacted or sanctioned. The term "international" used in rela-
1. For a general statement see this author's The First Age of European Law: The Origin
and Character of the Conflict of Laws in the Early Middle Ages, New York Law Forum,
VII, 2 (1961), 131-166.
The author would like to record his acknowledgment for aid received at various stages in
the preparation of this study to Professor C. H. McIlwain and the late Dr. E. F. Bruck, both
of Harvard University; and to Professor F. L. Ganshof, of the University of Ghent,
Belgium.
2. T. E. Holland, THE EEEENTs OF JURISPRUDENCE, 13th edition Oxford, 1924, p. 413;
and S. S. Liu, Extraterritoriality: Its Rise and Decline, New York, 1925, p. 48 ff (Levant),
p. 76 ff (Far East).
3. G. C. Cheshire, Private International Law, 6th edition, Oxford, 1961, pp. 22, 38-43;
and ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, Oxford, 1943, p. 5.
4. Fredrich Carl von Savigny, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, tr. William
Guthrie, 2nd edition, 1880, p. 57 if; and M. WOLFF, Private International Law, 2nd edition,
Oxford, 1950, p. 19 ff.
5. L. Stouff, "Etude sur le principe de ]a personalit6 des lois depuis les invasions barbares
jusqu'au XIIe si~cle," Revue bourguignonne de l'enseignement supirieur, IV, 1894, pp. 4-5;
H. Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, 2nd edition, Leipzig, 1906, Vol. I, #35, p. 383 if;
E. Chenon, HISTOIRE GCNERALE DU DROIT FRAN(AIS PUBLIC ET PRIV, Paris, 1926, I, 122;
and E. MEIJERs, "L'Histoire des principes fondamentaux de droit international priv6 h
partir du Moyen Age," Recueil des cours, Academie de Droit International, Paris, 1934,
III, vol. 49, p. 547 ff.
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tion to such systems of private law is in fact a misnomer.' The medieval
scheme of justice was much more truly international, because it did not
originate in state action. In modern private international law, to take
an example from court proceedings, both the forum and the lex fori are
determined largely on a territorial basis.7 Under the rule of personality
only the forum rei (competent tribunal) depended on territoriality,
while the lex fori-the basic rule in modern conflicts of laws-was
governed by race or nationality. As Klimrath put it, "The personal law
not only regulated the civil status and the capacity of the parties but
also everything which in territorial legislations belongs to real and mixed
statutes."9 The closest modern analogy to, and perhaps the most direct
link with, the medieval personality of private and penal law is extra-
territoriality, as it was practiced recently in China and Turkey, and
more remotely in Moslem Sicily, the Byzantine Empire and the Crusad-
ing states.' °
The origin of the system is to be found in (a) the duality of legal
culture resulting from the barbarian invasions and (b) the subjective
right of members of specified races to live according to their tradi-
tional laws."
6. Martin Wolff, op. cit. supra note 4, at 11.
7. Id. at 70, 100, 229.
8. Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori-Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws, 58 MICH. L. REv.
637 (1960).
9. H. Klimrath, Travaux sur l'histoire du droit francais, Paris 1843, Vol. I, p. 351.
10. The principle of personality was applied under different political regimes. C. D.
Du Cange, Glossarium Mediae et Infimae Latinitatis, ed. L. Favre, Vol. V, Niort, 1885, p. 79
col. 1, article "Lex" ("legem suam componere"), gives examples:
Sed et expugnata a Christianis urbe Hierosolymitana, totaque Syria, cum ex variis
ac procul diversis habitaretur nationibus, suas quique leges servavere. Will. ad
Oldenborg in Itenarario Terrae Sanctae de Antiochia: Ipsa etiam civitas divites et
plurimos habet inhabitatores, Francos et Surianos, Graecos et Judaeos, et quilibet
eorum suas leges observant. Ita Franci nostri observabant, uti docemus in Historia
nostra Franco Byzantina lib 8.n.9. Apud Byzantinos etiam ipsos Veneti, Pisani,
et Genuenses, qui in hoc urbe primaria commercii causa sedes fixerant, suis quique
legibus regebantur.
Frederigo Sclopis, Storia della legislazione italiana, Turin, 1863, Vol. I, p. 68 (and note 3)
cites the application of personal law principle by Saracens in Sicily. The letter is given by
V. Reinaud, INVASIONS DES SARRASINS EN FRANCE ET DE FRANCE EN PIEMONT ET DANS LA
SUISSE ETC., Paris, 1836, p. 272.
The Christians of Coimbra shall have their special count who shall govern them
wisely and according to their own usages. The count shall judge their law suits.
He shall be forbidden only to pronounce sentences of death, without the order of
the Moslem magistrate. His shall be the duty to lead the accused before this
magistrate, to read him the law of the Christians and if the magistrate consents
the penalty shall be pronounced.
Conflicts of laws in federal courts arising from diversity of citizenship offer an instruc-
tive analogy to cases brought before Carolingian tribunals, so far as both fora governed sub-
jects or citizens of the same country. Especially was this true after Swift vs. Tyson, 16 Pet.
1 (1842), in which Justice Story invoked the authority of a "general law" rather than
state rules as an approach to the settlement of conflicts of law in federal courts. There was
no "forum shopping" in the Carolingian era, for there was only one set of courts. See
ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, LAW AND LAWYERS IN THE UNITED STATES: THE ComoN LAW
UNDER STRESS 65-66, 68, 70-74 (1965).
11. Meijers, "L'Histoire des principes," p. 11.
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A history of the development of the personal law principle would
throw both of these factors into relief.' 2 It includes the following stages:
(1) There is first the period of origins in which, among the Germanic
tribes, law was a tribal possession and therefore personal but in which
the question of recognizing foreign law had not as yet arisen. This phase
is marked by the absence of written law, the dominance of custom and
the popular administration of justice. It coincides with the development
of classical and post-classical Roman law, which even after the Edict of
Caracalla, remained personal and acknowledged the existence and
validity of provincial customs, native traditions and especially vulgar
law side by side with official sources. It may be inferred that the undevel-
oped Germanic customs and the post-classical Roman law converged in
this respect during the critical Age of Invasions in the fifth century.
(2) The establishment of Germanic kingdoms in Italy, Gaul, Spain, and
North Africa reduced the law of the Roman population to the status of
a tolerated personal legislation. Among the Franks, Burgundians, Visi-
goths, and even Ostrogoths a dualistic system was established in which
Romans retained the privilege of their own private law, but in which the
Germanic law undoubtedly enjoyed territorial validity in disputes be-
tween Germans and Romans. (3) The expansion of the Frankish King-
dom and its transformation into a Carolingian empire led to the establish-
ment of a system of private international law replacing the dualistic
arrangement of an earlier period. This change occurred between the
sixth and seventh centuries and reached its climax in the eighth century.
(4) The final stage, which coincided with the decline of the Carolingian
Empire, witnessed the transformation of the personal laws into terri-
torial customs. Emergent feudalism took the place of the older national
laws as the principal influence in legal development.
Evidence of the personal law principle abounds in documents from
the fifth to the eleevnth century and even later. Of the so-called leges
barbarorum, some like the Ripuarian and Lombard codes attest the
practice of the principle; others, like the Salic, Burgundian, and Visi-
gothic collections suggest familiarity with it. The principle lies at the
foundation of the Roman laws of the Visigoths and of the Burgundians,
and it is implicit in the Edict of Theodoric. The Formulae, or legal instru-
ments, and the Capitularies, or royal ordinances, show its operation from
the seventh to the ninth century, as do the Court records. Letters, such
as those of Agobard of Lyons and of Hincmar of Rheims, give us fleeting
glimpses of the system in the ninth century. The treatise of Hincmar,
the De Ordine Palatii, throws light on the relations of the personal laws
to the territorial law in the ninth century. The Exceptiones Petri, a work
12. MCILWAm, THE GROWTH OF POLrIcrAL THOUGHT IN THE WEST 168-170 (1932);
P. Van Wetter, Le Droit Romain et le droit germanique dans la monarchie franque,
Premi"e Parte: La Famile, Paris, 1899, pp. 9-19. The works of Stouff, Brunner, and
Meijers are cited above.
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of the eleventh century, describes the fate of the personality of law in
France at that time, while the Cartularies and the professiones, or pro-
fessions of national law, reveal its wide penetration of legal practice in
Italy during the period of territoriality.18 Some of these sources, especially
the leges barbarorum, are undergoing critical evaluation, and, until
textual and other problems are resolved, these documents must be used
with circumspection.
This study is an attempt to trace the origin, growth, and operation
of the institutions associated with the personal law regime. Although
it deals with aspects of the political thought of the early Middle Ages,
it lies mainly on the border of two disciplines, history and law. This
presents the investigator with a difficulty, as well as a challenge. If the
jurist incurs the criticism of being the victim of excessive fixity of con-
ception, 4 the historian is open to the charge of proliferating facts and
ignoring the mechanism of legal thought. The literature illustrates the
dilemma. If Savigny's treatment, to begin with, systematizes excessively,
it is at least historical to the extent that it seeks to trace origins and
development.' 5 Stouff, whose study remains basic, examines the fate of
legal rules of Roman and Germanic origin but hardly attempts to trace
origins or identify the regions in which changes occurred. The same may
be said of Brunner's classic account, which treats Germanic law en masse
and does not distinguish sufficiently among the various laws. The most
recent legal study, that of Meijers, has the virtue of focus, for it illumi-
nates the links between the Italian Theory of Statutes and the personal
13. Brunner, op. cit. supra note 5, at 427. The standard survey of these materials
remains Brunner, ibid. Brief but current is Buchner, Die Rechtsquellen forming part
of Wattenbach-Levison, Deutschlands Geschichtsquellen im Mittelalter, Vorzeit und Ka-
rolinger, Beiheft, Weimar, (1953). For a brief bibliography concerning research on the
leges, see L. Musset, Les Invasions: Les Vagues Germaniques, Paris, 1965, pp. 278-281.
The leges barbarorum and the leges Romanae barbarorum will be found in the Monu-
menta Germaniae Historica, except for the Lex Romana Visigothorum for which the
edition of Haenel must be consulted (1849) ; and until the edition of the Lex Salica appears
in that collection the editions of Hessels, Behrend, and others must be used. The Anglo-
Saxon laws are edited by F. Liebermann, Die Gestze der Angelsachsen, Halle, 1903-1916.
The latest critical edition of the Lex Ribuaria is in the M. G. H., Lex Ribuaria, Legum
Section I, Legum Nationum Germanicarum, Tomi III Pars II, ed. F. Beyerle and R. Buchner,
Hanover, 1954. The older Sohm edition in the same series retains its utility, however, and
the references in this study are to that edition, but they have been compared with the
Beyerle-Buchner edition and in a few cases the numbering of that edition is included in
parentheses. The Formulae exist in the editions of Zeumer arranged by collection in the
Monumenta, and of Rozihre, arranged by topic. The Capitularies are found in the
Monumenta. The letters, treatises, and cartularies must be sought in scattered editions
though the letter of Agobard to the Emperor Louis may be found in the Monumenta
(Epistolae) and in Migne, Patrologia Latina. The most recent editions of all these works
are listed in Buchner, op. cit. supra note 13, and in REPERTORIUM FoNTirur HISTORIAE
Medii Aevi, I Series Collectionum, Rome, 1962; new edition of first part of A. Potthast,
Bibliotheca Historica Medii Aevi.
14. L. Halphen, Les Barbares 59, 5th edition, Paris, 1948, expressing a view common
among historians.
15. F. C. Savigny, Geschichte des r5mischen Rechts im Mittelalter, 7 vols., 2nd edition,
Heidelberg, 1834-1851, especially Vols. I, II.
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law principle of the earlier age and places the development of modern
private international law in historical perspective.
What perhaps is most important in this study is the fixing of the
frame of reference. For the historian it can be nothing else than the
invasions, viewed as a broad movement of social and political change.
He must not hesitate to utilize the juristic approach but he must never
forget that the personal law system was historically conditioned.
It is obvious that the personality of law is the focus of much general
institutional as well as legal history. Whether we view it from the point
of view of its effect on the survival of Roman law or of its influence on
the development of private international law, including the doctrines of
nationality and territoriality, or consider it in its relation to the origins
of feudalism or its links with constitutional development, we are dealing
with a vital chapter of European cultural history.
II. ORIGIN AND GROWTH
A. The Barbarian Invasions and their Effects
Do the barbarian invasions constitute one of the decisive breaks in
history? If we accept certain theories, the real break in continuity be-
tween the ancient world and the Middle Ages either occurred after the
Arab invasions of the seventh century, or did not occur at all.' If such
a view were accepted it would be difficult to understand the appearance
of the personal law system which in great part was based on a duality of
legal culture. The view that the Roman world did not perish led Fustel
de Coulanges logically to reject the existence of this stage of legal devel-
opment.' The assumption in all that follows is, in the words of Halphen,
that the Germanic Barbarians and their institutions really did count in
the process.8 The personal law regime is the "natural product" of the
period of the invasions.' The invasions must be studied, not in terms of
an "ethnic dilemma," as Germanists and Romanists for a long time
attempted to do, nor as a conflict of classes, as eighteenth-century authors
conceived them, but rather as a meeting of peoples in differing stages of
civilization.'
The Roman society with which the Germanic newcomers, friendly
or otherwise, were thrown into contact, had itself, beginning with the
1. PnIRENN, MOHAMMED & CHARLEMAGNE (N.Y. 1939).
2. Fustel de Coulanges, Nouvelles recherches sur quelques quelques problimes d'histoire,
Paris, 1891, p. 361 ft.
3. L. Halphen, L'Importance historique des grandes invasions," A Travers l'histoire
du moyen age, Paris, 1950, p. 22 ff.
4. Esmein, Histoire du droit franfais, p. 51, note 86.
5. M. Bloch, "Feudalism," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, New York, 1931, VI,
203; and Fustel de Coulanges, Histoire des institutions politiques de l'ancienne France, ed.
C. Jullian, Vol. 2, L'Invasion germanique, Paris, 1904, p. 324.
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third century, undergone great transformation. It had acquired some of
the characteristics of a more primitive social order. Fustel de Coulanges
points to the development of compositions for the settlement of crime.'
There is much to be said for the view that in Gaul old Celtic customs
transformed into a sort of lex loci (local law) in many cases took the
place of Roman law.7 Germanic influences resulted in the development
of new forms of law.8 We must try to picture two societies in different
stages of development existing side by side, but with many points of
similarity between them. The consequence of this, in the words of
Calmette, was, "two necessary and concomitant phenomena, the fusion of
races and the organization of a new regime." 9
Did the Roman population at any stage of the process lose their lib-
erty or their law? Probably no more so than their language, their religion,
or their land."° The survival of the vulgar tongue and of the Catholic
faith, in fact, promoted assimilation. Bilingualism among individuals may
have done the same. As to land, the Visigothic and Burgundian parti-
tions may not have been reenacted among the Franks, but the general
process everywhere can hardly be called an expropriation. No doubt we
must abandon the idea of a wide diffusion of conquerors and make
more allowance for a Germanic peasantry on the villas, but in the main,
demography over the greater part of Gaul remained stable. In regard to
equality of legal status in the initial stages of the conquest, however,
several questions have arisen.
With reference to the Franks, this question has led to the celebrated
controversy between Boulainvilliers, Histoire de l'ancien gouvernement
de la France, 1727, who believed that the Franks enslaved the Gallo-
Roman population, and the Abb6 Dubos, whose Histoire critique de
l'Itablissement de la monarchie fran~aise dans les Gaules, 1734, insisted
that there was no conquest but mainly an amicable settlement. The prin-
cipal objection to the latter position is in the inequality of the wergeld
(monetary composition for murder) of the Frank and the Roman in the
6. Fustel de Coulanges, op. cit. supra, Vol. III, La Monarchie franque, Paris, 1905,
pp. 476-479; and Chfnon, Histoire du droit fran ais, I, 265. For a view that the Germanic
tribes had a greater background of culture, owing partly to association with Rome, see
A. Dopsch, Economic and Social Foundations of European Civilization, tr. Marshall &
Beard, New York, 1937, pp. 15-19, 38, 43, 90.
7. Meijers, loc. cit., p. 568.
8. P. Vinogradoff, Roman Law in Medieval Europe, ed. Zulueta, Oxford, 1929, pp. 2 ff.
9. Joseph Calmette, Le Monde fdodal, (Ser. Clio-Introduction aux dtudes historiques),
Paris, n.d., p. 1.
10. Besides the classic work of Gaupp, Die germanischen Ansiedlungen und Land-
teilungen in den Provinzen des romischen Westreiches, Breslau, 1844; and Brunner, Deutsche
Rechtsgeschichte, I, nos. 8-10; see Esmein, Histoire, p. 45 ff and the following articles of
Marc Bloch: "Observations sur la conqute de la Gaule romaine par les rois francs," Revue
Historique, CLIV (1927), 1, 161-178; "Reliquiae. Les Invasions, occupation du sol et
peuplement," Annales d'histoire sociale, 1945, 13-28; and "Sur les grandes invasions:
quelques positions de problfmes," Revue de synthese historique, t. LX (1940-45), 55-81.
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Salic Law," where the murder of a free Frank is assessed at 200 solidi
(gold coins of Roman origin), and that of a Roman at 100 solidi. The
attempt of Fustel de Coulanges to prove that Romanus (Roman) means
"freedman" in this passage, the freedman's wergeld being only half that
of a freeman's in the Salic Law, has often been refuted.'" Brunner and
others, however, have tried to show that the difference in wergeld was
not based on social inequality, but simply on the fact that in the case of
the Roman, the part of the composition due the sippe (kindred) did not
have to be paid. The murderer paid only the part due the heirs. 3 It is
doubtful whether the difference in wergeld can be treated as an example
of social inequality, nor is it clear that the provision in the Lex Salica
was ever applied.' 4 The Germans and the Gallo-Roman population in the
other kingdoms must have enjoyed similar political rights. The Burgun-
dian law expresses this fact clearly.' 5 Among the Salian Franks, certainly,
the natives had access to most offices. They enjoyed the position of
convivae, or official intimates of the king.'6 The list of the Dukes and
Counts of Auvergne contains more Latin than German names."
The establishment of the Lombards in Italy has also led to much
controversy about the status of the native population. At the beginning it
is generally admitted that the Lombard settlement had a violent char-
acter, and that the Italians were dispossessed of much land and goods.
Savigny,"I however, refused to accept the common view expressed by
11. Lex Salica, XLI, 1, 5, 6, 7, ed. R. Behrend, 2nd edition, Weimar, 1897, pp. 79-81.
For controversy see G. A. Prevost, Revue des questions historiques, July 1879, 1-54.
12. Fustel de Coulanges, Nouvelles recherches sur queiques problimes d'histoire, ed.
C. Jullian, Paris, 1891, pp. 361 if; Histoire des institutions politiques de l'ancienne France,
1st edition, Paris, 1875) p. 482 if; contra, J. J. Thonissen, L'Organisation judiciaire, le
droit pinal et La procedure pinale de la loi salique, 2nd edition, Brussels and Paris, 1882,
p. 557 ff. Chenon discusses Fustel's thesis, Histoire du droit jranvais, I, pp. 347-348. He
points out that the Romanus in Lex Ribuaria, XXXVI (Sohm edition) can only mean
Roman: "3. Si quis Ripuarius advenam Romanum interfecerit, centum solidis multetur."
Nor is it easy to see how Romanus in Lex Salica XIV, 2, 3 can be anything but Roman.
13. H. Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, Vol. I, 2nd edition, pp. 326, 335; Vol. II,
2nd edition, ed. C. von Schwerin, Leipzig, 1928, p. 795 f; R. Schriider, Historische
Zeitschrilt, new series Vol. XLII, p. 194. See also F. Lot, Les Invasions germaniques, Paris,
1935, pp. 195-198. For an excellent criticism of the Brunner-Schriider view see Maurice
Kroell, "Etude sur l'institution des lites en droit franc," Etudes d'histoire juridique offertes
d P. F. Girard, Vol. II, Paris, 1913, p. 199 if; F. Vercauteren, "Le 'Romanus' des sources
franques," Revue beige de philologie et d'histoire, XI, 1932, pp. 77-88. "I1 faut voir simple-
ment dans le Romanus des sources juridiques franques un Gallo-romain." The views of
Stein in Mittheilungen des Oesterreichischen Instituts fiir Geschichtsjorschung, XLIII,
1929, pp. 1-19, "Der Romanus in den frankischen Recbtsquellen." See also Marc Bloch,
"Un pseudo-probl~me: le 'Romanus' des lois franques," pp. 1-11, Revue Historique de
droit franfais et itranger, 1946-1947.
14. Lot, Les Invasions germaniques, p. 195 ff.
15. Leges Burgundionum, Const. X, ed. de Sails, MGH, Leges, T. II, pars I, Hanover,
1892: "Burgundio et Romanus una conditione teneatur."
16. Lex Salica Emendata, XVIII, 6, J. M. Pardessus, Loi salique, Paris, 1843, p. 395.
17. Fustel de Coulanges, L'Invasion germanique, p. 547.
18. F. C. v. Savigny, Geschichte des rdmischen Rechts im Mittelalter, Vol. I, 2nd
edition, Heidelberg, 1834, pp. 118, 119; A. Pertile, Storia del diritto italiano, Vol. I, 2nd
edition, Turin, 1896, pp. 114-116.
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Troya9 and others concerning the fate of the Roman law in Italy during
this period, but depicted the Italians as proprietors enjoying complete
civil rights, regulated by Roman law, and in possession of their municipal
regime.2" The dispute hinges on two passages from Paul the Deacon's
History of the Lombards in which he describes the Lombards as hospites
(soldiers quartered on a private individual) and the Romans as tributarii
(tribute or tax payers).21 But, as Lot points out, the History was written
long after the events recorded, and when the author uses the word
hospites in such an unprecedented sense, can we be sure that he under-
stood the original meaning of the term?22
The words of Paul should not be interpreted in any case to suggest
any such complete expropriation of the Italians as some have suggested.2"
But whether the early Lombard invasions did have the harsh character
ascribed to them by Paul the Deacon, there is little doubt that the rela-
tions of the Lombards with the native population were subsequently
equalized. This new equality is attested by the statement in the laws of
Liutprand that in the preparation of deeds only Roman and Lombard
laws are to be recognized.24
Both in France and Italy as well as in Spain, where the process of
fusion was accelerated, foundations were thus laid for a dual stream of
legal activity and an intermingling of legal institutions and ideas on terms
of equality. Without these conditions it would have been impossible for
the developments that we associate with the personality of law to have
taken place. The Germanic people settled in the midst of a larger Roman
population and faced with a superior system of jurisprudence had little
alternative but to recognize existing legal conditions. This did not mean
19. Della condizione dei Romani, Milan, 1844, par. 288.
20. Controversy summarized in Hodgkin, Italy and her Invaders, Vol. VI, Oxford, 1895,
pp. 587 ff. See especially Alfred von Halban, Das romische Recht in den germanischen
Volksstaaten. Ein Beitrag zur deutchen Rechtsgeschielte, Breslau, II, 1901, p. 1 ff.
21. Paulus Diaconus, De Gestis Langobardorum, II, 32, Heinrich G. Gengler, Ger-
manische Rechtsdenkmiiler, Erlang~n, 1875, p. 518 (selection VI). The standard edition of
Paulus is Historia Langobardorum, ed. L. Bethmann and G. Waitz, MGH, Scriptores Rerum
Langobardorum, Hanover, 1878.
His diebus multi nobillum Romanorum ob cupiditatem interfecti sunt. Reliqui vero
per hospites divisi, ut terciam partem suarum frugum Langobardis persolverent,
tributarii efficiuntur. . . . Populi tamen adgravati per Langobardos hospites
partiuntur.
22. F. Lot, Les Invasions germaniques, Paris, 1935, p. 281.
23. Gabriele Pepe does not believe the Lombards acknowledged the existence of either
the Italians or their law. This is an extreme position. He does admit that the Lombards
adopted Roman private law formalities as revealed in charters containing formulae of
the late Roman law. On the other hand the Roman criminal law ceased entirely to be
observed. Le Moyen Age Barbare en Italie, tr., Paris, 1956, p. 237 ff. A. Pertile, op. cit.
supra note 18, at 61; J. B. Bury, The Invasion of Europe by the Barbarians, 268-271, sum-
marizes Vinogradoif's view expressed in a work published in Russia and containing a view
similar to that in the text. See more recently Francisco Calasso, "II Problema instituzionale
dell' Ordinamento barbabarico in Italia," It Passagio dall' Antichitd al Medioevo in
Occidente, Spoleto, 1962, pp. 57-90.
24. Liutprand, 91, VIII. Leg. Lang., MGH, 80 series, p. 120. See infra note 128.
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that the invaders were prepared to accept the Roman law for themselves,
for potent influences originating in racial and tribal memories perpetuated
differences between the races that long survived the invasions.25 Not the
least of these were legal notions such as that law is immemorial custom, a
possession of the tribe not to be readily shared with strangers. But,
added to the argument of expediency, the same line of reasoning involved
the recognition of the right of the conquered Romans to their own law.
B. Origins
Ever since the problem first attracted attention the origins of the
regime of the personality of law have been the subject of controversy.
The literature on the question goes back to the seventeenth century and
carries us up to recent times. It includes such names as Ducange,
Baluze, Muratori, the Abb Dubos, Montesquieu, Savigny, Waitz,
Schr6der and Brunner, to mention only a few. It would be idle to attempt
an exhaustive repertory of all the literature on the subject for, in one way
or another, it touches one of the most prolific subjects of historical study,
that of the character and consequences of the Barbarian Invasions.
It is possible to trace three or four general answers to the question,
how and where did the system of personal laws originate? The first an-
swer, popular because of its simplicity and because it answered to a deep
rooted sentiment in the nineteenth century, is that the 1principle was
Germanic in origin. The principal exponent of this view, though without
much of its subsequent nationalist adornment, was Montesquieu." Of
the same opinion were several German scholars, notably Waitz and
Dahn, who found evidences of the existence of personality of law under
Ariovistus and Ermanaric.27 The theory was also upheld by Schrider
in his popular manual of German law, though subsequent editions of the
work seemed to modify the statements made in the earlier editions.2"
The second answer to the question of the origin of the principle is
that it was a consequence of the invasion. This was the view of Savigny.
Far from being governed by a principle at the beginning, the barbarian
kings, according to Savigny, faced a condition which they solved in a
practical way. They saw fit to grant personal law rights to the Romans,
and to the Romans alone, at the beginning of their conquest. Savigny
explains the origin of the system as follows:
25. A luminous general account of these contending influences is F. Lot, Les Invasions
germaniques, Paris, 1945, passim, especially Chapters VI-X. Though originally published
before the war and slightly dated in its approach, this still remains a prime synthesis. An
admirable current manual, the first of several volumes dealing with the period of the
barbarian invasion, is L. Musset, Les Invasions, cited above (Nouvelle Clio: L'Histoire
et ses problhmes).
26. Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws, Bk. XXVIII, Chapter 2, tr. T. Nugent, London, 1878.
27. F. Dahn, Die Kdnige der Germanen, Munich, 1861-1911, Vol. VII, 3, p. 2.
28. R. Schr6der, Lehrbuch der deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, 5th ed., Leipzig, 1907, p. 242,
n.12.
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The truth is, that the want of such an institution, and the possi-
bility of introducing it, could occur only after the nations were
blended together in considerable masses. The internal condition
of each kingdom would then produce what could never have
been brought about by mere benevolence towards individual
foreigners.
29
Savigny's view was accepted and modified by Brunner in his note-
worthy Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte.30 Not only did Brunner reject the
Germanic origin of the personal law principle but, going beyond Savigny,
he saw it develop out of the needs of the Frankish Empire. "This system
is certainly not of old German origin. Neither in the Germanic nor the
Frankish period did it apply to strangers from the point of view of
public law."'31 Brunner regarded the principle in its developed form as a
creation of the Frankish monarchy. It was a means of assuring to the
conquering Franks the full recognition of their own laws when they
went amongst their subjects of the empire. In other words, it was really
a system of private international law. Brunner describes the early growth
of the system as follows:
If therefore the principle of the personality of law did not exist
from the beginning in the Frankish Kingdom yet it is possible to
surmise that its development proceeded from the needs and
from the endeavor of the Salian Franks to secure themselves
in the use of their tribal law in the various jurisdictions over
which they had spread out. The resort to the birth law must
then from the point of view of reciprocity have been extended
over all the other tribes.32
A third answer sometimes given to the question is that it was prac-
ticed in Rome before it was taken over by the barbarians for their own
purposes." The principal advocate of Roman continuity has been Fustel
de Coulanges. For Fustel, however, the mixture of races began at once.
8 4
Where others recognized the influence of differences of nationality in the
judicial system of the sixth century, Fustel acknowledged only differ-
ences based on social classes. For him the Roman judicial machinery
29. F. C. von Savigny, Geschichte des r6mischen Rechts im Mittelalter, Vol. I, 2nd
edition, Heidelberg, 1834, pp. 117-119, tr. E. Cathcart, from first edition, Edinburgh, 1829,
pp. 101-102.
30. Vol. I, § 35, pp. 382-399.
31. Brunner, D. R., I, 383-384. For similar views see A. Esmein, Cours Jlementaire
d'histoire du droit franfais, pp. 50-51; J. Brissaud, Manuel d'histoire du droit jran~ais,
p. 55. See, for a modern statement, C. H. Mc ILwAn, GROWTH OF POLITICAL THOUGHT
IN THE WEST 168.
32. Ibid.
33. J. Declareuil, Histoire g~n~rale du droit franfais, Paris, 1925, p. 84: "Ce serait
plutbt un fait romain."
34. L'Invasion germanique, pp. 546-548, and La Monarchie franque, passim.




continued, but in the hands of barbarians and Romans instead of Romans
only, as before the invasion. 6
The mixed Roman and Teutonic origin of the regime of the person-
ality of law is advocated by Chenon.37 Before examining the evidence on
the question a few observations are necessary on the role of "race"
or nationality in law.
Law belongs to the nation or the race and is part of the immemorial
tradition of the group.3 Law in this period deals with individuals only
insofar as they are members of the established groups in society3 9
The popular character of the barbarian laws also, as Thvenin
points out, had certain consequences. In the first place the law of the
tribe was personal.40 It followed the person wherever he traveled or re-
sided. The king himself was subject to this law.4 Being personal the
law under the Frankish Empire demanded the recognition and the respect
of other national groups.
42
Since the laws of the barbarians were personal laws, it would have
been difficult to apply them to the conquered people en masse without
transforming the latter into Germans. Thus, the barbarians were obliged
to recognize the personality of the Roman law, even though they did
not extend this privilege to other barbarian nations. The relatively few
cases in which the invading band found itself confronted with the
problem of extending personality of the law to members of other Ger-
36. Fustel de Coulanges, Recherches sur quelques probl~mes d'histoire, 2nd edition,
Paris, 1894, p. 33 9 ff.; Idem., La Monarchie franque, pp. 406 ff., 417-418.
37. E. Chenon, Histoire gdnirale du droit frangais public et privi des origines a 1815,
1, 123.
38. For a summary of modern views on the nature of the national laws or Volksrechte
see Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, Vol. I, p. 417 ff. An attempt to reconcile the
Germanist and Romanist points of view is contained in Jean P~trau-Gay, La Notion de
"Lex" dans la coutume salienne et ses transformations dans les capitulaires, Grenoble, 1920,
pp. 25, 35 ff. and passim. Idem, Revue Historique de droit fran ais et 9tranger, 4th Series,
Vol. XIV, 1935, pp. 77-83.
39. Henri Klimrath, Travaux sur 'histoire du droit franVais, ed. Warnkoenig, Paris,
1843, Vol. I, p. 353.
40. M. Thbvenin, Lex et Capitula in Bibliothque de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes, Paris,
1878, p. 146.
41. Fredegarius, Epitome of Gregory of Torts, 18 (ed. B. Krusch, MGH, Scriptores,
Hanover, 1888) cited by Th~venin, op. cit. supra note 40, at 147. Ordinatio Imperii A.
817, c. 16 (Capitularia Regum Francorum, ed. A. Boretius, MGH, Leges, Sectio II, Vol. I);
... nobis decedentibus ad annos legitimos iuxta Ribuariam legem nondum pervenisse .... "
42. Th~venin, op. cit. supra note 40, at 148. For what follows concerning possible
incorporation of barbarians among the Franks see Lex Salica Em., XLIII, § 1 cited else-
where. For the Lombards see Paulus Diaconus, De Gest. Lang. I, 13 (Historia Langobar-
dorum, ed. L. Bethmann and G. Waitz, MGH, Scriptores, Hanover, 1878): ............
Igitur Langobardi . . . ut bellatorum possent ampliare numerum, plures a se servile
jugo eruptos, ad libertatis statur perducunt. Utque rata posset haberi libertos,
sanciunt more solito per sagittam immurmurantes nihilominus ob rei firmitatem
quaedam patria verba.
P. Villari, The Barbarian Invasion of Italy, tr., London, 1913, p. 284.
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manic tribes were obviated by the incorporation of the latter in the con-
quering host and their consequent acceptance of the conqueror's law.
The text of the Lex Salica noticed below which speaks of "a Frankish
freeman or a barbarian man who lives by the Salic Law" hints at such a
status. But this must have been exceptional. The case of the 20,000
Saxons to whom, according to Paul the Deacon, the Lombards refused
permission to settle in Italy with their own law-"proprio jure"-proba-
bly illustrates the usual treatment of foreigners.
Law, like religion, was a personal possession. This attitude is found
admirably expressed in the commentary of Carolus de Tocco on the
Lombarda. Carolus in the thirteenth century recognizes the right of a
person to obligate himself solely by his national law.43
When the Teutonic laws speak of a man's lex they describe not
merely the law under which he lives but also his whole social position.44
The word law in the Teutonic laws has a much wider connotation than
does the modem word. That is why, as explained elsewhere, Agobard
was opposed to the Burgundian law. He opposed not merely its practice
of the judicial duel, obnoxious to his refined moral sense, but also the
Arian authorship of the law. 45 Thus the principle of the personality of
law appears as a subjective idea (of the rights of the individual member
of the tribe) rooted in religious conceptions. The tie of law and justice
with religious conceptions is evident in the curious extension in meaning
of the term handgemal to include the sacred meeting place of the do-
manial court as well as the judicial power therein exercised.
What precedents existed in Rome for the practice of the personal
law? In a very important sense the Roman law remained a personal
law to the last days of the Roman Empire.46 The civil law of Rome
43. E. M. Meijers, "L'Histoire des principes fondamentaux du droit international
priv6 & partir du Moyen Age," Recueil des cours, p. 554, quotes the gloss by Carolus, in
Lege, Tuum et iudices (C. 2, 58, 2, f. 39 v.). See also Carolus, in Lombarda II, 34, 11, glossa
excludantur (quoted by Meijers, p. 554): "ius suum cuique tribuere." Leges Longobardorum
cum argutissimis glosis D Caroli de Tocco, Venice, 1537. On Carolus, see Savigny, Geschichte
des rdmischen Rechts im Mittelalter, Vol. V. pp. 174-183. See also Brunner, Deutsche
Rechtsgeschichte, Vol. I, p. 563.
44. Examples in Capitularies: Responsa de rebus Fiscalibus, in Boretius, Capitularia,
MGH, I, p. 297, line 5: "eadem lege defendant." Cap. Miss. Spec., Boretius, Cap. MGH,
I, p. 104, line 35: "secundum legem ... componantur." Boretius, Cap. MGH, I, 201, line 5:
"Contra quem culpavit secundum ipsius legem emendet," etc. For a further extension of
the meaning of lex see the novel thesis of Joseph Balon, Lex iurisdictio-Recherches sur les
assemblies judiciaires et lgislatives, sur les droits et sur les obligations communautaires
dans l'Europe des Francs, 2 vols., Namur, 1960, I, 215, who concludes: Lex means assembly,
deliberative and judicial, and is opposed to power of rex. Origin of dualism of medieval
society is found here. See the index to the Capitularies under lex, and the article "Lex" in
Ducange, Glossarium, in which some confusion between two senses of the word occurs;
see especially "Legem suam componere."
45. Bpistolae Karolini Aevi, t. III, MGH, Berlin, 1899, c. 6, p. 160. Balon, op. cit.
supra note 44, at I, pp. 22-123; II, p. 537.
46. H. D. Hazeltine, Cambridge Medieval History, Vol. V. Cambridge, 1926, p. 699;
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applied only to citizens and excluded foreigners or peregrini from its
application. The Edict of Caracalla47 was a tremendous effort to trans-
form the personal law of Roman citizens into a universal law for the
whole empire,48 but its exact application is a matter of question. Though
it eliminated many brackets from individuals and groups within the em-
pire, it certainly did not put an end completely to distinctions between
citizen and non-citizen.49 The study of this edict by Bickermann has
attempted to trace the link between the conditions in the third century
and the later situation in the Roman Empire. 0 During the third and
following centuries the empire was absorbing large numbers of barbarians
into its military forces on the frontiers. These bands, especially the
laeti (German military colonists), were obviously not treated as Roman
citizen communities. They continued the distinction of peregrini or non-
citizens. They were not subject to Roman law and presumably were
allowed to abide by their own customs wherever they resided. Thus the
first stage of the barbarian settlement marks the last stage of the devel-
opment of Roman law. The Germans became in the fourth and fifth cen-
turies the foreign communities which the failing empire failed to absorb.
It would be outside the purview of this part of the study to treat
the history of the personality of law in the Roman Empire. Such institu-
tions as the ius gentium (law of nations), reciperatio (reciprocal protec-
tion of citizens of two states)," the meddix tuticus (a magistrate) in
Capua,52 autonomia (autonomy) in Termessus," the Jewish privilegia
Buckland and McNair, Roman Law and Common Law, 2nd edition, Cambridge, 1952,
pp. 23-25.
47. Dio Cassius, Roman History, LXXVII, 9; Hist. Aug., Sept. Sev., 1; St. Augustine,
De Civitate Dei 5, 17; Ulpian, Digest 1, 5, 17 (ed. T. Mommsen, Stereotype edition of
Corpus Juris Civilis, Berlin, 1884): "In orbe Romano qui sunt ex constitutione impera-
toris Antonini cives Romani effecti sunt ... 2" The first two writers in the Loeb editions.
48. See note 64 infra.
49. L. Mitteis, Reichsrecht und Volksrecht in den dstlichen Provinzen des R1imischen
Kaisserreichs, Leipzig, 1891, p. 159 ff. For the more recent literature consult among others
Sherwin-White, The Roman Citizenship, Oxford, 1939, p. 223 ff., where the views of
Wilcken, Wilhelm, P. Meyer, and others on the controversial restoration of the Giessen
Papyrus are discussed. The Giessen Papyrus 40 is thus rendered by Sherwin-White, op. cit.
supra at 224: "So I gave to all foreigners in the world Roman citizenship, provided that
the status of all communities remains unchanged, except the dediticii." See also J. Stroux,
Philologus, LXXXVIII, p. 272 if: and A. H. M. Jones, "The Dediticii and the Constitutio
Antoniniana," pp. 127-140 of Studies in Roman Government and Law, New York, 1960.
50. E. Bickermann, Das Edikt des Kaisers Caracalla, Berlin, 1926, pp. 27-34, according
to whom Caracalla proposed to give the citizenship to barbarians ready to serve in the
army, the joederati, but not to the laeti, those settled forcibly on imperial soil.
51. H. F. Jolowicz, Roman Foundations of Modern Law, Oxford, 1957, p. 38: Paul F.
Girard, Histoire de l'organisation judiciaire des Romains, Vol. I, Paris, 1901, p. 99; Polybius,
History, III, 22 (Loeb); and Festus, s. v. "reciperatio," Sexti Pompei Festi De Verborum
Significatu, ed. W. M. Lindsay, Leipzig, 1913.
52. A. H. J. Greenidge, Roman Public Life, London, 1922, p. 304; and Livy, History,
VIII, 14 (Loeb).
53. Lex Antonia de Termessibus, I, tr. E. G. Hardy, Six Roman Laws, Oxford, 1911,
p. 99. Text in C. G. Bruns, Fontes luris Romani Antiqui, 7th edition, by 0. Gradenwitz,
Tilbingen, '1909, p. 93.
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(privileges) ,54 and the role of local usage in the provinces 5 all attest to
some degree of recognition of the principle during the early and classical
periods of legal development. So in a sense do the documents found in
Cyrene some years ago."6
Though the ius gentium, to select one of the leading institutions, had
become a general law applicable to all free persons in "matters of com-
merce," the personal principle, more strictly speaking, "applied especially
to matters of family law and inheritance."5 7 Documents such as the Lex
Rubria concerning the organization of Cisalpine Gaul,58 the orations
of Cicero for Balbus59 and against Verres-the latter with its reference
to the rule of the Rupilian law that if a Roman citizen "makes a claim
on a Sicilian a Sicilian judge is assigned; if a Sicilian makes a claim on
a Roman citizen, a Roman citizen is assigned as a judge" 6°-certainly
offer unmistakable evidence that "though Rome had no perfect system
of private international law" she did have rules for limiting and regulat-
ing conflicts of law, "and this is the vital substance of private interna-
tional law."'"
It is true that the portion of the codes that might have been ex-
pected to deal with conflicts of laws arising from the application of the
personal principle are missing. But considerable attention is given in
these writings to conflicts of jurisdiction.6 2
Curious evidence of the way in which the later Roman Empire
allowed the practice of foreign laws within its borders is contained in
the statement of Bishop Theodoret of Cyrus.6 Theodoret in the fifth
century lists some of the peoples who insisted on abiding by their own
systems of law. 4 When the Germanic invaders settled in the empire they
54. Jean Juster, Les Juijs dans L'empire romain, leur condition juridique, 9conomique
et sociale, Paris, 1914, I, 213; S. L. Guterman, Religious Toleration and Persecution in
Ancient Rome, London, 1951, p. 108 ff. See Josephus, Antiquities, XIV, X, 17.
55. J. Gilson, L'Etude du droit romain comparg aux autres droits de l'antiquiti, Paris,
1899, p. 181; and F. Schulz, Principles of Roman Law, tr. M. Wolff, Oxford, 1936, pp. 14-16,
for a recent statement.
56. G. Oliverio, Notizziario archaeologico, fasc. IV, 1927, pp. 13-67; A. N. Sherwin-
White, The Roman Citizenship, p. 212; J. Anderson, "The Augustan Edicts from Cyrene,"
Journal of Roman Studies, 1927, Vol. 17, p. 39.
57. Jolowicz, Roman Foundations, pp. 38-39.
58. Greenidge, op. cit. supra note 52, at 314. Text in Bruns-Gradenwitz, Fontes, p. 97 ff.
59. Pro Balbo 8, 21 (Loeb); Greenidge, op. cit. supra note 52, at 308.
60. Cicero, Actionis in C. Verrem Secundae Liber Secundus, 13, Opera, eds. J. G. Barter
and C. L. Kayser, Vol. III, Leipzig, 1861, p. 178.
61. Coleman Phillipson, The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and
Rome, London, 1911, Vol. I, p. 301; Mitteis, Reichsrecht und Volksrecht, p. 123, denies the
existence of such rules; Schinbauer, "Studien zum personalitiits prinzip in antiken Reschte,"
Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung fiir Rechtsgeschichte, Romanistische Abteilung, XLIX,
pp. 345-403, admits the application of personal law principles within limits.
62. Jolowicz, op. cit. supra note 57, at 39.
63. Written in 437.
64. Theodoreti Episcopi Cyrensis Graecarum Affectionum Curatio, ed. T. Gaisford,
Oxford, 1839, ninth discourse, p. 341. " . . . nor a great many other barbarian peoples,
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may have been able to regulate their relations with the Roman provin-
cials to a certain extent on the basis of similar arrangements. An example
of such influence may be contained in an interesting, if anachronistic,
account of the continuance of Roman law under the barbarians given by
Procopius. The latter describes the fate of Roman auxiliaries who were
cut off by the barbarian invaders from direct contact with the Roman
government and who were able to secure from the barbarian leaders the
right to practice their own laws. 5
In addition, the Roman vulgar law of the later empire marked a
first step toward the accommodation with the barbarian custom.
66 Vulgar
law is defined by Levy as "the generic term . . . which comprises all
those rules or concepts appearing on Roman soil, especially in the inter-
vening period, which differ from the classical system and yet cannot be
traced to some positive enactment."67 Vulgar law was governed by social
and economic rather than merely legal considerations, and it penetrated
legislation as well as practice.6" Its influence is revealed especially in the
Interpretatio (commentary) of the Breviary (Roman code of Alaric II,
506).69 Its significance for an understanding of the law of the Germanic
kingdoms is immense, for "the Roman law adopted in [these kingdoms]
was at first everywhere the vulgar law. And such 'receptions' appear,
though in different degrees, in the laws of the Goths and the Burgundians,
the Franks as well as the Lombards."7 The infusion of Germanic ideas
in the vulgar law produced new rules in such areas as "the law of persons,
domestic relations and succession....
Under the Frankish Empire the only person who could enjoy the
possession of his own national law was one who was socially free and
belonged to one of the established national groups. The position of the
stranger did not at first fit into this political and legal scheme.
72 The
though the domination of the Romans has been accepted, use any Roman laws in their
own compacts." See also JoNEs, TnE LATER ROMAN EMPIRE 284-602, A SOCIAL, ECONOMIC
AND ADMINISTRATIVE SURVEY, (1964). See especially Vol. I, pp. 470-522, chapter on "Justice."
65. Procopius, History of the Wars, Book V, corresponding with Book I of the Gothic
War, ch. XII (Procopius, tr. H. B. Dewing, in Loeb Library, London, 1919, Vol. III,
pp. 121, 123). See, however, F. Lot, "La conqute du pays d'entre Seine-et-Loire par les
Francs:-La ligue Armoricaine et les destindes du Duch6 du Maine," Revue historique,
Vol. CLXV, 1930, pp. 241-253. Passage of Procopius is treated on pages 244-245. Whole
text from which the passage is taken is unreliable in affirming presence of Roman troops
defending extremities of Gaul in time of Clovis. See further, R. Latouche, Les Grandes
invasions et la crise de l'occident au Ve siacle, Paris, 1946, pp. 154-157.
66. Jean Gaudemet, La Formation du droit seculier et du droit de l'eglise aux IV
O et
Ve siecles, Paris, 1957; Idem, "A Propos du 'droit vulgaire,'" Studi in onore di Biondo
Biondi, Vol. 1, Milan, 1963, p. 271-300.
67. E. Levy, West Roman Vulgar Law-The Law of Property, Philadelphia, 1951, p. 6.
68. Id. at 7.
69. Ibid.
70. Id. at 15.
71. Ibid.
72. Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, Vol. I, pp. 399 ff.; Klimrath, Travaux sur
l'histoire du droit franfais, Vol. I, p. 405.
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society revealed in the early laws of the barbarians possessed no ma-
chinery such as the Roman praetorship for dealing with foreigners or
strangers.73 But as the power of kingship increased a new instrument of
legal development began to operate, namely, the judicial power of the
king. This extension of royal influence is revealed in the new status ac-
corded to the stranger in Lombard law. The stranger, or wargangus, was
very much like an outlaw unless he had placed himself under the protec-
tion of a patron who was in the enjoyment of full political and legal
rights. As time went on, the king took the stranger under his protection
if the newcomer had not chosen another patron. This process can be
clearly seen in the law of Rothari:
All the Gargangi or Wargangi, that is strangers who come
from afar to settle in our kingdom under the protection of the
royal safeguard, ought to live according to the Lombard law
unless they have obtained the royal permission to live according
to their national laws. If they leave legitimate children, these
shall inherit like the legitimate children of Lombards; if they
do not have legitimate children they shall not be able without
the royal permission to make a will in favor of anyone they
wish, nor to alienate their goods under any title whatsoever.74
Because of the protection accorded the stranger the former's composi-
tion was paid to his patron or sometimes to the treasury of the king.
75
Royal ordinances make a duty of the practice of hospitality. The law
of the Burgundians, for example, assesses damages against anyone who
has refused shelter to the stranger.76
The Jews in the Frankish Empire were also in the position of
strangers enjoying limited rights by the consent of the king in whose
protection they were. They were under the control of a special function-
ary called the magister iudaeorum (magistrate for Jews) from the time of
Louis the Pious.
77
73. Were foreigners "rechtlos"? (Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, I, p. 399). In
theory perhaps, but in actual practice, as a study of all the references reveals, no. See Eduard
Meyer, Geschichte des Altertums, Vol. I, 5th edition, Stuttgart and Berlin, 1925, sections
33, 34. The major references are collected by G. A. Davoud-Oghlou, Histoire de la legislation
des anciens Germains, Berlin, 1845, vol. I, p. CVI, and section "U,, for each of the barbarian
laws examined, vols. I and II.
74. Edictus Rothari, 367, Leges Langobardorum, MGH, edition in 80 by Blubme,
p. 68: ". . . legibus nostris langobardorum vivere debeant, nisi si aliam legem ad pietatem
nostram meruerint .... "
75. Examples in the laws of the Bavarians and Alamanni: Lex Baiwariorum, IV,
XXXII, ed. Heymann, MGH, pp. 336-337; Leges Alamannorum, VCVII, 2 (E. Codd. A),
XCIX, 25 (E. Codd. B), ed. Karl Lehmann, MGH, Hanover, 1888, p. 156.
76. Leg. Burg., XXXVIII, 1, ed. de Sais, MGH, p. 69.
77. SoLomoN KATZ, THE JEWS IN TIE VsIoorHIc AND FRANiKISH KINGDOMS OF SPAIN
AND GAUL 83-84. The position of the Jews under the personal law system will be examined
more fully in a note in the chapter dealing with the determination of a person's national law.
For what follows see Balon, Lex Jurisdictio, II, notes 78, 198, 397, 623, 857.
[VOL. XXI
PERSONALITY OF LAW
In our examination of the provisions of the various leges barbarorum
in regard to strangers, we must realize that we are dealing with privileges.
The notion of a legal privilege existed among the barbarian peoples as
well as among the Romans and it is by way of such legal privileges that
precedents were often set for later extensions of legal rights. What was
originally a grant to an individual could eventually become the basis of a
national right.
C. Dualistic Systems
Though the principle of the personality of law existed inchoately
among the early Germans in the sense in which we have just defined it, it
would have been difficult for any system of private international law to
develop in this period. If we take the example of Rome, we find that
the distinction between civil law and the law of nations was applied
by regular magistrates with some legal training. Among the barbarian
kingdoms, the only machinery that might have carried out a policy based
upon principles of private international law was the possession of
the conquered population. We know that the notarial practice among
barbarians and Romans from the fifth to the eighth centuries was domi-
nated by Romans or persons who had some training in the forms of
Roman law.7" One of the best examples of this type of Roman influence
on Germanic law is the formulary of Marculf prepared in the region of
Paris probably in the seventh century.5
At the outset there was only one personal law, that of the Romans.
The first evidence exists in the preface to the Roman Law of the Visi-
goths which expressly recognizes the legal rights of the Roman subjects
in the Visigothic realm. 0 How extensive a jurisdiction did the Romans
enjoy under the Visigoths? The Breviary and its Interpretatio are the
only documents that can enlighten us on this question and much is dis-
puted as to their application. The Interpretatio does not appear to have
been the work of the commissioners of Alaric, as Savigny believed, and,
therefore, could not incorporate modifications of the Roman municipal
and judicial organization introduced by the Goths in the early sixth
century.' Nevertheless, when due allowance is made for antiquarian
78. L. Stouff, "Etude sur le principe de la personnaliti des lois depuis les invasions
barbares jusqu'au XIIe sicle," Revue bourguignonne de l'enseignement sup4rieur, IV, 1894,
8-10.
79. H. Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, Vol. I, p. 579. The formulary is strongly
Germanic but shows Roman influence. See below.
80. Commonitorium, Lex Romana Visigothorum, ed. G. Haenel, Leipzig, 1849, p. 3.
"Providere ergo te convenit, ut in foro tuo nulla alla lex neque iuris formula proferri
vel recipi praesumatur."
81. F. von Savigny, Geschichte des r6dnischen Rechts im Mittelalter, Vol. I, p. 301 ff.;
followed by T. Mommsen, Preface to Codex Theodosianus, Berlin, 1905; by M. Conrat,
Die Entstehung des westgotischen Gaius, Amsterdam, 1905, Sec. 12; idem, Der Westgotische
Paulus, Amsterdam, 1907, Sec. 14. The view of the text is based on Brunner, Deutsche
Rechtsgeschichte, Vol. I, p. 514, and Brissaud, Manuel d'histoire du droit franvais, pp. 69-70.
For a more recent summation see Chenon, Histoire du droit franCais, I, pp. 224-226.
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elements in the code it seems safe to agree with Savigny that in matters
of public law the code contains less that is obsolescent than in matters of
private law.8" Even if we do not grant Savigny's view that the decurions
of the cities exercised greater power under the Visigoths than under
the empire,8" it appears that the Roman municipal and judicial machinery
continued to operate in the cities.
How much actual Roman jurisdiction do these continuing institu-
tions denote? They signify a more extensive application of Roman law
doctrines to Romans than in any other barbarian kingdom. The term
iudex (judge), for example, when used of a city, according to Savigny,
refers to the duumvir (a magistrate) or defensor s4 Petty crimes are
inferentially left to their jurisdiction. 5 Civil suits may be tried before the
governor of the province or any court of record, the latter including
the dejensor86 The old restitutio integri (reinstatement in former legal
position) of the praetor continues but is now vested in the municipal
iudices (judges).87 Adoption, 8 the making of wills' and donations 0
fall within the competence of curia (municipal council) and decurions
(members of council). Appellate rights of the Romans are retained.9'
Finally the text of the code decreeing that criminal charges against a
senator must be heard before five other senators is transformed in the
Interpretatio into a similar grant of trial by nobiles (members of the
ruling class) .92 In all these cases jurisdiction is exercised jointly by
governor and by municipal officials. The judicial organization is thus
partly Gothic and partly Roman, but how far Gothic and how far Roman
remains a problem.
In brief, under the Visigoths the Romans enjoyed the benefit of
Roman law among themselves in civil cases and to a limited extent in
criminal matters. In lawsuits between Romans and Goths, as well as in
cases of homicide, it appears that Gothic law was employed.9'
82. Savigny, op. cit. supra note 81, at Vol. I, pp. 301-302.
83. Id. at 303-305.
84. Savigny, op. cit. supra note 81, at Vol. I, p. 303. See the Interpretatio to Paul I,
7, 2 (Lex Romana Visigothorum, ed. Haenel).
85. Inter. Cod. Th., II, 1, 8 (Haenel, pp. 32-34); "... ad mediocres iudices . . . id est,
aut defensores aut assertores pads."
86 Inter. Cod. Th., 11, 4, 2 (Haenel, p. 36).
87. Inter Paul, I, 7, sec. 2 (cited supra).
88. Inter Cod. Th., V, 1, 2 (Haenel, p. 136): "... adoptivum id est gestis ante curiam
affillatumn."
89. Inter. Cod. Th., IV, 4, 4 (Haenel, p. 106): "Testamenta omnia . . . apud curiae
viros."
90. Cod. Th., VIII, V, i (Haenel, p. 156): "Apud Iudicem vel Magistratus." Inter. Cod.
Th., VIII, V. 1 (Haenel, p. 156): "Aut apud iudicem, aut apud curiarn."
91. Inter Cod. Th., II, 1, 6 (Haenel, p. 32).
92. Cod. Th., II, 1, 12 (L. Rom. Vis., Haenel, p. 34).
93. Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, Vol. I, p. 384; M. A. v. Bethmann-Hollweg,
Der Civilprozess des gemeinen Rechts in geschichtlichen Entwickelung, Bonn, 1864-1874,
Vol. IV, pp. 194, 332; K. Zeuner, Neues Archly der Gesellschajt Alr ailtere deutsche
Geschichtskunde, Hanover, Vol. XXJII, p. 471.
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A second document is the introduction to the Burgundian law of
the year 500, which recognizes two categories of legal subjects, Romans
and Burgundians.94
Of special interest to the student is the Roman law of the Burgun-
dians known through the error of a copyist as the Papian.5 The first
thirty-six titles follow the order of the Lex Gundobada, the rest do not.
Many titles of the Burgundian code are therefore not found in the
Papian.96 On a few matters on which the Roman law is silent the Papian
invokes the authority of the Germanic law, as in the case of composition
of a Roman: "Quia de pretio occisorum nihil evidenter lex Romana
constituit" (Because the Roman law makes no provision for payments
in satisfaction of homicide)." The existence of the Papian proves in a
marked way the acceptance of the dual personal law system among the
Burgundians while also suggesting limits to the application of the Roman
law to Romans.
Did the Romans enjoy a separate court system under the Burgun-
dians? It seems not, although there is a hint in the Papian that certain
provisions of the Roman criminal law were applied to Romans. The
Burgundian law was also enforced in cases arising between Romans
and Burgundians, but with assessors of both nationalites on the tribu-
nal.
98
94. For the date of the code see Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, Vol. I, pp. 497 ff.
and Brissaud, Manuel, pp. 82-83. Though much question is raised by the occurrence of the
name of Sigismund in the code, the major part of the code belongs to Gundobad. The two
prefaces, as Brissaud points out (Manuel, p. 82, n. 4) really form one with later inter-
polations by Sigismund. See especially A. Coville, Recherches sur l'histoire de Lyon du V"'e
sikcle au IXme si~cle (450-800), Paris, 1928, p. 193; Leges Burgundionum, Prima Constitutio,
3, ed. L. De Salis, MGH, Hanover, 1892, p. 31; L. Burg., Prim. Const., 5, MGH, pp. 31-32;
L. Burg., Prim. Const., 8, MGH, p. 32. The other references to Romans in the Prima Consti-
tutio are No. 11, MGH, p. 33: "Si quis sane iudicum, tam barbarus quam Romanus . . .";
and L. Burg., Prim. Const., 13, MGH, p. 33: ". . . vel Romanus comes vel Burgundio .... "
95. Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, Vol. I, p. 506; Coville, op. cit., pp. 198-199. It
is not a collection of constitutions. The best critical account is now, W. Roels, Onderzoek
naar het gebruik van de aangehaalde bronnen van Romeins Recht in de Lex romana
Burgundionum, Antwerp, 1958. See note 98 below.
96. Ibid.
97. Lex Romana Burgundionum, II, 2, 3, ed. De Sais, MGH.
98. These conclusions will emerge from the following provisions in the Leges Burgun-
dionum; Const., VIII, 1, ed. De Salis, MGH, p. 49; Const., XXXVIII, 5, ed. De Sais, MGH,
p. 70; Const., XXVIII, 1, ed. De Salis, MGH, p. 65; Const., XV, 1, ed. De Sais, MGH, p.
54; Const., XIII, ed. De Salis, MGH, p. 52; Const., X, 1, ed. De Sais, MGH, p. 50; and
Const., IX, ed. De Sais, MGH, p. 50. In matters of private law involving Romans, Roman
law was applied. Was Roman law also applied in criminal questions? Probably not. Delicts
or torts may very well, however, have been settled by Roman law. In all cases between
Burgundians and Romans there seems little doubt that the Roman law gave way to
Burgundian law. See also Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, Vol. I, pp. 383-384. Neverthe-
less, the Roman law became the valid territorial law in cases involving lands held by
Burgundians iure hospitalitatis. See Const. LV of the Burgundian code and the comment
on it by E. T. Gaupp, Die germanische Ansiedlungen und Landtheilungen in den Provinzen
des rimischen Westreiches, Breslau, 1844, p. 360 ff. Were there separate judges for Romans
and Burgundians? Coville, Recherches, pp. 216-217 seems to believe so, at least in Lyon.
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Recent attempts to deny the existence of personality or to antedate
the advent of territoriality among Burgundians and Visigoths, by throw-
ing into question accepted views concerning the barbarian and Roman
codes in these kingdoms, must be regarded as challenging but as yet
unproved theories.
Whatever the relations of the Franks originally to the Roman Em-
pire, when they began their conquest of southern Gaul under Clovis,
they did so as representatives of Catholic Christianity and as enemies
of the Arian kingdoms. They recognized the legal rights of their Roman
subjects at least in the south, though they never issued a separate code
for them, as did the Visigothic and Burgundian rulers. In its treatment
of persons and the orders of society the Salic law99 shows the influence
of the Roman environment and the acceptance of the principle of the
personal law in its dualistic form.100 The composition of the Roman
is stated and the amount determined as a fraction of that of the Frank.'01
A number of the provisions of the code deal with social classes among
the Roman as well as Frank population.
One of the provisions of the Salic law bearing on the status of
persons is the one which speaks of a "Salian Frank or a barbarian who
lives by the Salic law.' 0 2 A host of conflicting deductions and construc-
tions have appeared based on this portion of the text. Does the text
mean to include under the head of those who lived by the Salic law other
For what follows see MUSSET, LES INVASIONS, p. 280. A Garcia Gallo, "Nacionalidad y
territorialidad del derecho" Anuario de historia del derecho espafiol, XIII, 1936-41, pp. 168-
264, argues for territoriality under Leovigild (570-580). Alvaro d'Ours, Estudios visigoticos:
II. El cddigo de Eurico, Madrid, 1960, regards the Code of Euric (if there was one) as
territorial and also as an example of Roman vulgar law later Germanized. Similar attempts,
notably by Roels, op. cit. supra note 95, to transform the Papian into a privately issued
work, and to emphasize more strongly than heretofore the territorial character of the Lex
Burgundionum are examined in a review by G. Chevrier, Bibliothaque de l'Ecole des
Chartes, Paris, 1960, pp. 206-209. The radical views of Simon Stein with regard to Lex
Salica were introduced to American readers in an article, "Lex Saica," in Speculum, XXII,
nos. 2, 3 (1947), pp. 113-134, 395-418. Stein's conclusion that the Lex Salica (as we have it)
is a forgery of the ninth century has not gained adherents. Stein's work and, for that matter
the critical handling of the Visigothic and Burgundian codes noted above, underline, it seems
to the author, the need to distinguish more strongly between the oral tradition that really
constitutes each of the barbarian laws and the written compilations that bear the names of
these national customs. The latter depend on a more or less fallible manuscript tradition, the
former must be reconstructed with the help of charters, formulae and other documents, as
well as critically acceptable texts of the leges barbarorum.
99. J. H. Hessels, Lex Salica, the Ten Texts with the Glosses and the Lex Emendata,
London, 1880, col. XIV ff.
100. Buchner, Rechtsquellen, pp. 15-21 for a recent statement; Savigny, Rom. Recht in
Mittelalter, Vol. I, p. 122.
101. Lex Salica, XIV, 1, 2, 3 (ed. Behrend, 2nd edition, Weimar, 1897, pp. 26-27);
XXXIX, 2, 3 (ed. Behrend, pp. 72-73); XLI, 1, 5, 6, 7 (ed. Behrend, pp. 79-81); XLII, 3, 4
(ed. Behrend, pp. 84-85). J. J. Thonissen, L'Organisation judiciaire, le droit pinale et la
procidure pinal de la loi salique, 2nd edition, Brussels and Paris, 1882, p. 91.
102. Lex Salica XLI, 1, (ed. Behrend, p. 79), Hessels, Lex Salica, Cod. I, col. 244: "Si
quis ingenuo Franco aut barbarum qui legem Salicam vivit occiderit, cui fuerit adprobatum
8000 dinarios qui faciunt solidos 200, culpabilis iudicetur."
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Germans who were settled in the Frankish dominion? The explanation
given by Sohm and Thonissen, that the conjunction "or," the Latin aut,
is a tautology characteristic of the style of the Salic law and its continua-
tions, resolves this question, but hardly in a manner that will satisfy all
inquirers.1 3 The Herold text adds to the perplexities of the Salic text." 4
One manuscript reading of the same provision speaks of "a Frank, a bar-
barian or one who lives under the Salic law."1°' In this passage an addi-
tional aut appears to complicate the interpretation of the text. The infer-
ence drawn from this text by Montesquieu and others was that Romans
were allowed to assume the Salic law if they wished and that conse-
quently not two but several groups enjoyed personal law rights.'0 6 The
manuscript reading in this case must be regarded as an aberration.
Pardessus attributed the extra conjunction in this text to the slip of a
copyist's pen.0
Consequently, it is safe to say that the Salic law recognizes only two
groups for purpose of determination of the wergeld or composition, the
Franks and the Romans.
0 8
Another confirmation of the dual system in which the Romans alone
enjoyed personal law rights is the constitution of Clothar II (584-629)
which contains express provision for the settlement of legal cases among
the Romans by Roman law. 1 9 "Inter Romanos negotia causarum romanis
legibus praecepemus terminari" (We decree that litigation among
Romans be settled by the Roman laws)."o
103 R. Sohm, Die altdeutsche Reichs-und Gerichtsverfassung, Vol. I, Die frinkische
Reichs-und Gerichtsverjassung, Weimar, 1871, p. 570 ff.; Thonissen, op. cit. supra note 101,
at 134-138. Professor Ganshof, in a comment on this passage, does not regard it as a tautology.
104. Herold, Originum ac Germanicarum Antiquitatum libri, Basel, 1557, gives a text of
Lex Salica which forms the third appendix of Pardessus, Loi salique and the tenth text of
Hessels. The MS or MSS from which Herold worked are lost. See cols. XXI-XXII of Hessels'
work.
105. Text in Pardessus, Loi salique, p. 249; Hessels, Lex Salica, col. 250; Pactus Legis
Salicae, XLIV, De Homicidiis Ingenuorum, "Si quis ingenuus Franco, aut Barbarum, aut
hominem qui Salica lege vivit, occiderit, Malb. leudi, VIII M Denarios qui faciunt solidos
CC culpabilis iudicetur."
106. Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, XXVIII, ch. IV.
107. Pardessus, op. cit. supra note 105, at 444.
108. Professor Ganshof comments on this passage: "Conclusion is right but this does not
permit one to conclude that only romani enjoyed personal law rights. The Lex Salica is not a
complete code. The Constitution of Clothar deals with definite cases."
109. The praeceptio is put in the reign of Clothar II rather than Clothar I by Boretius,
Capitularia Regum Francorum, MGH, Vol. I, p. 18; G. Waitz, Deutsche Verjassungsgeschichte,
Kiel and Berlin, 1880 ff., Vol. II, 2nd edition, p. 683, and E. Loening, Geschichte des deutschen
Kirchenrechts, Vol. II, Strassburg, 1878, p. 269. The authorship of Clothar I is maintained by
P. Roth, Geschichte des Benejlzialwesens von den dltesten Zeiten bis ins zehnte Jahrhundert,
Erlangen, 1850, p. 224; and by M. Bloch, "Observations sur la conqu~te de la Gaule romaine
pas les rois francs," Revue Historique, CLIV (1927), 166 ff.
110. Chlotharii II Praeceptio, Boretius, Capitularia Regum Francorum, MGH, Vol. I,
p. 19, c. 4. Before the subject is dismissed mention should also be made of Lex Salica, XLVII
which in a rubric, "De Filtortis Qui Lege Salica Vivunt," Hessels, Lex Salica, London, 1880,
cod. 4, col. 301, suggests that some persons, presumably Romans, did not live by the Salic
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What type of legal questions could thus be settled by Roman law?
The edict as well as the Salic Law itself do not indicate whether the
Romans enjoyed a criminal in addition to a civil jurisdiction among them-
selves. I am inclined to agree with Pardessus that the "negotia causarum"
included only civil cases and that criminal matters along with all cases
arising between Franks and Romans were settled by Frankish law."1
The robbery of a Frank even by a Roman, for example, was punished
in the Frankish law according to Salic law.112 The Frank, however, who
robbed a Roman did not pay as large a sum as the Roman who robbed
a Frank.118 Thus, the Romans were subjected, for certain purposes, to
the Salic law.
The Edict of Theodoric in Italy, issued around the year 500, applied
to Goths and Romans." 4 The Edict has given rise to many questions con-
law, van Wetter, Droit roman et droit germanique dans la monarchie franque, Paris, 1899,
part I, p. 10, note.
Ill. Pardessus, Loi Salique, p. 446 cites titles XV (De homicidiis vel si quis uxorem
alienam tulerit) and XLII (De Homicidio in contubernio facto) and XLIII (De homicidio
in contubernio ... facto) to prove the application of Salic law to Romans in matters of
composition.-Lex Sal., XV (Pardessus, p. 10; Hessels, col. 91): "Si quis hominem ingenuum
occiderit aut uxorem alienam tulerit a vivo marito, mal. leudardi, hoc est VIII M din., qui
faciunt Solidos CC culpabilis iudicetur."--Lex Sal., XLII, 4 (Pardessus, p. 23; Hessels, col.
262): "De Romanis vero vel letis et pueris haec lex superius compraehensa ex medietate
solvantur."
How about a crime committed by a Roman against a Roman? Pardessus, p. 447, cites
the MS. Wolfenbiittel, title XVI, 3, which imposes on the Roman defendant non-Roman
procedure, i.e., justification by oath-helpers or by proof of boiling water and, if guilty,
prescribes a composition of XXX solidi; Lex Salica (Wolf. MS.), XVI, 3 (Pardessus, p. 167,
Hessels, cod. 2, col. 92): "Si Romanus hoc Romanum admiserit et certa probacio non fuerit
per XX se iuratores exsolbat medius tamen electus; se iuratoris invenire non potuerit tunc
ad inium ambulit, hoc dicunt MaIb. leodecal, sunt dinarius MCC, fadunt solidos XXX
culpabilis iudicetur." Cf. Lex Sal. (Wolf. MS), XIV, 2 (Pardessus, p. 166; Hessels, cod. 2,
col. 83): "Si vero romanum franco saligo expoliaverit, et certa non fuerit per XXV se
iuratores exsolbat, medius tamen electus; se iuratores non potuerit invenire, Malb. murdo,
aut ad inium ambulat, aut MMD dinarius, qui faciunt solidos LXII, culpabilis iudicitur."
See Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, Vol. I, p. 384, and note 7. In the light of this
evidence it is difficult to agree with the view that, in the sixth century at least, the Romans
enjoyed a separate criminal jurisdiction under the Franks or indeed that Roman law was
ever applied in relations between Franks and Romans, as Schridder has tried to argue,
Historische Zeitschri/t, XLII, pp. 194, 195.
Pardessus, pp. 447-448 also compares title VII, 2 with title XI, 9 of Capita extravagantia
to prove that outside the field of civil law proper the Romans were subject to Salic law;
Cap. Ex., VII, 2 De muliere vidua qui se ad alium maritum donare voluerit (Pardessus,
p. 331): "De puellas militurias vel litas haec lex medietate servetur." Question of civil law;
therefore, no mention of Romans. Cap. Ex., XI, 9, De muliere cesa vel excapilata (Pardessus,
p. 334): "Haec lex de militunias vel letas Romanas in medietate convenit observare." Ques-
tion of composition, i.e., criminal law; therefore, mention of Romans.
112. Lex Sal., XLI (Behrend, p. 79; Hessels, col. 244): "Si quis ingenuo franco . ..
occiderit ... solidos CC culpabilis iudicetur."
113. Lex Sal., XLI, 6 (Behrend, pp. 80-81; Hessels, col. 253): "Si vero Romano
possessorem ... qui eum occiderit .. .solidos C culpabilis iudicetur."
114. Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, Vol. I, pp. 526 ff. For the date, p. 527. On the
Ostrogothic king's ius edicendi as opposed to the legislative power of the emperor, see
T. Mommsen, Ostogothische St'udien, (Ges. Schriften, VI, 457 ff. 459, 476 ff.)
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cerning its sphere of operation." 5 Some authors have been unable to
believe that the Goths gave up their national customs in order to accept
the Roman law. Others have tried to interpret the code in such a way as
to make it apply only in litigation between Italians and Goths. Yet the
text of the code itself says, "Quae barbari Romanique sequi debeant"
(which barbarians and Romans should follow)."' Did the Goths remain
subject to their own customs in matters that the Edict did not regulate?
"The code, however, touches on all branches of law. How can one sup-
pose under this arrangement the contradictory authority of Roman law
and of Gothic customs?"" 7 The Variae of Cassiodorus as well as the
code itself furnish evidence on this question.
The prologue of the Edictum Theoderici, after speaking of complaints
brought to the ears of the government that the "precepts of the laws were
trampled under foot," ordains "what course Barbarians and Romans
ought to pursue in respect of the several articles here set forth.""' The
"edicts" mentioned in this passage are designed to settle disputes arising
between Romans and barbarians; the law in such cases is common to both
peoples. But other laws already existing, i.e., Roman and Gothic, are infer-
entially not barred if they do not invalidate the provisions of the Edict.
The epilogue of the Edictum supports this inference by affirming that
"those cases which either the brevity of the Edict or our public cares have
not allowed us to comprehend in the foregoing must be terminated when
they arise by the regular course of the laws."" 9 If any confirmation were
necessary of the dualistic nature of the Gothic legal provisions found in
the code of Theodoric, it can be found in several letters of Cassiodorus.
In one of them Cassiodorus asserts the existence of a law "common to
Goths and Roman"; -"Gothis Romanisque apud nos ius esse com-
mune."'
20
Another letter of Cassiodorus containing the formula of investment
of the Gothic count prescribes that in "contests between two Goths" the
edicts are to be invoked, but that "if any matter should arise between a
Goth and a born Roman, he (the count) may, after associating with
himself a Roman jurisconsult, decide the strife by fair reason. As between
two Romans the decision is to rest with Roman examiners (cognitores)."
115. On the Edictum Theoderici and the various theories as to its application see Pertile,
Storia del diritto italiano, Vol. I, 2nd edition, pp. 122-123; Savigny, Rom. Recht im
Mittelalter, Vol. I, 2nd edition, p. 336 ff.; Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, Vol. I, p. 525
ft., and Calisse, in General Survey of Events, Sources, Persons and Movements in Continental
Legal History, p. 10 ff.
116. Edictum Theoderici, Prologus, ed. F. Bluhme, MGH, p. 152.
117. L. De Valroger, "Les Barbares et leurs lois," Revue critique de ligislation et de
jurisprudence, XXIX, 1866, p. 440.
118. Edictum Theoderici, Prologus, ed. Bluhmne, MGH, p. 152.
119. Ed. Theod., 155 (Epilogus), MGH, p. 168.
120. Cassiodorus, Variae, VIII, 3; Cassiodori Senatoris Variae, ed. T. Mommsen, MGH,
Auctores Antiquissimi, tomnus XII, Berlin, 1894, p. 234 (Patrologia Latina, LXIX, col. 736).
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The letter then concludes with the wish "that each [people] may keep
its own laws and with various judges one justice may embrace the whole
realm-una justicia complectatur universos."''I Still another letter sent
in the name of King Athalaric to the Count of Syracuse warns the latter
against citing "causes between two Romans" before his tribunal against
their will.1'2
The following conclusions concerning the Ostrogothic legal system
appear to me to emerge from a study of these documents: (1) Only two
nationalities, the Roman and the Gothic, receive legal recognition. (2)
The personnel of the court varies, depending on whether the lawsuit is
between two Goths, two Romans, or between a Goth and a Roman.
Presumably different legal principles would be applied in cases where
Roman assessors, or cognitores, sat. (3) The Edictum Theoderici in its
154 titles covers every phase of law; a division of competence between
Gothic and Roman Laws on the basis of separate branches of law (as
of persons, contracts, etc.) is therefore not apparent. (4) The Edictum
nevertheless binds Goths and Romans on all matters covered by its titles.
This is not incompatible with the existence of separate Gothic and Roman
laws. The epilogue of the Edictum attests this fact.
In brief, the common law of Goths and Romans is Roman law
incorporated in the Edict of Theodoric and perhaps other enactments.
However, as in England local customs existed side by side with the com-
mon law, 3 so in parts of Italy it is probable that Gothic legal ideas
survived throughout the early Middle Ages.'24
The Lombard legislation gives little information in its earlier stages
on the all-important question of the relations of Lombards and Romans. 25
There is no definite trace of the principle of the personality of law in the
early Lombard codes except a reference noticed elsewhere in the laws of
Rothari to the Gargangi (strangers) in which a privilege of a personal
law is mentioned as a special dispensation from the king.1'2 The recogni-
tion of Roman law has been inferred, inconclusively however, from the
following extract which mentions "a free woman living according to the
121. Cassiodorus, Variae, VII, 3, MGH, p. 203 (Pat. Lat. LXIX, col. 709).
122. Cassiodorus, Variae, IX, 14, MGH, p. 279 (Pat. Lat. LXIX, col. 778).
123. I POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF
EDWARD 184-187 (2d ed. 1898).
124. Is there any evidence of the survival of Ostrogothic law? A deed drawn up at
Brescia in 769 by a Goth named Stavila has given rise to some controversy. In this document
(Codex Diplomaticus Langobardiae in Historiae Patriae Monumenta, XIII, Turin, 1873, no.
38, col. 72) Stavila disposing of land and property professes to be vivens legem Gothorum.
Brunner sums up the case for Stavila's being an East Goth, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, Vol.
I, p. 396, note 65. J. Ficker, Untersuchungen zur Erbenfolge der ost germanischen Rechte,
Innsbruck, 1891-1904, Vol. IV, pp. 330 ft., has shown the continuance of East Gothic law in
Istria and Friuli especially in matters relating to family law.
125. Pertile, Storia del diritto italiano, Vol. I, 2nd edition, pp. 5 ff.
126. Edictus Rothari, 367, MGH in 80, pp. 68-69 (MGH 4, p. 85). On Lombard Laws
see Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, Vol. I, pp. 529 ft.
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law of the Lombards-Nulli mulieri sub regni nostri ditionem Legis
Langobardorum viventem.
''127
Liutprand's laws first introduce us to the principle of the personality
of law. In the writing of deeds a provision specifically acknowledges the
authority of the Roman law beside that of the Lombard law but gives no
indication how it was applied by the courts, or whether it was limited to
private law. Liutprand's actual words on this point are interesting:
We have ordained that they who write deeds, whether according
to the law of the Lombards (since that is most open and known
by nearly all men), or according to the law of the Romans, shall
not prepare them otherwise than according to the contents of
those laws themselves. For let them not write contrary to the
law of the Lombards or the Romans. If they do not know the
provisions of those laws, let them ask others who do, and if they
cannot fully learn the laws, let them not write the deeds .'2
According to another law of Liutprand a Lombard woman who married
a Roman lost her Lombard nationality and became a Roman. The chil-
dren of such a marriage were Romans. 9
In the eighth century in Italy there is further evidence of a negative
character of the practice of the dual system in a plea or placitum of the
crown in which, though the case was heard according to Lombard law, a
number of the judges are Alamans.' 8°
Under the Lombards as under the other Germanic peoples the Romans
alone enjoyed personal law rights. Unlike the situation in the other king-
doms, however, the Lombards limited the application of Roman law from
the start even in the field of private law. Furthermore, in Italy as else-
where the Roman law was not valid for Romans as a criminal code. More
so than other systems the Lombard law was "territorial. 13 1
Acts of sale in North Africa under Vandal domination show little
effect of the barbarian occupation, and disclose the continuance of local
and Roman legal practices. 82
127. Edictus Rothari, 204, MGH, in 8, p. 43. See also Ed. Roth, 194, MGH, in 8, p.
40: "Si quis cum ancilla gentili fornicatus fuerit, componat domino eius solidos XX." Neither
passage appears to me to be decisive on the question.
128. Liutprandi Leges, 91 (VIII) anno 727, Leges Langobardorum, ed. F. Bluhme, MGH
in 8, p. 120 (MGH, 4, p. 144): "nam contra legem Langobardorum aut Romanorum non
scribant."
129. Liut. Leg., 127, MGH in 8, p. 134 (MGH, 4, p. 160). Cf. Liut. Leg., 153, anno 735.
130. Savigny, Rdm. Recht in Mittelalter, Vol. I, pp. 123-24, citing Fumagalli, Codex
Diplomaticus, p. 18.
131. Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, Vol. I, p. 384; Karl Neumeyer, Die gemein-
rechtliche Entwickelung des internationalen privat und Strajrechts bis Bartolus, Vol. I,
Die Geltung der Stammesrechte in Italien, Munich, 1901, pp. 22 ff., 80 ff.
132. E. Albertini, "Actes de vente du Ve sicle trouv~es dans la r~gion de TMbessa,"
Journal des Savants, 1930, 23-30.
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The Anglo-Saxons who effected the conquest of England in the fifth
century do not appear to have developed a principle of personality of law
even on the limited scale practiced in the other kingdoms.'
D. Growth of the Frankish RJgime of Personal Laws
For reasons which may only be surmised these more primitive bar-
barian arrangements for regulating the legal relations among members
of the national groups received a significant extension in the Frankish
kingdom. Instructions issued to Frank officials at a date long after the
Lex Salica and included in one of the formulae of the period, list among
their duties:
et omnis populus ibiden commanentes, tam Franci, Romani,
Burgundiones, quam reliquas nationes sub tuo regimine et gub-
ernatione degant et moderentur, et eos recto tramite secundum
legem et consuetudinem eorum regas (and the entire population
there residing, Franks, Romans, Burgundians as well as other
nations, should live and conduct themselves well under your rule
and government, and may you direct them in the right path ac-
cording to their law and custom).""
The date of composition of the formulary of Marculf has been in
dispute. On the whole it appears to be a seventh-century product,"3 5
though some of the formulae were added in the eighth century. Between
the constitution of Clothar at the end of the sixth century and the state-
ment in Marculf a century or more later, an important extension of the
principle of the personality of law had taken place. In the Constitution of
Clothar we still observe the dualistic system based on the recognition of
Roman and Frankish law; in Marculf the privilege has been extended to
Burgundians and "other nations living under the Frankish r6gime." No
document, however, in the intervening period enlightens us on the exact
method or time in which this transition took place.
The Ripuarian law signalizes a noteworthy advance in the growth
of the personal law system by decreeing "that if a Frank, a Burgundian,
an Alaman or a member of any nation established in the country occupied
by the Ripuarians, be summoned in judgment, that he be judged according
133. F. W. Maitland, English Law, 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 564 (14th ed.);
Materials for the History of English Law, 2 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL
HISTORY, 67 (1908).
134. Marculf, I, 8, Formulae, ed. K. Zeumer, MGH, p. 48.
135. A. Tardif, Histoire des sources de droit franfais, origines romaines, Paris, 1890, p.
172, and "Etude sur la date du formulaire de Marculf," Nouvelle revue historique de droit
francais et historique, Vol. XIII, 1884, pp. 557 ff. places it between 650 and 656; K. Zeumer,
ed. Formulae, MGH, pp. 32-36 places it at the end of the seventh or beginning of the eighth
century. The formulary was revised in the eighth century. See also Brunner, Deutsche
Rechtsgeschichte, Vol. I, pp. 579-580. Levillain puts the date around 650 and favors the
region of Paris as the place of origin, Leon Levillain, "Le formulaire de Marculf et la critique
modern," Bibliothique de F'Ecole des Chartes, LXXXIV, 1923, pp. 21-91.
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to the law of the country in which he was born," and that "If he is
condemned he shall suffer the penalty which is indicated in the law of
his country and not what is prescribed by the law of the Ripuarians."
Hoc autem constituemus, ut infra pago Ribuario tam Franci,
Burgundionis, Alamanni, sue de quacumque natione commo-
ratus fuerit, in iudicio interpellatus, sicut lex loci contenit, ubi
natus fuit, sic respondeat.1 6
Quod si damnatus fuerit, secundum legem propriam, non
secundum Ribuariam, damnum susteneat.187
The Ripuarian law thus affirms that the law applied to an individual is
not that of the judge or region in which the crime was committed but
that of the place of origin or race of the defendant.'
Why the Ripuarian law should be the first of the barbarian codes
to contain express confirmation of the principle of the personality of law
is a difficult question to answer. If it is argued that the Ripuarian law
represents more completely in this case the old Germanic tradition pre-
served on the right bank of the Rhine the question may be asked why
the earlier codes such as the Salic law and the fragments of the code
of Euric do not contain similar recognition of the personal law r6gime.
If it is claimed on the other hand that these provisions of the Ripuarian
law belong to the traditions of the independent Ripuarian tribe, the
answer is that the codification of the law was probably undertaken when
136. Lex Ribuaria, XXXI, 3, ed. Sohm, MGH, p. 224. (Lex Ribuaria, Legum Sectio 1,
Legum Nationum Germanicarum, Tomi III, Pars II, ed. Franz Beyerle, Rudolf Buchner,
Hanover, 1954, p. 87, No. 35, 3).
137. Lex Rib., XXXI, 4, MGH, p. 224. (35, 4, p. 87 of Buchner-Beyerle ed.) Other
passages of the same law regulating the relations of persons of different nationalities are: Lex
Rib., XXXVI, 1, MGH, p. 229: "Si quis Ribuarius advenam Francum interficerit, 200 solidos
culpabilis iudicetur;" Lex Rib., XXXVI, 2, MGH, p. 229: "Si quis Ribuarius advenam
Burgondionem interficerit, his 80 solidis multetur;" Lex Rib., XXXVI, 3, MGH, p. 229: "Si
quis Ribuarius advenam Romanum interficerit, his quinquagenus solidus multetur;" Lex. Rib.,
XXXVI, 4, MGH, p. 229: "Si quis Ribuarius advenam Alamannum seu Fresionem vel
Bogium, Saxonem interempserit, his octuagenus solidus culpabilis iudicetur." Above references
are to numbers of the Sohm edition.
138. Are the terms "pago ... loci ... provincia" consistent with "race" or "nationality"?
Fustel de Coulanges, Nouvelles recherches, p. 379 and note 1, has raised some interesting
questions as to the meaning of the terms used in the Salic and Ripuarian codes: Francus,
Ribuarius, Romanus. According to Fustel these terms denote regions and social classes as well
as races. The term "advenam Romanum" (Lex Rib., XXXVI, 3, MGH, p. 229) for example
refers to a resident of Aquitaine. Reason: Aquitaine is the only region omitted from the list.
This is based on the assumption that "Ribuarius . . . Francus . . . Burgondio . . . Alamannus
• . . Romanus . . . Fresionem . . . Bogium . . . Saxonem" refer to regions. The difficulty does
not arise if we assume that these terms designate races or nationalities. The differing com-
positions in Lex Rib., XXXVI, for members of different groups give Fustel de Coulanges
some trouble and he tries to explain them by assuming that they correspond with the tables
of composition in their respective national laws. No such correspondence exists between the
table in the Lex Rib. and the scale in the Burgundian code, as he admits. Nevertheless, Fustel
de Coulanges has directed useful attention to the difficulty of distinguishing "race" from
"region" in these documents. The words Frank, Ripuarian, etc. are probably used in both
senses. Needless to say, this does not affect the question of the existence of the personal law
principle which is compatible with the existence of either "races" or "regions."
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the Ripuarian state, if there ever was one, was already merged with the
Salian state and that many provisions in the code are really due to the
initiative of the Salian rulers."8 9
Certainly the Aquitanian capitulary of 768 which restored the
personal law system in this Romanized region is unmistakable in the
definiteness with which the personal law principle is affirmed.140 The
Roman Constitution of the Emperor Lothar issued in 824 in a real sense
marks a high point in the development of the system.' It extended to the
residents of Rome the privilege of personal law option. In what was once
the legal and administrative center of the empire, personality replaced
uniformity of law. The Constitution did not,. as later commentators
would have had it, establish an election of territoriality in Rome.
42
139. Heinrich Mitteis, Deutsche Rechtsgeschechte, Munich and Berlin, 1958, p. 61: "Die
Lex Ribuaria (Pactus legis Ribuariae) ist weniger ein Stamnesrecht der Ribwaren als ein
Landesgesetz fUr Austrasien." Titles 1-31 (1-35 in new edition) probably date from about
630-650. For literature on text and on the problem of the Ripuarian folk see R. Buchner,
Deutschlands Geschichtsquellen im Mittelalter, Vorzeit und Karolinger, Beiheft: Die Rechts-
quellen (Wattenbach-Levison), Weimar, 1953, pp. 21-26. For older literature see Sohm,
Introduction to the Lex Ribuaria, MGH; Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, Vol. I, pp.
442 ff. A valuable analysis of the differences between the Salic and Ripuarian law is given by
E. Mayer-Homberg, Die jriinkischen Volksrechte im Mittelalter, Vol. I, Die jriinkischen
und das Reichsrecht, Weimar, 1912, pp. 55, 100, 374, and passim. Cf., Musset, Les Invasions,
297.
140. Pippini Capitulare Aquitanicum, c. 10, Capitularia Regum Francorum, Vol. I, ed.
A. Boretius, MGH, Leges, Sectio II, Hanover, 1883, p. 43: "Ut omnes homines eorum legis
habeant, tam Romani quam et Salici, et si de alia provincia advenerit, secundum legem ipsius
patriae vivat." A. Longnon, Atlas historique de la France, texte explicatif des planches,
Paris, 1912, pp. 40 ff. traces the geographical expansion. Gustav Richter, Annalen des
jrinkischen Reichs im Zeitalter Der Merovinger (part one of Annalen Der Deutschen
Geschichte im Mittelalter) Halle, 1873, pp. 38 ff.; and Gustav Richter and Horst Kohl,
Annalen des friinkischen Reichs im Zeitalter der Karolinger (II Abteilung, Erste Hiilfte of
Annalen der deutschen Geschichte im Mittelalter), Halle, 1885, p. 1, ff. trace the events. The
texts dealing with the personal law system are given in chronological order by van Wetter,
Droit romain et droit germanique, Part I, pp. 9-20. Such of them as are not discussed in this
chapter will, so far as they are relevant, be cited in the topical chapters that follow. The
principal references are (the dates given are those of Boretius-Krause; they are critically
examined by F. Ganshof, Recherches sur les capitulaires, Paris, 1958, p. 109 if): Capitulare
Missorum, 786, 792, vel 793, 25, Cap., Vol. I, MGH, p. 67; Capitulare Aquisgranense, 813,
Cap., Vol. I, MGH, p. 170; Constitutio de Hispanis in Francorum Regnum Profugis Prima,
815, c. 2, Cap., Vol. I, MGH, p. 262; Ordinatio Imperii, 817, c. 9, Cap., Vol. 1, MGH,
p. 272; Capitula Legibus Addenda, 818, 819, c. 6, Cap., Vol. I, MGH, p. 282; Caroli Calvi
Praeceptio Confirmationis, 844, c. 3, Capitularia Regum Francorum, Vol. II, ed. A. Boretius
and V. Krause, MGH, Leges, Sectio II, Hanover, 1897, p. 260. Other capitularies of
Charlemagne and of Louis the Pious dealing with Spaniards but without specific mention
of the personal law principle are: Praeceptum Pro Hispanis, 812, Cap., I, MGH, p. 169;
Constitutio Hludowici De Hispanis Secunda, 816, Cap. I, MGH, pp. 263-264; Sacramenta
Carisiaci Praestita, 858, Cap., Vol. II, MGH, p. 296.
141. Savigny, Rom. Recht im Mittelalter, Vol. I, pp. 158 ff.; Constitutio Romana, 824,
c. 5, Cap., Vol. I, MGH, p. 323:
Volumus ut cunctus populus Romanus interrogetur, qua lege vult vivere, ut tali
qua se professi fuerint vivere velle vivant, illisque denuntietur, quod hoc unusquis-
que sciat, tam duces quam et iudices vel reliquus populus, quod si in offensione sua
contra candem legem fecerint, eidem legi quam profitentur per dispositionem
pontificis ac nostram subiacebunt.
142. Meijers, "Principes Fondamentaux," Recueil des Cours, p. 559.
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The next stage in the development is a long and obscure one and it
is marked by the transition to territoriality. This transition is clearly if
broadly disclosed in one of the longer capitularies. This is the Edictum
Pistense of 864, which distinguishes between the territories in which
certain criminal provisions prescribed by the capitulary are valid and
those regions in which the Roman law is valid. "For neither we nor our
predecessors have ever ruled in supererogation or in derogation of that
law."' 48 Here we see a law which is still personal but which is on the way
to becoming territorial. These words also record the earliest formation of
the distinction between the country of written law in the south and the
country of customary law in the north. The distinction is a matter of fact
in the eleventh century when a document, probably of southern French
origin, the Exceptiones Petri, discusses its incidents. 44
With the expansion of the Frankish state came the recognition of
new legal systems. The documents vary in their enumeration, but in a
large number of cases the same nationalities appear. The most complete
list I have found is contained in a capitulary of Charlemagne cited by
Benedict Levita 41 in which Charlemagne lists "Romans as well as Franks,
Alamans, Bavarians, Saxons, Thuringians, Frisians, Gauls, Burgundians,
Bretons, Lombards, Gascons, Beneventans, Goths and Spaniards....
The condition of the Visigothic law is of interest in this respect.
Though there is abundant evidence of its inclusion among the established
law systems after the conquest of Septimania in 759, there is no record
of its recognition in the domain of Aquitaine taken from the Visigoths
as a result of the earlier conquests of Clovis. 47 It is possible that the
Gothic law was not recognized after the first conquest because of the small
143. Capitularia, MGH, ed. Boretius and Krause, Vol. II, c. 20, p. 319.
144. Chnon, Histoire du droit franoais, I, p. 549.
145. On Benedict Levita and the false capitularies see Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgesch-
ichte, Vol. I, pp. 553 ff. Though much of the material included in the Capitularium is of
doubtful authority there is no doubt that some of the contents are authentic. Buchner,
Rechtsquellen, p. 44 ff.
146. Capitularium, Liber Sextus, CCCLXVI (MGH, ed. Pertz): "Volumus atque
praecipimus ut omnes ditioni nostrae, Deo auxiliante, subiecti, tam Romani, quam Franci,
Alamanni, Baiuvarii, Saxones, Turingii, Fresones, Galli, Burgundiones, Britones, Longobardi,
Vuascones, Beneventani, Gothi, et Hispani, caeterique nobis subiecti omnes. . . ." Who
are the Gauls in this list? Some of these names are obviously geographical. In such an
enumeration the Aquitanians ought to appear. See the Divisio Regnorum, 806, Capitularia
Regum Francorum, Vol. I, ed. A. Boretius, MGH, Leges, Sectio II, Hanover, 1883, p. 127,
and the note infra.
147. Henri Klimrath, Travaux sur l'histoire due droit franfais, Paris, 1843, Vol. I,
p. 348, note 1. Besides the capitularies in favor of the fugitive Spaniards, (Cap. I, MGH,
Vol. I, p. 262; Vol. II, p. 260; Vol. I, p. 169; Vol. I, pp. 263-264) see the Chronicon
Moissiacense, Anno 759 (ed. G. H. Pertz, MGH, Scriptores, Vol. I, p. 294; M. Bouquet,
Recucil des historiens des Gaules et de la France, ed. L. Delisle, Paris, 1869, Vol. V, p. 69):
"Franci Narbonum obsident, datoque sacramento Gothis qul ibi erant, ut si civitatem
partibus traderent Pipini regis Francorum, permitterunt eos legem suam habere, . . .
ipsi ... civitatem partibus Francorum tradunt."
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number of individuals affected- by it in the region north of Septimania, but
the evidence is too meager to justify any conclusion.
In Visigothic Spain, the personal law regime came to an end at the
very time that the Frankish system was being built up. Recceswinth
(c. 654) forbade the use of laws other than the official Visigothic code. 48
Marriages between Romans and Visigoths were now permitted and the old
interdict of the Roman law against such marriages was "abrogated."' 49
The conquest of the Lombard kingdom added another to the numer-
ous laws of the Frankish Empire. The Lombards in Italy were obliged
to recognize the full standing of the national laws professed in the Frank
Empire. Was the same privilege accorded to the Lombard law in the
Frankish realm proper? I have been unable with one possible exception
to find any declaration of Lombard law in the trans-alpine Frankish
Empire.5 ° This is an argument ex silentio, but it squares with the fact
that the Lombard kingdom was regarded as a separate entity and not
subject to the direct administrative control of the empire in the same way
as the other conquests of the Franks.' The ruler of the Lombard king-
dom, the Wearer of the Iron Crown, was the Frankish king. Nevertheless,
the application of Lombard law outside Italy may have occurred oc-
casionally.
All this reveals what we have already suggested as the clue to the
understanding of the personal law system in the empire, namely, that
practice of a personal law depended upon membership in one of the
recognized nations of the empire.
148. Lex Visigothorum Recessvindiana, II, I, VIII; Leges Visigothorum Antiquiores,
ed. K. Zeumer, MGH in 80, Hanover and Leipzig, 1894, p. 44; De remotis alienarum
gentium legibus; Lex Visigothorum Recessvindiana, II, I, IX. MGH in 8", p. 44. The
change may go back to Leovigild (568-586) and, according to some recent authors, even
earlier. See note 98 above.
149. Lex Visigothorum Reccessvindiana, III, I, I, Antiqua, MGH in 8*, pp. 86-87, Ut
tam Goto Romanam, quam Romano Gotam matrimonio liceat sociari.
150. Savigny, Rim. Recht im Mittelalter, Vol. I, p. 120 accepts the application of
Lombard law north of the Alps. This view is defended by Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgesch-
ichte, Vol. I, p. 384 and note 10, against G. Waitz, Deutsche Verlassungsgeschichte, 3rd edi-
tion, Vol. III, p. 347. Brunner cites, in defense of his view a document of 1058 contained
in Johann F. Kleimayrn, Nachrichten yom Zustdinde der Gegenden und Stadt Juvavia,
Salzburg, 1784, p. 287, in which Fridaricus gives to the canons of the church of St. Peter
and Ruodbert a "villa sancti OudaIrici . . . reliquit earum rerum vestituram cartamque
ipse Fridaricus ipsis canonicis presens presentibus dedit scriptam et confirmatam secundum
legem Langobardorum et Baioariorum." This is the only instance of the application of
Lombard law north of the Alps that has been found, and can hardly be regarded as con-
clusive for the question as a whole. Charlemagne entitled himself Rex Francorum et
Lan gobardorum, not Rex Saxonum or Rex Hispanorum, as Fustel de Coulanges, Les Trans-
formations de la royautJ pendant Pepoque carolingienne, 2nd edition by C. Jullian, Paris,
1907, p. 413, note 1, points out. The term Francia is employed by the historian Nithard to
include all the lands outside Italy (Fustel de Coulanges, ibid., note 2). For these reasons I
cannot follow Brunner's view on this question.
151. KLIMRATH, op. cit. supra note 147, at 349.
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One of the most important developments associated with the per-
sonality of law was the "codification" of the national laws undertaken
in the Frankish realms. The Visigoths and the Burgundians had already
reduced their law to writing when the Frankish monarchs undertook a
similar task for their own subjects. The principal document dealing with
this work undertaken in the Merovingian period is a prologue found in the
manuscripts of several laws."6 2 The prologue relates that Theodoric caused
the compilation of the laws of the Franks, of the Alamans, and of the
Bavarians, and that modifications were introduced into these laws by
Childebert and Clothar and finally by Dagobert. Each people, according
to the prologue, received from this ruler laws which still guide them.
Other revisions and publications occurred in the Carolingian period. The
exact character of this work, however, is a matter of question. According
to Einhard, Charlemagne never succeeded in accomplishing more than an
incomplete revision of the national laws by means of capitularies."5 ' The
Chronicon Moissiacense and the titles of some of these national laws
which are described as leges emendatae (corrected or amended laws),
raise some question about Einhard's accuracy." 4 There is no inconsis-
tency between these sources, however, if we assume that all that Charle-
magne attempted was a revision of the form of some of the major laws
rather than a fundamental change in their contents. 5 At any rate every
extension of the Frankish Empire was accompanied either by the con-
firmation of the law of the conquered as in the cases of Aquitaine and of
Lombardy, 5 ' by their amendment as in the capitula legi (and legibus)
addenda (capitularies to be incorporated in the national law or laws), or
by the publication of a new code as in the cases of the Chamavian
152. Lex Baiwariorum, ed. Heymann, MGH, pp. 201-203.
153. Eginharti Vita Caroli Magni, c. 29, ed. 0. Holder-Egger, MGH. The passage "nam
Franci duas habent leges" etc. does not refer to Roman law, but to the Salic and Ripuarian
laws, Savigny, Rom. Recht im Mittelalter, Vol. I, p. 129. Einhard exaggerates the differences
between the Salic and Ripuarian laws. See especially Ganshof, Recherches, p. 96 ff.
154. Chronicon Moissiacense, Anno 802, ed. G. H. Pertz, MGH, Scriptores, Vol. I,
p. 307. For the designation lex emendata, Buchner, Rechtsquellen, 16, 17, 21, 24 ff.
155. Thirteen Carolingian capitularies appear to be additional to single laws (legi
addita): Lex Salica (816: Cap. MGH, nos. 134, 135; 819: Cap. no. 142), Lex Ribuaria
(803: Cap, no. 41), Lex Saxonum (775-790, 797: Cap. 26, 27), Lex Baiwariorum (801-813:
Cap. no. 68), Italy (six: Cap. nos. 90-98, 201, 214, 219, 215). In addition to these thirteen,
five capitularies are attached to several national laws (legibus addita): Cap. nos. 39, 45,
136, 193. The Merovingian rulers were responsible for six capitularies added to indi-
vidual laws. I am indebted to the careful classification of the capitularies by jean Petrau-
Gay, "La 'Laghsaga' salienne," Rev. histor. de droit jran~ais et itranger, 14, 1935, pp. 278,
297-300. Cf. Ganshof, Recherches, p. 76 ff.
156. Aquitaine: Capitulare Aquitanicum, c. 10, Cap., MGH, Vol. I, p. 43; Italy:
Karoli Magni Notitia Italica, Cap., I, MGH, p. 188, c. 4: "Juxta legem ipsorum exinde
procedat iudicium. Tantum sic faciant, sicut eorum lex fuit." Pippini Italiae regis capitulare,
782-786, Cap., MGH, Vol. I, p. 192, c. 7; p. 196, c. 8; Pippini capitulare, circa 790, Cap.
No. 95, Vol. I, p. 201, c. 4; Capitulare Italicum, 801, Cap., MGH, no. 98, p. 205, cc. 2, 6;
p. 206, c. 8; Memoria Olonnae comitibus data, 822-823, Cap., MGH, no. 158, Vol. I, p. 319,
cc. 13, 14, 16.
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Franks 1 7 the Saxons,158 the Thuringians, 159 and the Frisians. 60 All this
legislative activity, if it may be called such, is an integral part of the
system of the personal law. Without it the knowledge of the national laws
would often have been in jeopardy.
The geoghaphical sphere of application of the capitularies as indicated
above was circumscribed. In Frankish lands proper, the regular capitu-
lanes were applied. In the Lombard kingdom and in Rome other ordi-
nances were issued directed specifically to the needs of these regions.6
In other divisions the distinction is not so clear. What was the position
of Burgundy at different times? 62 What was the position of Aquitaine?
What part of its national organization was preserved under the Franks?6 3
What was the status of Provence,164 of Septimania?65 In all these regions
the general capitularies circulated in spite of any autonomy otherwise
granted to them. 6
An important feature of the personal law system lay in the use of
157. H. Froidevaux, Etude sur la Lex Dicta Francorum Chamavorum et sur les Francs
du pays d'Amor, Paris, 1891. Against the view that the Ewa Chamavorum is a bona fide
code see N. D. Fustel de Coulanges, "Quelques remarques sur la loi dite des Francs
Chamaves," pp. 398-414 of Nouvelles recherches. See Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte,
Vol. I, sec. 46; and Buchner, Rechtsquellen, 42.
158. Leges Saxonum, ed. K. von Richtofen, MGH, Leges, V; also ed. Cl. von Schwerin,
8° series, MGH, Hanover, 1918. Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, Vol. I, pp. 465 f;
Buchner, op. cit. supra note 157, at 39 ff.
159. Lex Angliorum et Werinorum (Thuringorum), ed. v. Richtofen, MGH, Leges, V;
also ed. von Schwerin, 8 ° series, MGH, Hanover, 1918; Brunner, op. cit. supra note 157, at
Vol. I, pp. 469 if; Buchner, op. cit. supra note 157, at 41 ff.
160. Lex Frisionum, ed. Karl v. Richtofen, MGH, Leges, III. Brunner, op. cit., Vol. I,
pp. 475 ff.; Buchner, op. cit. supra note 157, at 42 ff., 58.
161. On the three spheres of application see Savigny, Rom. Recht. im Mittelalter,
Vol. I, pp. 172-173.
162. A. Kleinclausz, Histoire de Bourgogne, Paris, 1909, p. 96: "Ils (Franks) ne
privrent pas les Burgondes de leurs droits. . . . La Bourgogne . . . continue de s'appeler,
dans la langue officielle et courante, le royaume de Bourgogne (regnum Burgundiae)." See
also H. Drouot and J. Calmette, Histoire de Bourgogne, Paris, 1927, p. 65. See also Auguste
Longnon, Atlas historique de la France, Texte explicatif des planches, Paris, 1912, p. 47.
The Majordomus of Burgundy was discontinued after 642. But see Covile, Recherches,
p. 236 for qualifications on older views.
163. Jacques Flach, Les Origines de l'ancienne France, Paris, 1917, Vol. IV (Les
Nationalitis regionales), pp. 465 ff. emphasizes the maintenance of national traditions in
Aquitaine.
164. Id. at 317, 383. For the historical geography of Provence see Longnon, op. cit.
supra note 162, at 46, Planches III, IV, V of Atlas.
165. For Septimania see Longnon, op. cit. supra note 162, at 46-47, and in general
Flach, op. cit. supra note 163 at 462.
166. The Divisio Regnorum of 806, c. 1, 2, 3 (Cap., Vol. I, MGH, p. 127) lists the
states to be divided: Bavaria, Alamannia, Thuringia, Saxony, Frisia, Aquitaine, Gascony,
part of Burgundy, Provence, Septimania or Gothia, and Francia. This is an official enumera-
tion but it tells us nothing of the status, legal or political, of these regions. The Annales
Bertiniani for the year 858 (ed. Bouquet and Delisle, Recueil des historiens des Gaules)
distinguish Aquitaine, Neustria and Burgundy. "Francia, Burgundy, Aquitaine and Ger-
mania" are also distinguished in the Astronomer, c. 49 (ed. Bouquet and Delisle, Recueil




professiones (professions of law) which became widespread in the Car-
olingian period, especially in the ninth century.17 The first professiones
in Italy may go back to the eight century. Savigny put the earliest
professio in the year 807,168 Brunner in 767.169 The last is placed by
Lupi in the year 1388.170 The professiones are much more abundant in
Italy than in France, for in northern Italy there appeared to be a greater
mixture of nationalities. Many documents, it is true, lack professiones.
This may be due to the fact that the two parties belong to the same
nationality. Another possible explanation lies in the frequent use of forms
and documents based on Roman law and common to barbarians and
Romans.' 7 l
A distinction often merely verbal exists in the professiones between
lex and natio. The latter term referred to the birth law, the former to
the law by which one lived.' 72 Generally the two relations thus indicated
were identical but, as in the cases of men entering the clergy and married
women, the birth law might give way to a new law assumed with the
change of status. The distinction is clearly shown in a deed of the Countess
Matilda, who was a Salian by birth but had assumed the Lombard law by
marriage. For alienating property, however, the Countess employed the
Salic law. The distinction is brought out in the following words: "Qui
professa sum ex natione mea, lege vivere Salicha. '1 78 In another case the
expression employed is:
qui professa sum ego ipsa Ferlinda natione mea legem vivere
Langobardorum, sed nunc pro ipso viro meo legem vivere videor
Salicam. 74
The history of the professiones between the eighth and ninth cen-
turies reveals changes of practice in these respects. At first the national
law of one party was indicated, and then only in transactions between
167. For extensive literature on the projessiones see L. Stouff, "Rtude sur le principe
de la personnait6 des lois," Rev. Bourg., IV, 1894, p. 7, note 1, and Brunner, Deutsche
Rechtsgeschichte, Vol. I, p. 398 and notes 71, 73. For early projessiones in France and Italy,
see Historiae Patriae Monumenta, Vol. XIII, 8 (anno 737), 14 (anno 754). For Luxemburg
and Tyrol, Viollet, Histoire du droit civil franvais, p. 104. For Germany, G. Blondel, Atude
sur la politique de l'empereur, Frederic II en Alletnagne, Paris, 1892, p. 48. In general, see
Gaupp, Germanische Ansiedlungen, pp. 257 ff.
168. Savigny, Rdm Recht im Mittelalter, Vol. I, p. 150, citing the Milan deeds of
Fumagalli: ". . . accepi ad te Verohacheri ex Alamannorum genere. .. ."
169. Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, Vol. I, p. 396 citing Carol Troya, Codice
Diplomatico Longobardo, Naples, 1852 ff., Vol. V, p. 430, no. 880 (anno 767): "Signa
manus B. qui hanc cartola donationis fieri rogavit, qui iuxta lege sua Langobardorum
recepit launechilt." Brunner, ibid., points out that the term projessio never acquired a
technical meaning. Hence the difficulty of deciding on the earliest examples.
170. SAVIGNY, op. cit. supra note 168, at 150; Mario Lupi, Codex Diplomaticus Civita-
tis et Ecclesiae Bergomatis, Bergamo, 1784, cols. 230, 231.
171. Stouff, "Atude," Rev. bourg., 1894, pp. 294, 298.
172. Savigny, op. cit. supra note 168, at 145-146.
173. Id. at 147, and note C; Fiorentini, Memorie della Gran Contessa Matilda, 2nd
edition, Lucca, 1756, Vol. IV, Documenti, pp. 7, 10.
174. Savigny, op. cit. supra note 168, at 147.
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members of nationalities other than Lombard and Roman. Later on the
professiones appear in relations of Lombards and Romans)" The other
change has already been indicated. In the earlier period the nation or the
national descent included also the national law. Thus the expression
"G. Salicus." As time went on more projessiones appear with the double
designation of law and race, as "qui professi sumus ex natione nostra
legem vivere Langobardorum."'76 This development coincides with a
change in the signification of names that takes place in the ninth century.
German names no longer denote German nationality, though Roman
names are still indications of Roman nationality.17
The dispersion of members of the various nationalities over the
Frankish Empire is attested in the documents of the period. Salian and
Ripuarian Franks are found in France, 178 Alamannia, 79 and Italy.180
Romans profess their own law in the south of France' and in Italy. 82
Goths are found in Septimania, 18' and Italy.'8 4 Burgundians are found
in Burgundy 8 ' and northern Italy. 8 ' Alamans are found in Italy. 87
Thus by the ninth century an elaborate system of personal law rela-
tions had been worked out which was a great advance on the simpler
dualistic arrangement of earlier times. 88 A few conclusions emerge from
the foregoing discussion which may be stated with some assurance even
though there is not so much evidence as one would like on the general
question of the origins of the regime.
The principle of the personality of law in the sense of a system of
private international law did not exist among the Teutonic tribes before
their settlement in the Roman Empire. The principle of the personality
of law in the sense of law as a personal possession based upon membership
in the nation, or rather the tribe, did exist among the early Teutons and
was brought with them into the domains of the Empire and there sub-
sequently developed, as we have seen, into the later Frankish system. 89
175. Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, Vol. I, p. 397.
176. Savigny, op. cit. supra note 168, at 145-146.
177. Stouff, "Rtude," Rev. bourg., 1894, p. 25.
178. M. Th(venin, Textes relatils aux institutions privies et publiques aux epoques
m~rovingienne et carolingienne, institutions privies, Paris, 1887, nos. 102, 117, 176, 179, 132.
179. Stouff, loc. cit., p. 4.
180. Codex Diplomaticus Langobardiae, Historiae Patriae Monumenta, XIII, Turin,
1873, no. 764, anno 975.
181. Thvenin, op. cit. supra note 178, at nos. 98 (865), 110 (887), 80 (845). Recueil
des chartes de l'Abbaye de Cluny, ed. Bernard and Bruel, Paris, 1876 ff., Vol. I, nos. 23
(880), 229 (922), 439 (935), 686 (946).
182. Th~venin, op. cit. supra note 178, at nos. 50, 52.
183. C. Devic and J. Vaissete, Histoire gdnerale de Languedoc, Toulouse, 1872 ff.,
Vol. II, nos. 80 (832), 439 (852), 144 (854), 161 (862), 185 (874).
184. Th~venin, op. cit. supra note 178, at nos. 50, 52 (also Roman law).
185. Id. at nos. 178, 520, 52; Chartes de Cluny, Vol. I, no. 189.
186. Stouff, loc. cit., p. 5.
187. Cluny, Vol. IV, no. 3489.
188. Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, Vol. I, p. 383.
189. Brunner, op. cit. supra note 175, at Vol. I, p. 383, and note 3, distinguishes
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On the other hand, the existence of a well developed system of
personal law among the Romans is uncontestable. The maintenance of
local and national laws in the empire by the side of the civil law is attested
by official and literary documents. But this system, even in its diversity,
possessed a unity that is not to be sought in any of the barbarian systems
of law established on the soil of the Empire. The fully developed Frankish
personal law regime was much different from anything of its kind among
the Romans because it touched every phase of personal status. 0°
It was the invasions viewed in their broadest sense as a transforma-
tion of society that brought these disparate and yet similar elements to-
gether and thus laid the foundations of the regime of the personality of
law in the form of a system of private international law. But it should be
noted that the invasions only produced the personal law system out of
ingredients already in existence. If these elements had been absent the
results would not have been the same. The variety of experience of the
Germanic kingdoms with the principle of the personality of law proves
this point abundantly.
An attempt to construct a scheme for comparative study 'based on
the relationship between invasion and personality of law may be defended
within limits. Invasions often produce results in the legal sphere resem-
bling those obtained in the fifth and sixth centuries. But they also fail
to produce such results where certain elements are lacking. The absence
of the person "vivens legem Romanam" in England, as Maitland has
remarked, prevented the development of a system of personal laws
there.' 9 '
Given these fundamental considerations the establishment of systems
based on the application of personal law principles can be described as
follows: (1) There was no one r6gime of the personality of law; there
were several, differing in certain respects from one another: the Ostro-
gothic, the Visigothic, the Burgundian, and the early Frankish systems.
(2) At first personal law rights in each of these kingdoms were accorded
only to Romans, not to Germanic peoples other than the rulers. (3)
These personal law rights included most private law relations among
Romans but not criminal matters. Furthermore, in law cases arising
between Romans and Germans the law of the latter enjoyed territorial
validity, except among the Ostrogoths.
In terms of the literature on the subject the following seems clear:
Brunner makes inadequate provision for the existence of a subjective
between these senses of the word "personality." See also E. M. Meijers, "L'Histoire des
principes fondamentaux du droit international priv6 & partir du Moyen Age," in Recueil
des cours, 1934, III, 549-551, for the distinction between international law and inter-tribal
or intergentile law.
190. H. Klimrath, Travaux sur l'histoire du droit fran~ais, Vol. I, p. 351.
191. Materials for History of English Law, 2 SELECT ESSAYS iN ANGLo-AMEUCAN
LEGAL HISTORY 67 (1908).
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principle of personality.192 If we accept his view we must assume that the
regime was imposed from above by the Frankish rulers. Does such an
action square with what we know of the pace of social and legal develop-
ment? Furthermore, Brunner fails to emphasize the experience of the
Visigoths and Burgundians with the principle of the personality of law.
Schr6der and his school are not entirely correct.' 93 There is no evidence
of the full acceptance of the principle of personal laws in the earliest
Teutonic codes. There is, however, a subjective principle embedded in
Teutonic as in other early law systems: that law like religion is a personal
possession, a national or tribal inheritance denied to strangers. The
correct view appears to be an eclectic one.
III. THE FRANKISH SYSTEM OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. The National Law of the Individual
The personal law was acquired principally through birth which also
determined tribal or national membership. No one renounced this sub-
jective right "without abandoning a little of himself."' An example of
the common reaction to such apostasy was the indignation caused by the
marriage of the Lombard King Ratchis. He made use of the Roman
pre-marital gift sponsalitium, instead of the Lombard morgengabe.2 Mei-
jers finds in the glosses of the thirteenth century Romanist-Lombardist
Carolus de Tocco a similar pre-occupation with the right to law-"ius
suum cuique tribuere."3 Though Carolus uses the texts of Justinian to
explain questions concerning conflicts of law, it must not be inferred that
these texts are more than illustrative tracts. For the problems and solu-
tions thereon based have a history going back to the period of personality.4
Hence the question, was a free choice of law possible, as we shall
see, has no meaning. For the same reason Brunner's theory of reciprocity
requires modification to allow for the existence of a subjective right to
law. The Jews enjoyed the right to their law (whatever that may have
been) obviously not because of national reciprocity."
It is significant that in the Frankish Empire we know of no clearly
defined rule of procedure which obliged a person to continue to live by
his own law.6 This reveals a feature of medieval political life in general,
the absence of public sanctions for infringements of a rule.7 Of course a
192. Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, Vol. I, pp. 382 ff.
193. Lehrbuch der deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, p. 242, note. 12.
1. Meijers, "Principes fondamentaux," Recueil des cours, p. 552.
2. Benedicti Chronicon, MGH, Scriptores, III, p. 702.
3. Meijers, op. cit. supra note 1 at 552.
4. Id. at 555.
5. See infra text accompanying note 33 et seq.
6. Stouff, "Etude sur le principe de la personnalit6 des lois depuis les invasions barbares
jusqu'au XIIe siecle," Revue bourguignonne de l'enseignement suPirieur, IV, 1894, pp. 21,
24.
7. C. H. MCILwAIN, GROWTH OF POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE WEST, 363.
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counter action for fraudulent profession was theoretically possible, since
legal status was acquired normally through the father. Proofs of personal
law adherence were available in the Frankish period in various public
documents and private charters and deeds, but the absence of official
registers of births made investigation difficult. It does not seem, therefore,
that any public investigation was normally made of the individual's birth
law.' One case, however, which is attested occurs in the year 824 in Rome,
and arose out of exceptional conditions resulting from the new legal
situation established in the domain of the popes as a result of Frankish
administrative control.9 There is also reference to such an inquest in a
capitularly already cited of 786 or 792.0 We must take up a few of the
leading features of personal law determination before we enter into
further discussion of the question whether it was possible to renounce
one's law.
The church lived according to Roman law. The first council of
Orleans of 511 established this rule in the following words: "We wish
that the Canons and the Roman rule be observed."" The Ripuarian law
refers to this principle in connection with the manumission performed
in ecclesia, when it declares that the charter of manumission should
conform to "the Roman law by which the church lives."'1 2 One of the
capitularies of Louis the Pious also affirms "that the hierarchy of churches
should live by the Roman rule."" An interesting responsum of 820 or
823, confirming a previous decision of Charlemagne, makes an exception
of certain church property: the law to be applied to this property in the
event of any claims directed against it is not the law of the church but
of the original grantor.' 4 The treatment of landed property was for
certain purposes based on a personal law that was becoming "real."
Furthermore, the churches and convents which were under the protection
of the king were subject to the personal law of the king.'5 The convent
* of Farfa was thus regulated by the Lombard law.'"
8. Opinion of Savigny, Geschichte des romischen Rechts im Mittelalter, vol. I, pp. 148,
151.
9. Capitularia Regum Francorum, I, no. 161, MGH, p. 323, c. 5.
10. Cap., I, no. 25, MGH, p. 67, c. 5.
11. E. Loening, Geschichte des deutschen Kirchenrechts, vol. II, Strassburg, 1878,
p. 285: "Id constituimus observandum quod eccIesiastici canones decreverunt et lex romana
constituit."
12. Lex Ribuaria, LVIII, 1, MGH, p. 242: "Secundum legem romanam qua Ecclesia
vivit." But not the qualifications infra.
13. Cap., I, no. 168, MGH, p. 335, c. 1. This is probably mistakenly ascribed to
Louis. Brissaud, Manuel, p. 57, note 2.
14. Responsa Imperatoris de Rebus Fiscalibus Data, circa 820 (823?), c. 3, Cap., I,
MGH, p. 297.
15. H. Brunner, Zeugen und Inquisitionsbeweis im deutschen Gerichtsverjahren
karolingischer Zeit, Vienna, 1866, p. 83: "Resipsius secundum legem Salicam aut Ribuarian
tuerentur." See also Brunner, Forschungen zur Geschichte des deutschen und franzdsischen
Rechtes, Stuttgart, 1894, p. 165.
16. Bethmann-Hollweg, Der Civilprozess des gemeinen Rechts in geschichtlicher
Entwickelung, vol. V, p. 78, note 78.
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The position of the clergy vis A vis the national laws is more difficult
to define. Little doubt exists that a majority of the clergy in the sixth,
seventh, and eighth centuries insisted on the right to live by the Roman
law.17 Nevertheless, as time goes on, more and more cases occur of
clergy conforming to the law of their birth. In order to explain this change
it is necessary to distinguish between the Frankish and the Lombard
territories.
Flach has pointed out, as a solution of the problem of the legal
status of the clergy among the Franks, that the text of the Ripuarian law
varies on the subject of the composition of the clergy. 8 The early texts
equate the composition of the clergy with that of the Romans. 9 The
revised texts of Charlemagne's time determine the composition accord-
ing to nationality.2 ° The conclusion drawn by Flach is that in the earlier
period when the clergy consisted mainly of men of Roman origin the
Roman law applied to them as a personal law, but. that when more of the
clergy were recruited from the Germanic nations the personal laws of the
members of the ecclesiastical establishment became more varied.2 The
Carolingian period which witnessed the increase in the power of the
Austrasian Franks, also resulted in some Germanization of the clergy.22
The documents originating in Lombardy show us, however, on sev-
eral occasions, members of the clergy continuing to profess Roman law.
A law of Liutprand prescribes that if a Lombard enters the clergy the
children do not undergo a change of law but continue to be subject to
the Lombard law.2 The inference is that the father changed his law
on becoming a priest. Later on the Lombard law under the influence
perhaps of the Frankish practice altered the position. A deacon named
Guntzo makes a donation in one of the documents cited in the Historiae
Patriae Monumenta and receives a launegild according to the Lombard
law.24 This suggests that he lived 'by Lombard law though, in view of the
confusion of terminology, this is by no means a conclusive inference.
17. Loening, Geschichte des deutschen Kirchenrechts, vol. II, p. 286. But see Brissaud,
Manuel, p. 57, note 1 for a review of the older literature on this highly controversial
question.
18. J. Flach, Les Origines de l'ancienne France, vol. I, Paris, 1886, pp. 289-290.
19. Lex Ribuaria, XXXVI, 5 (Codd. A), ed. Sohm, MGH, p. 230 "... bis quin-
quagenus solidus culpabilis iudicetur."
20. Lex Ribuaria (emendata), XXXVIII, 5 (Codd. B), ed. Sohm, MGH, p. 230:
. iuxta nativitas." See, however, Fustel de Coulanges, Nouvelles recherches, p. 380,
who treats the word nativitas as a reference to a social rather than a racial distinction.
21. Id. at 290.
22. Lot, Les Invasions germaniques, p. 261.
23. Liutprandi Leges, 153: The woman who entered a convent apparently did not
change her law, for in 737 a woman embraces religion while professing to live by Lom-
bard law, Historiae Patriae Monumenta, XIII, no. 8. Some doubt attaches to the authen-
ticity of this document. See another document cited by J. Kohler, Beitriige zur german-
ischen Privatrechts-geschichte, Stuttgart, 1896, Part II, p. 7, no. 2 dealing with lands
deeded by a clergyman named Felix for which he received a launegild; he had inherited
these lands from his wife, hence the Lombard law.
24. Hist. Patr. Mon., vol. XIII, nos. 118, 326.
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Other documents of the tenth century show members of the clergy in-
voking the Lombard and the Salic laws. 5 In the eleventh century, Salic
law is professed by Bishop Adelricus 6
An interesting example of textual distortion is the construction put
on the capitulary of Louis the Pious placing the church under the Roman
law." The clergy invoked this capitulary as authority to change from
their national laws to the Roman law.2" A document of the eleventh
century in which a member of the clergy disposes of property states,
"Just as it is written in the law that the hierarchy of the churches live and
act according to this law, so do I act according to this law."2
The clergy became independent of the secular authorities in the
same way as the lay holders of immunities.3 ° The leaders of the church
slowly established a separate church jurisdiction based on control of
matters lying within the sphere of church authority and on control of the
persons of the clergy which became the later privilegium fori or benefit
of clergy. The justice which the church succeeded in monopolizing for
itself grew up, therefore, out of secular conditions associated with the
personal law system.
The law of a majority of the ruling class was the Salic law. Many
of the descendants of Roman families eventually gloried in their connec-
tion with the law of the ruling families." The great fortune of the Salic
law, in this regard as well as in others, has attracted the attention of
students and will be noticed elsewhere in this study. But the point that
calls for emphasis is the ease with which the transition from national law
to class law is effected. This transition is clearly disclosed in the com-
mentary to the Lombarda which compares the claim of a person to his
national law with the right of the clergy to their law."2
The position of the Jews under the personal law r6gime is a matter
25. Chartes de Cluny, II, 1229, anno 967. Hist. Patr. Mon., vol. XIII, no. 326, col.
548, anno. 885; no. 703, anno 967.
26. Hist. Patr. Mon., vol. I, no. 273, anno 1028: "Nos Adelricus episcopus . . . qui
professi sumus omnes lege vivere salicha."
27. Cap., I, MGH, no. 168, p. 335, c. 1, cited in note 13:
Ut omnis ordo ecclesiarum secundum Romanam legem vivat: et sic inquirantur
et defendantur res ecclesiasticae, ut emphyteusis under damnum ecclesiae patiuntur
non observetur sed secundum legem Romanam destruatur, et poena non salvatur.
28. Hist. Patr. Mon., vol. XIII, no. 974, col. 1713, anno 1000.
29. Muratori, Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, Milan, 1723-1751, vol. lIb, p. 1002, anno
1086. See also Pertile, Storia del diritto italiano, vol. I, p. 67, note 10.
30. This topic is treated in the section on feudalism, infra.
31. Th~venin, no. 105 (872): "Ex genere Francorum." Hist. Patr. Mon., vol. XIII,
nos. 230, 243, 333, 875. See especially E. Mayer-Homberg, Die jrinkischen Volksrechte im
Mittelalter, I, p. 374 ff.
32. Leges Longobardorum curn Argutissimis Glosis Caroli de Tocco, in Lege, Tuum
et ludices, c. 2, 58, 2, f. 39v, cited in Chapter 1 supra. Cf., Meijers, "L'Histoire des principes
fondamentaux de droit international privA a partir du Moyen Age," Recueil des cours,
Academie de Droit International, Paris, 1934, III, vol. 49, p. 554.
1966]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
of dispute. 8 Not being members of a regular state they were not entitled
to the use of Jewish law. In the sixth century they seemed to be viventes
legem Romanam. But in the Carolingian period they were not treated as
Romani. Their position in this period involved some recognition of the
Jewish law and can best be explained as a royal privilege accorded to
strangers or wargangi, forming a kind of "Jewry law."
In principle, the law of the father determined the law of the off-
spring. This accords with the social and legal ideas of the Germanic
people which attached importance to the form of paternal authority
called mundium.8 4 An exception to this rule is the case of children whose
father entered the clergy and thus became subject to the Roman law.
They remained subject to the original law of the parent.3 5 Another
exception is afforded by the privilege of children born out of wedlock
33. Under which law did the Jews live, the Roman or the Jewish? It appears that
Roman law was first applied to them. Theodoric's Edict, Sec. 43 (MGH, Leges, V, 166)
states: "Circa Iudaeos privilegia legibus delata serventur: quos inter se iurgantes et suis
viventes legibus eos iudices habere necesse est, quos habent observantiae praeceptores." Pope
Gregory the Great also seemed to consider them as living under Roman law: "Sicut lIudaei)
Romanis vivere legibus permittuntur," (Gregory, Ep. II, 6 (891)). So also the Interpretatic
to the Breviary, II, 1, 10 (Cod. Theod., II, 1, 10): "Iudaei omnes qui Romani esse
noscuntur" and the L. Visig, XII, 2, 14: "Libertare vero servum Christianum Hebreus si
maluerit, ad civium Romanorum dignitatem eundem manumittere debebit." On the other
hand the Lex Romana Curiensis of the eighth century (M. Conrat, Geschichte der Quellen
und Literatur des rimischen Rechts im fruheren Mittelalter, Leipzig, 1891, vol. I, pp. 286-
292 gives the year 766) contrasts Iudaeus and Romanus for purpose of law. See Brunner,
Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, vol. I, p. 403, and note 2. The Merovingian period appears to
be one of transition. The evidence for the question of attachment to Jewish law or Roman
law is small. Hence much dispute in the literature on the subject which is summarized by
SOLOMON KATZ, THE JEWS IN THE VISIGOTHIC AND FRANKISH KINGDOMS OF SPAIN AND
GAUL, 83-84 (1937). Much of this discussion, however, misses the vital point. When the
Jews are treated as Romani, are they under Roman law qua Romans, or under Roman
law provisions dealing with Jews? The answer varies according to locality and it is
doubtful whether the barbarian codes of the period can give a complete answer. Under
the Carolingians the Jews were not treated as subject to Roman law. In two charters of
Louis the Pious Jews are granted "secundum legem vivere." Formulae Imperiales, 30
(MGH, Formulae, p. 309); 31 (p. 310); 52 (p. 325). See the Capitula de ludaeis, c. 6
(MGH, Cap., I, 259): "Si Iudaeus contra Iudaeum aliquod negocium habuerit, per legem
suam se defendat." In accordance with the status of foreigners in general the payment for
the murder of a Jew went not to kinsmen but to the royal fiscus. (Formulae Imperiales
30, 31 in MGH, Form., p. 309, 310). They were also exempted from trial by ordeal. See
Formulae Imperiales, 30. The Edictum Pistense prescribes a fine in gold for counterfeiting
by Jews. Ed. Pist., c. 23 (MGH). Other references to the status of Jews are contained
in Capitulare Missorum Aquisgranense Alterum of 809, c. 13 (MGH, Cap., I, 152), dealing
with the number of witnesses required at a trial by a Jew. In general see KATZ, op. cit.
supra note 33, at 84-87 and notes. More recently Bernhard Blumenkranz, Juifs et
chritiens dans le monde occidental, 430-1096, Paris, 1960, following Guido Kisch, The
Jews in Medieval Germany, Chicago, 1948, p. 15 ff, makes a distinction between "Jewish
law" and "Jewry-law." Blumenkranz, at 298, argues forcefully against the "Jewish law"
being considered a personal law like the barbarian and Roman laws. This is supported by
the fact that the barbarian laws contain no mention of Jews, not even for determina-
tion of wergeld though Gregory of Tours does picture them as exercising what Blumen-
kranz, at 299, calls the "Germanic right" of jaida, Historia Francorum, 7, 23.
34. Brunner, Deutsche Rechtegeschichte, vol. I, p. 393; Stouff, "Etude," Rev. bourg.,
1894, p. 16.
35. Liut, Leg., 153, cited supra.
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of selecting their own law, though the choice usually favored the law of
the mother. This seemed to be the rule in Italy as the following excerpt
suggests: "Iustum est ut homo de adulterio natus vivat qua lege vol-
uerit"88 (It is just that a man born in adultery lives by the law of his
choice). However, among the Franks it is probable that natural offspring
were either treated as servile or, by adoption, shared the same law as
the father.
87
The law of the freedman varied among the different Germanic na-
tions. Among the Ripuarians the status of the freedman depended on
whether he had been released according to the formalities of Roman or
of Frankish law. 88 It was commonly believed that among the Burgun-
dians the national law to which the former serf belonged before his
change of status, regulated his new condition of freedom. 9 This is based
on a misinterpretation of the Lex Romana Burgundionum which simply
allowed the ruler to emancipate a serf by Roman law." This usage which
was also followed in Lombardy, resulted from an improper reading of an
edict of Rothari. The edict simply prescribed that the freedman should
conform to the conditions laid down by the act of manumission, the leges
dominorum.4
The Frankish method of freeing the slave was per denarium (by
fictitious purchase), before the king. After this formality, the former
slave became subject to the Salic or Ripuarian law.4 The Roman method
of manumission, which was more widespread, w.s by testament, or in the
church, or by charter. If one of these methods was employed, the slave
assumed Roman nationality. The freedman assumed the legal status and
the wergeld of the Roman.4 The option of using any one of several
formalities in manumission may have produced some strange results. A
Roman who freed his slave according to the formalities of the Salic law
thereby transformed the former slave into a Salian Frank.
The status of married women seems also to have varied. Generally
36. Quaestiones ac Monita, c. 30, MGH, Leges, IV, p. 593.
37. J. M. Pardessus, Loi Salique, p. 449.
38. Lex. Rib., LVII, 1: "Si quis libertum suum per manum propriam seu per alienam
in praesentia Regis secundum legem Ripuariam ingenuum demiserit, per denarium . . .
sicut reliqui Ripularii liber permaneat." Cf. also Lex. Rib., LXI, 1; LVIII, 1; Lex Salica,
XXVI.
39. Klirrath, Travaux sur l'histoire du droit franfais, vol. I, p. 351. The reasoning
on which this is based is extremely vague.
40. Lex Rora. Burg., III, 2: "... liberti Romani natione a principe manumissi ..
See Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, vol. I, p. 393, note 54.
41. Ed. Roth., 226, MGH, 80 series, p. 47; Cap., I, no. 98, MGH, p. 205, c. 6.
42. Lex Rib., LVII, 1, quoted in note 38. Cf., Lex Salica, XXVI, ed. Behrend.
43. Lex Rib., LXI, 2, MGH, p. 253: "Quod si aliquid criminis admiserit, secundum
legem Romanam iudicetur. Et qui eum interficerit, 100 solidos multetur." For France,
Appendix ad Marculfum, 61: De Roziere, Formules, no. 63: "Semper ad civitatem debeat
pertinere Romanam." De Roziere, Formules, nos. 62, 75, 88: "Civis romanus ipsos eos esse
praecipio." For Italy, Hist. Patr. Mon., XIII, no. 243, anno 867. Devic and Vaiss~te,
Histoire gnirale de Languedoc, vol. II, 49 (Preuves, col. 123).
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the married woman assumed the law of her husband." This tendency was
fortified by express provision of church councils in the ninth century and
following.45 Meijers ascribes the frequent application of the husband's
law in the documents to the fact that it was the husband who usually
made the gift or donation; when the wife made the grant, her birth law
was cited separately." The case of the Countess Matilda who though
married to a Lombard continued to use her original law, the Salic, is not
untypical of this practice.
Lombard documents give us additional information on the status
of the wife. The husband regularly acquired the mundium (paternal or
marital authority) over his wife who thereby became subject to his law.
A law of Liutprand declares: "If a Roman marries a Lombard woman
and obtains the mundium over her, she becomes a Roman."48 An interest-
ing complication was resolved as a result of the application of this rule.
If the woman had remained a Lombard, she would not have been able
to remarry without the consent of the heirs of her first husband. The
second husband would have had to pay them a composition if the con-
sent had not been obtained. Since the woman was a Roman the consent
of the heirs was unnecessary in order for her to contract a new marriage.
It would appear, therefore, that in addition to the wife's being subject to
the husband's law, the widow remained under the law of her husband.
The 'Constitution of Lothar abolished the older rule on the latter point
and declared that for the future, the widow should return to her original
national law.49
For the sale of property, as already suggested, women in the Lom-
bard documents conformed to their original law rather than to that of
the husband. In 961 a Lombard woman married to a Roman disposes of
property according to the Lombard law.5" In 998, the Countess Ermen-
garde married to a Lombard makes a donation according to Salic law."
The principle revealed in these documents is quite clear: no one need
obligate himself or surrender either property or rights except according
to personal law rules accepted in a specified region.52
The question of a free choice of law to which we now turn, for a
44. Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, vol. 1, p. 393.
45. Stouff, "Etude," Rev. bourg., 1894, pp. 19, 38, 290.
46. Meijers, "Droit int. prive," Rec. des cours, p. 536, note 2.
47. Stouff, loc. cit., p. 16 quoting Saint-Pere de Chartres, I, proleg., p. xcviii, no. 4,
anno 1107: "Ego Mathildis, comitissa et ducatrix, et filia quondam Bonifacii, qui fuit
similiter dux et marchio, que professa sum lege vivere salica."
48. Liut. Leges, 127, MGH, 80 series, p. 134.
49. Hlotharii Capitula Italica Memoriae Olonnae Comitibus Data, 822-823, Cap., I,
MGH, p. 319. See Hist., Parr. Mon., XIII, no. 634, anno. 959.
50. Hist. Patr. Mon., vol. 1, p. 193.
51. Ficker, Urkunden zur Reichs und Rechtsgeschichts Italiens, IV, 1874, 34; Thvenin,
Textes, 113: "Qui professa sum ego ipsa Ermengarda cometissa ex nacione mea legem
vivere Solicha, set nunc pro ipso viro meo legem vivere videor Langobardorum."
52. Meijers, "Principes de droit int. prive," Rec. des cours, p. 588.
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long time aroused controversy. The right of an individual to change his
birth law at will was suggested by Montesquieu who made it the basis
of an elaborate theory for the disappearance of the Roman law in northern
France. According to Montesquieu, the reason the Roman law did not
survive in the so-called country of customary law or pays de droit
coutumier was that the Franks allowed the conquered population to
embrace the Salic law.5" Furthermore, the Salic law offered an incentive
to Romans to accept it because of the higher composition allowed to
Franks. 4 This free choice of law was based on a number of arguments
which do not bear up well under examination. The theory was taken up
in detail by Savigny and answered to the satisfaction of most students.55
The main points of the controversy, however, deserve notice.
The first and principal evidence for a free choice of law is founded
on the single reading of the Salic law already alluded to.56 As pointed out,
however, Herold's manuscript version is probably an aberration. 57
Another argument is based on the so-called "professions." It has
been commonly assumed that this meant that a person was simply bound
by whatever law he first professed but that the original profession was
made in complete liberty. It is quite clear that the profession had no
such meaning or intention. The profession of law is often stated side by
side with the nationality of the person. This does not mean that the two
ideas of nationality and law are distinct. As already shown, it was only
in exceptional cases that the birth law was changed and the use of the
two terms side by side was meant to allow for a possible change in a
person's legal status 'brought about, for example, by marriage.
The rule of Lombard law which permitted children born out of
wedlock to choose their own law would certainly not have been necessary
if the choice of law were common to all persons.
Savigny cites an apparent argument for the free choice of law in a
document of the early twelfth century. In it Oddo Blanco professes the
Roman law though his sons somewhat later affirm their adherence to the
Lombard law.' Savigny seeks the explanation for this anomaly in a
copyist's error, for the deed mentions a launegild, an institution of Lom-
bard law.59 There is also the possibility that Oddo had entered the clergy
and assumed a new law.
An argument for the free choice of law also is based on a text of
Liutprand cited elsewhere which seems to allow individuals a choice of
53. MONTESQumu, SPmrr OF =hE LAWS, Bk. XXVIII, ch. 4.
54. Ibid. Bk. XXVIII, Chapters 3, 4.
55. Savigny, Rom. Recht im Mittelalter, vol. I, pp. 151 ff.
56. Lex Salica, XLIV, ed. Hessels, Cod. 10, col. 250.
57. Id. at ch. 1, note 104.
58. Lupi, Codez Diplomaticus Civitatis et Ecclesiae Bergomatis, col. 228.
59. Savigny, op. cit. supra note 55 at 153.
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legal procedure.60 This statement cannot be regarded as countenancing
the free choice of law. It merely allows the use for certain purposes of
agreements and conventions in which the state had no special interest.6 '
The most important of all the documents cited on the general ques-
tion of the free choice of national law is undoubtedly the Constitution
of Lothar issued in the year 824 in which the people of Rome were given
an opportunity to choose under what law they wished to live. The actual
decree has come down to us in two texts. One is the approved or official
Lombard text, and the other is a text contained in a Roman collection of
church canons. There are one or two differences in these texts which have
some bearing on the question under discussion. The first sentence of the
Lombard text follows:
We wish that all the Roman people be questioned as to
what law they wish to live under so that by such law as they
have professed they may abide.2
The Roman text begins:
We wish moreover that all the senate and people of Rome
be asked under what law they wish to live so that they may
live under that law.63
The Roman text contains a reference to the senate of Rome which
is absent from the Lombard text. However, it is doubtful whether any
inference can be drawn therefrom concerning the effect of this ordinance
on the Lombard kingdom as distinct from the city of Rome. 4 The im-
portant point is that in both texts the application of this principle is
confined to the city of Rome, and the explanation of this fact is that
Rome, which up to this time had not had the system of the personality
of law, was now obliged to establish it for the benefit of Franks who had
come into the city perhaps in connection with the business of govern-
ment. The use of the word vu/t in the ordinance is not to be construed,
therefore, as implying a choice by the whole Roman population of a
territorial code for themselves but rather, in conformity with the personal
* law system in general, as implying a choice by individuals of the law
60. Liutprandi Leges, 91: ". . .Et si quiscumque de lege sum subdiscendere voluerit
et pactionis aut convenentias inter se fecerent, et ambe partis consenserent, isto non
impotetur contra legem, quia ambe partis volontariae faciunt. 21
61. Savigny, op. cit. supra note 55, at 156-157.
62. Cap., I, no. 161, MGH, p. 232, c. 5, cited in previous chapter.
63. This text was originally included in the Collectio Canonum of Cardinal Deusdedit,
in 1086 or 1087, and has been reprinted several times, Savigny, op. cit. supra note 55, at
vol. I, pp. 159-160. Capitulare Romanum, ed. E. Baluze, Capitularia Regum Francorum,
Paris, 1780, vol. II, col. 318, c. v: "Volumus etiam ut omnis Senatus et Populus Romanus
interrogetur, quali vult Lege vivere, ut sub ea vivat; ..."
64. Savigny, op. cit. supra note 55, at vol. I, pp. 166-167 argues against the so-called
Lombard text's actually being a Lombard ordinance, pointing to the unwonted use of
"populus Romanus" and also to the absence in the Lombarda of the gloss of Carolus de
Tocco on this provision.
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under which they were to live. If the purpose of the ordinance had been
to establish a territorial law for Rome it would only have perpetuated
the status quo, for there is no doubt that the Roman population would
have chosen Roman law.
The gloss of a Paris manuscript referring to the Constitution of
Lothar adds, however, "It is not to be thought that the Roman people
were to be questioned any further since they confessed, at this time, to
be living under the Roman law." 5 This suggests that what was originally
intended as an affirmation of the personal law principle was subsequently
interpreted as establishing a territorial law. Another document of some-
what uncertain provenance and date, the Constitution of Conrad II, also
seems to contain the same interpretation of the ordinance of 824.66
Meijers in addition seems to accept the later interpretations of the Con-
stitution of Lothar making a change of law possible in Rome. 7 No doubt
many Ripuarians called themselves Salians in Italy, 8 but the Italian
commentators of the Constitution such as Ariprandus, Albertus and
Jacobus do not appear to argue for a free choice of law. 9 The Act of
Lantemann of 1237 which conferred a morgengabe on his wife though
she professed to be "living by Roman law," may be an example of mutual
borrowing rather than of repudiation of personal law.7"
Was there ever outright repudiation of national law? The instances
cited by Stouff are inconclusive. In one a clergyman, Felix, after making
a gift to his daughter declares, "although subject to Roman law I have
received from you, my daughter, a launegild."' The launegild or counter-
gift was an institution of Lombard law and the reason the transaction was
accompanied by this procedure was that Felix had originally received the
lands from his wife by Lombard law. The Bishop of Brescia, who in the
eleventh century received a launegild from the citizens of his episcopal
city, may also be acquitted of violating his "national" law, for in Italy
65. Baluze, op. cit. supra note 63, at vol. II, col. 1291: "Non est putandum populum
Romanum ulterius esse interrogandum, quando quidem Romana lege confessi sunt se vivere
eo tempore."
66. MGH, Legum Sectio IV, Constitutiones et Acta Publica Publica Imperatorum et
Regum, vol. I, 1893, ed. L. Weiland, p. 82. Conradi II. Constitutiones, 37. Mandatum de
Lege Romana. (1027-1039):
Imperator Chuonradus augustus Romanis iudicibus. Audita controversia, que
hactenus inter vos et Longobardos iudices versabatur nulloque termino quiescebat,
sancimus, ut quecunque amodo negocia mota fuerint, tam inter Romane urbis
menia quam etiam de foris in Romanis pertinenciis, actore Longobardo vel reo
Langobardo, a vobis duntaxat Romanis legibus terminentur nulloque tempore
revivescant.
Savigny, op. cit. supra note 55, at vol. I, p. 164.
67. Meijers, "Principes du droit int. prive," Rec. des cours, pp. 558-559.
68. Mayer-Homberg, Die frankischen Volksrechte im Mittelalter, I, p. 19 ff.
69. Meijers, op. cit. supra note 67, at 559, n. 1.
70. Voltellini, Acta Tirolensia, I, no. 592 cited by Meijers, op. cit. supra note 67, at
p. 559, n.3.
71. Kohler, Beitrage zur germanischen Privatrechts-geschichte, 1885, H, 2, Thevenin,
Textes, p. 61. Stouff, "Etude," Rev. bourg., p. 23. Cf., note of Brunner, Deutsche Rechts-
geschichte, vol. I, p. 395, note 60.
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at this time, as well as in France, the clergy granted property by the
birth law rather than by Roman law.
72
On the whole, in studying the question of the individual's personal
law in the Frankish period, it seems necessary to make allowance for
some differences in practice from one region to another and from the
eighth to the ninth century. In principle, a free choice of law was cer-
tainly not permitted. In practice, the free choice might be achieved in
legitimate ways. In theory, the average person accepted his law with the
same good grace with which he accepted membership in his national group
or in his church.
B. Conflicts of Law in the Frankish Empire
Inasmuch as a person's entire status depended upon his personal
law, it was inevitable that conflicts of law should arise when persons of
different national origin became involved in litigation.73 Some of the
questions arising from such encounters were regulated by the capitularies
which had a territorial application, or by specific dispositions of the
separate barbarian laws, as in the Burgundian law provisions for the
settlement of disputes between Burgundians and Romans. In addition to
this, a fusion of doctrines was slowly taking place among the national
law systems which was to reduce the number of possible conflicts of law
as time went on. 74 During the Frankish period there was constant
"oscillation" going on between the conception of a common law regulating
the concerns of all the inhabitants, a kind of ius gentium (Roman law of
nations), and the idea of a system of private international law governing
peoples of differing race.
75
Rules were worked out in the several fields for resolving these con-
flicts. Uniformity was not attained, but a dominant principle can be
discerned in all these practices. It is "that no one may lose a right, no one
may obligate himself except in conformance with his personal law. ' 76 Of
course, the application of the principle varied, but this was to be expected
72. Hist. Patr. Mon., XIII, 21, p. 44, n.1. See also ibid., no. 145 (1842). The wit-
nesses to this document are Alamanni. The example cited by Stouff, loc. cit., p. 23 based
on Hist. Patr. Mon., XIII, no. 145 is inconclusive.
73. Stouff, "Etude sur le principe de la personnalite des lois," Revue bourguignonne
de l'enseignement superieur, IV, 1894, pp. 282 ff. Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, vol.
I, pp. 385 ff.
74. Stouff, op. cit. supra note 13, at 287.
75. Brissaud, Manuel d'histoire due droit fran ais, pp. 58-59.
76. Meijers, "L'Histoire des principes fondamentaux du droit international prive a
partir du Moyen Age," Recueil des cours, Academie de droit international, III, vol. 49,
p. 555. The principle of consent to taxation in the later Middle Ages is based on the same
idea. See McIlwain, Growth of Political Thought in the West, pp. 189, 373 and the nu-
merous illustrations there given. Typical expressions of this point of view in the capitularies
are: Boretius, Cap., I, p. 201, C. 4 (790): "De vero statu ingenuitatis aut aliis quaerelis
unusquisque secundum legem se ipsum defendat;" and the Aquitanian capitulary of 768,
Boretius, Cap., I, p. 43, c. 10: "ut omnes homines eorum legis habeant tam Romani quam
et Salici. .. "
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in a period which placed more emphasis on rights than on sanctions or the
machinery of control. Furthermore, the ignorance of certain personal
laws in some regions also rendered a consistent application difficult to
achieve. Let us trace the operation of this dominant principle in the lead-
ing legal questions that arose from the association of the races in the
Frankish Empire.
Marriage did not ordinarily give rise to a conflict of laws. The old
interdict against the marriage between a barbarian and a Roman fell
into desuetude in the barbarian countries.7  The Visigoth law of
Recceswinth specifically abrogated the law forbidding the marriage of
Roman with barbarian.79 It probably never had validity among the
Franks.8 °
According to whose national law was the marriage ceremony to be
performed? Generally the wife conformed to the national law of the
husband.8' In the betrothal of Clovis and Clotilda, Frankish ceremonies
were observed.82 The Lombard king Ratchis failed to endow his wife with
a morgengabe and was severely censured by his people for this over-
sight.83 An interesting case, however, arose which was settled by the
Council of Tribur in the ninth century. A woman of Saxon nationality
was deserted by her husband. Although her husband was a Frank, the
betrothal ceremonies had taken place by the Saxon law. The husband
alleged the non-observance of his national law and repudiated the mar-
riage. The Council of Tribur determined that betrothal and marriage
ceremonies were valid provided that they had been contracted in agree-
ment with the law of one of the parties.84 The decisions of the Council of
Tribur have often been understood to change the rule that the husband's
law was followed in the marriage ceremony. This is not so. The Council
merely mitigated the harsh consequences of either this rule or the rule
77. In the Middle Ages the power of monarchy is "limited" in the sense that the king
is under the law but he is not "controlled" by any other organ of government, McIlwain,
op. cit. supra note 76, at 363.
78. Stouff, op. cit. supra note 73, at 290. The interdict found its way into the Lex
Romana Visigothorum and was practiced in Languedoc up to the seventh century; Haenel,
Lex Romana Visigothorum, p. 92, Interpretatio. Devic and Vaiss6te, Histoire gingrale de
Languedoc, vol. I, p. 529.
79. Lex Visigothorum Reccesvindiana, III, I, I, Antiqua, MGH, 8* series, pp. 86-87,
quoted supra.
80. Lot, Les Invasions germaniques, p. 215.
81. Stouff, op. cit. supra note 73, at 19, 290. Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte,
vol. I, p. 391. Bernard and Bruel, Chartes de Cluny, I, No. 86, p. 96 of 904. Ibid., I, No.
105, p. 117 of 909: ". . . Ego F. desponso mihi iuxta legem meam romanam..."
82. Stouff, op. cit. supra note 73, at 292.
83. Chronicon Benedicti, MGH, Scriptores III, p. 702, c. 16. Cf., supra note 2.
84. Concilium Triburiense, 895, ludicia, c. 4, Boretius and Krause, Capitularia, II,
MGH, p. 207: "De Francia nobilis quidam homo nobilem de Saxonia Saxonum lege
duxit uxorem. . . Definivit super hoc sancta synodus ut Me transgressor evangelicae legis
subigatur penitentiae, a secunda coniuge separetur, priorem resumere cogatur." See also
Ch. 39 of rules of the Council, op. cit., p. 235. Meijers, op. cit. supra note 76, at 556.
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requiring observance of two personal laws, and thus implied that one law
would thereafter suffice.
The morning gift, or morgengabe, made by the groom to his wife was
also given in accordance with the groom's law.85
The purchase-price of the bride by which the husband acquired the
mundium over her was determined by the bride's national law. 6 In the
same way the Lombard bridegroom paid the reipus or redemption money




Contracts between persons of different nationality only occasionally
gave rise to conflicts of law, for in most of the covenants concluded
between such persons the forms of Roman law were observed. Accord-
ingly, contractual documents in which no law is mentioned invariably
appear to follow Roman law forms.88 Where the Roman law was not
employed in the making of a contract and where other formalities were
observed the documents record the national law of the person who
grants or sells rather than that of the purchaser or the receiver. The
usual formula is: "I, Count Bernard, and my wife, Senegundis give to
you, just as my law, the Salic, recalls."89 In the ninth century Ragimbald,
a Frank, gave lands to the monastery near Metz." The formalities were
discharged before a placitum (tribunal of "hundred") according to the
custom of the Franks. Count Theodoric in the tenth century sold property
to the abbey of Babenberg.9 ' The actual transfer of the property took
place by the procedure of the Frankish and Saxon laws. The documents
coming from Lombardy in all such cases of sale recall the nationality of
the seller. He is either a Roman, a Salian, a Ripuarian, a Goth, an Ala-
man, a Bavarian, or a Burgundian.92 At Cremona in the tenth century
a transfer of property was made by a Lombard to a Frank named Al-
cherus. The formality of the launegild was employed in conformance
with the national law of the Lombard donor.9" In this document the
85. Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, vol. I, p. 391 and note 42. Bernard and
Bruel, Chartes de Cluny, I, no. 189, p. 176 of 912: ". . . porcione mea secundum lege
mea Gonbada in morgingiva ... tibi dono ad abendum."
86. Liutprandi Leges, 127, MGH, 80 series, p. 134.
87. Cartularium Langobardicum, ed. A. Boretius, MGH, Leges, IV, no. 16.
88. Stouff, op. cit. supra note 73, at 294. The notion of a contract was poorly de-
veloped in Germanic law. See section infra on fusion of national laws.
89. Devic and Vaissfte, Hist. gin. de Languedoc, V. 138, col. 300 (985).
90. H. Loersch and R. Schroder, Urkunden zur Geschichte des deutschen Privatrechtes,
Bonn, 1881, no. 77: "957-Tradidi namque per manus fidelium meorum lege salica vi-
ventium. ..
91. Loersch and Schr6der, op. cit. supra note 90, at no. 83 (1027-1038).
92. Thvenin, Textes, 52, Cartularium Langobardicum, 2.
93. Historiae Patriae Monumenta, XIII, 432: "Et accepi ego qui supra Arderigo a te
qui supra Altecherio Launchild manitias pars uno." See nos. 84 and 421 in same work.
Cf., Troya, Codice diplomatico longobardo, V. 430, no. 880, anno 767, and no. 118; Brun-
ner, op. cit. supra note 85, at vol. I, p. 389.
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nationality of the donor is not specifically mentioned but must be in-
ferred.
Emancipation occasionally gave rise to conflicts of law. The law of
the person asserting his freedom was valid in lawsuits. 4 Brunner, how-
ever, believes that in cases where the master had concealed the fact that
the slave had lived as a free man, the national law of the master was
applied. 5 An interesting capitulary of 801 allows the plea of the former
slave who had enjoyed liberty for thirty years to prevail against the con-
trary plea of the Roman and Lombard masters, but not against that of
the Frank or Alaman masters." The reason was that the latter laws had
not accepted the Roman rules of prescription.
The witnesses to documents of sale, whenever their law is recorded,
belonged to the nationality of the seller. A capitulary added to the Salic
law ordains that anyone desiring to dispose of goods take suitable wit-
nesses "either among the residents of the district or among those who
live under the same law as himself." ' A document of the twelfth century
originating in Thuringia and cited by Loersch and Schr~der shows this
rule in effect in the sale of some lands by a noble woman to the church
of St. Gregory. The act of sale affirms: "the witnesses should be Franks,
because the land sold is situated in Frankish country, and because
Matilda is subject to the law of the Franks. 98 Here we observe the
tendency of the national law to blend with a territorial principle.
The personal law of the ward determined the disposition of his or
her property and the settlement of any legal issues that might arise.99
In the same way the law of church lands under the protection of laymen
was valid against that of the protector.' 0 In testamentary succession the
law of the testator governed the rules of succession to property. 10
Interesting evidence of the way in which the law of the "principal"
party, which was that of the person obligating himself or alienating
property, even if improperly acquired, received judicial recognition, is
contained in the trial procedure of the Goth, Joshua, and the Frank
Rodestagnus. A church belonging to Joshua had been seized by Rodes-
tagnus. The latter promised restitution. This promise was made by a
procedure familiar to the Franks, the adramitio.°2
94. Brunner, op. cit. supra note 85, at vol. I, p. 392.
95. Ibid.
96. Cap. I, no. 98, MGH, p. 206, c. 8.
97. Cap. I, no. 136, MGH, p. 282, c. 6, quoted supra. See also Brunner, op. cit. supra
note 85, at vol. I, p. 388, notes 25, 26.
98. Loersch and Schrider, Urkunden, no. 100, p. 76, 1133-1152.
99. Cap., I, no. 91, MGH, p. 192, c. 5: "... ut viduas et orfanos tutorem habeant
iuxta illorum legem, qui illos defensent ...
100. Ibid.
101. Cap. Ital., I, no. 105, MGH, p. 218, c. 14: "Observamus ut romanus populus
successionem eorum iuxta suam legem habeant." Cf., Liut. Leg., 91.
102. Th~venin, Textes, no. 114 contains an account of this interesting case based
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A curious variant on the rule that the law of the donor applied in
transactions of contract or sale occurs in the treatment of donations
made to churches. A law of Liutprand by special favor excused the
churches from giving the launegild in return for gifts made to them by
Lombards.' The inference is that the gift was to be made according to
Lombard law, rather than according to the Roman law by which the
church lived. This explains, according to Stouff, the unusual feature
noticeable in acts of exchange made in Lombardy between churches and
individuals.10 4 The nationality of the individuals involved in the trans-
action is often cited, as in the act of exchange between the Abbot of the
monastery of St. Ambrose and the priest Adelbert, who is mentioned as
living under the Lombard law.' °5 In the Frankish territories proper ex-
changes between churches and Franks are often made according to the
Salic law because, as Stouff again observes, these acts of exchange are
usually performed to the benefit of the church.' °6
The law applied to landed property often did not vary. A capitulary
of Louis the Pious, already cited, made church lands subject to the law
of the original donor of the lands."0 7 Married women'08 and clergy,109
though they lived by another law, nevertheless disposed of landed prop-
erty by their original national law. Thus we find "the severance of landed
property from the tribal law of its occasional possessor." ' °
The principle of the personality of law is applied by the Ripuarian
law and several of the capitularies to the field of court procedure."'
Lawsuits between persons of different nationality were subject to certain
general prescriptions: (1) The tribunal usually contained judges of the
upon Germer-Durand, Cartulaire de Notre-Dame de Nimes, 8 (898). Cf. also the pleas at
Narbonne, 933, Devic and Vaisshte, Hist. gin. de Languedoc. V. 57, col. 160. On the
adramitio or arramitio see Brissaud, Manuel, p. 1384.
103. Liut. Leg., 73, MGH, 8* series, p. 113.
104. Stouff, "Etude," Rev. bourg, 1894, pp. 296-297.
105. Hist. Patr. Mon., XIII, no. 451 (913); between Adelbert, Archdeacon of Bergamo
and Landeric, living by the Salic law, Hist. Patr. Mon., XIII, no. 604 (953). See also nos.
662, 710, 786.
106. Stouff, "Etude," Rev. bourg., 1894, p. 297. Th6venin, 7extes, no. 72 (836), ex-
change of movables between monks and a priest in Burgundy; ibid., no. 95 (862-863),
exchange of lands between an abbey and a layman in Burgundy; ibid., no. 169 (1081-1105),
exchange of serfs with an abbey.
107. Cap., I, no. 145, MGH, p. 297, c. 3.
108. Hist. Patr. Mon., I, Chartae, no. 193 (961). See Pertile, Storia del diritto italiano,
vol. I, 2nd ed., p. 69, note 22.
109. Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, vol. I, p. 390, note 35, cites the case of the
nun, Warnhild, who in 856 sells "iuxta saligam legem" what her deceased husband gave her
on their marriage "iuxta suam saligam legem," Registrum Farfense, Rome, 1881, vol. II,
p. 250. Cf., also the case of Felix, already cited in a previous chapter. He was a clergyman
who left lands to his daughter and received the launegild, according to Lombard law, J.
Kohler, Beitrdge zur germanische Privatrechtsgeschichte, part 2, p. 7, no. 2.
110. BRUNNER, op. cit. supra note 85, at vol. I, p. 389.
111. Lex Ribuaria, XXXI, 3, ed. Sohm, MGH, p. 224 quoted in full Chapter 1:
... in iudicio interpellatus, sicutlex loci contenit ubi natus fuit, sic respondeat." Cap. Ital.
Pippini, 790, Cap., I, no. 95, MGH, p. 201, c. 4.
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nationality of each litigant." 2 In the trial of Joshua and of Rodestagnus,
Gothic and Salian judges participated. 113 (2) Each litigant was allowed
delays in accordance with the rules of his own law.114 In the trial re-
ferred to, the judges gave Rodestagnus a delay of forty nights, which was
based on the Salic law." 5 (3) Each litigant furnished proofs, oaths, and
testimony prescribed by his national law." 6 The Roman produced wit-
nesses,"' the barbarian brought oath helpers or underwent the duel or
the judgment of God." 8 An exception to this rule was contained in the
Burgundian law, which imposed judicial combat in any case involving
Burgundians." 9
A few words are needed more specifically about the ordinary tribunal
of Frank law, the Mallum, and its composition. The court was, as Lot
puts it, an adaptation of the pre-conquest machinery "to the new needs
of the Germanic administration of justice.' 120 It associated Romans and
barbarians in a common judicial organization. This it did through the
medium of the suitors, the rachimburgi(i) or boni homines selected from
the principal races. Later, when the court system was reformed under
Charlemagne, these were replaced by the scabini, professional judges or
judgment sayers. It is a reasonable guess that the reform itself was
dictated by the needs of the personal law regime, in particular the need
for judicial personnel familiar with the several national laws.' 2' The
112. See Cap. Miss. Spec., c. 48, Cap., I, no. 35, MGH, p. 104 cited in Chapter 1.
113. Th~venin, Textes, no. 114; Stouff, "Etude," Rev. bourg., 1894, p. 301.
114. Expositio, c. 7, Ad Lud. P., 15, MGH, Leges, IV, p. 530: "Ceteri vero secundum
suam legem, veluti Romanus 20 dies habeant indutias."
115. Th~venin, Textes, no. 114, p. 168: "Indices decreverunt et iudicium ut in
quadraginta noctes suum auctorem presentare faciat." See Pkrard, Recueil de plusieurs pieces
curieuses servant a I'histoire de Bourgogne, Paris, 1664, p. 34.
116. Cap. Ital., no. 105, I, MGH, p. 219, c. 14: ". . . et quando iurant iuxta suam legem,
iurent . . . ." Ed. Pist. of 864, c. 20: ". . . secundum suam legem se inde sacramento
idoneum reddat." Cap. Legi Add. of 816, no. 134, I, MGH, p. 268, c. 2. Cap. Legibus Add.
of 818-819, no. 139, I, MGH, p. 282, c. 6.
117. L. V. Muratori, Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, II, 2, 505, in a lawsuit involving
the abbey of Farfa. Cf. also the notitia of a judgment given in 870, Chartes de Cluny, I, no.
15, p. 18.
118. Thivenin, Textes, nos. 5, 24, 25, 32, 46 (oath helpers); nos. 49, 102, 125, 160
(proof by battle) ; no. 146 (iudidum Dei) ; no. 39 (judgment of the Cross).
119. Agobard, Adversus Legem Gundobadi, 4, MGH, Epistolae Karolini Aevi:
Si subito contigerit alicui ex ipsis disceptatio in iudiciis, nullum poterit habere
testem . . . eo quod non recipiatur testimonium super Gundobadum.
Agobard, loc. ct., 6, 7, 9.
120. Lot, Les Invasions germaniques, p. 211.
121. Bernard Althoffer, Les Scabins, Paris and Nancy, 1938, p. V finds the cause of
the development of scabini and rachimburgii in the personality of law. See especially p.
107ff on the role of the scabini in the court; and pp. 133-138 on the manner in which
they discharged this function. See p. 165ff for a catalog of legal actions involving scabini
in the Carolingian era. J. Flach, Les Origines de l'ancienne France, I, Paris, 1886, 228-229,
also emphasizes the necessity of rachimburgii and scabini belonging to the same nationality
as the litigants: "qu'en d'autres termes ils fussent des pairs." Most recently on the role
of scabini, F. L. Ganshof, "The Impact of Charlemagne on the Institutions of the Frankish
Realm," Speculum, 1965, XL, 1, pp. 55-57.
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need is echoed more than once in the capitularies and is expressed as
early as the seventh century in the formula of Marculf quoted elsewhere. 2'
Thereafter judges of several nationalities appear frequently in court
records, though the composition of these tribunals varies considerably
in different regions. In the south of France the documents disclose the
mixed character of the courts. These occur at Marseilles in 844; in a
village near Arles in 845; at Toulouse in 918; at Nimes in 898; at
Narbonne in 933; and at Arles in 968.123 In the north and east there is
the evidence of Rabanus Maurus that the principle of mixed tribunals
was applied in Saxony. Waitz generalizes this rule to include the entire
northern part of the empire. To Beauchet, however, the provision in a
capitulary of 817 permitting, in the absence of witnesses of the same
nationality, the use of others-"vel si illos habere non potuerit, tunc de
aliis quales ibi meliores inveniri possunt"(or if he has not been able to
have those, then from others such as can be found there among the best)
-raises doubts about the application of the principle outside the midi
and Italy.
124
How about the lawsuit of a Goth or a Burgundian in a region such
as Austrasia where there were not likely to be found scabini of the same
nationality as the litigants? A capitulary of Ansegisus allows the transfer,
under certain conditions, of the case so that "liceat ei sacramentum in
patria sua, id est in legitimo sui sacramenti loco jurandum offerre, et
is qui cum eo litigatur, si velit, sequatur illum in patriam suam ad
recipiendum illud sacramentum" (it be permitted him to take the oath
in his own country, that is to offer his avowal in the legitimate place
of the oath, and he who litigates with him, let him follow him into his
country for the purpose of receiving that oath) allows, in other words,
a change of venue in order to permit the litigant the use of his "legitimate"
mode of proof in his patria.
125
An interesting Capitulare Missorum of 802 issued by Charlemagne
orders the counts to declare by what law they live and to judge according
to this law.22 Roman litigants under this rule would either have had to
122. Marculf, Formulae, I, 8; Zeumer, pp. 47-48. On the capitularies of 802 (Cap. I,
no. 34) and 806 (Cap., I, no. 35, C. 48), see Ganshof, loc. cit., pp. 58-59.
123. L. Beauchet, Histoire de l'organisation judiciaire en France-Epoque franque,
Paris, 1886, p. 287. For additional examples see Cartulaire de Saint-Victor de Marseille,
I, 290, (Aries); PWrard, Recueil de pibces servant a l'histoire de Bourgogne, p. 35 (Autun).
124. Beauchet, op. cit. supra note 123, at 289. G. Waitz, "Sendrecht der Mainwenden,"
Zeitschrijt jiir deutsches Recht, XIX, p. 84.
125. Beauchet, op. cit. supra note 123, at 289-290. Ch6non, Histoire du droit franfais,
I, p. 240ff. Cap., ed. Boretius, MGH, vol. I, p. 268, c. 2 anno 816.
126. Capitulare Missorum Item Speciale, 802, c. 48, Cap., vol. 1, MGH p. 104. M. A.
v. Bethmann-Hollweg, Der Civilprozess des gemeinen Rechts in geschichtlicher Entwickel-
ung, Bonn, 1864-1874, vol. V, p. 79, note 67, emends the passage in the text to read
"Confiteri faciant partes qua." In this way he brings it into apparent consistency with
Marculf, Bk. I, no. 8, cited above, which makes no distinction as to the personal law of
the judge. Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, vol. I, p. 388, note 27 rejects the emenda-
tion and confines its effect to Neustria. Brunner takes issue with Sohm, Die jrdnkische
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accept the judgment of Frankish judges declaring Frankish law or demand
a tribunal containing judges professing Roman law. Apparently there
had been frequent cases of Frankish judges deciding lawsuits involving
men of other nationalities. The ordinance would have had the effect, if
strictly observed, of barring judges living under a national law different
from that of parties to a suit. Its application may have been confined to
the iudices, strictly speaking, rather than to the counts, though the text
itself seems explicit.
Ut comites et iudices confiteantur qua lege vivere debeant et
secundum ipsam iudicent (so that the counts and judges declare
by what law they ought to live and according to that law let
them judge).
A lawsuit involving the abbeys of St. Denis and of Fleury on the Loire
shows us the practical application. The case was brought before judges
of the Salic law who, since the principals lived by the Roman law, were
obliged to refer the litigation to Orleans where judges of the Roman law
could be found.127
How were conflicts of law that arose from torts or crime settled?
In the event of the commission of a crime such as murder, two considera-
tions entered. In the first place, the guilty person violated his national
law. Secondly, the murderer incurred the hostility of the family of the
victim which, under Teutonic law, even at a very late date under the
Frankish monarchs, could exact vengeance from the guilty party. The
influence of government and of the law was early exerted in order to
induce the family of the injured person to renounce the jaida, or private
war, and accept a payment equivalent to the magnitude of the damage or
injury sustained. The consequence of this second line of thought was that
it was the privilege of the injured party to determine the amount of
damage in accordance with the precise provisions of his national law. The
first line of reasoning was based on the fundamental conception of a
person's liability to punishment in accordance with the dictates of his
personal law, which is clearly expressed in the Ripuarian Law. 28
Reichsund Rechtsverfassung, Weimar, 1871, p. 173 who suggested that the count be judged
and outlawed by his own national law. Brunner rightly emphasizes the royal authority
exercised by the count, which enabled him to carry out the ban without regard to his
own national law, but perhaps with some regard to the national law of the province he
ruled. C. 57 of the Cap. Miss. Spec. states: "Caeteri vero banni, quos comites et iudices
faciunt secundum legem uniuscuiusque componantur"; the national law of the judge is
certainly not meant here. To reconcile Marculf, Bk. I, no. 8 and Cap. Miss., 48, I suggest
that the count presided in the court at all times but that in the case of litigants of
nationality other than his own he selected iudices or cognitores of the litigants' nationalities.
See Brissaud, Manuel, p. 54, note 1.
127. Miracula Benedicti, Acta Sanctorum, ed. Bolland, VIII, p. 309 (MGH, Scriptores,
XV, 1, p. 490).
128. Esmein, Cours lementaire d'histoire du droit fran ais, 15th (-14th) ed. by R.
Genestal, Paris, 1930, pp. 85-90 who, however, fails to emphasize adequately the public
crime. The tariffs of composition may be regarded as a "prime contre la vengeance" rather
than as indemnity or fine, Lot, Les Invasions germaniques, p. 166ff.
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The rule of personality applied in certain cases. The Ripuarian law
states that a Salian Frank, a Burgundian, an Alaman, or a member of
any other race accused of having committed a crime in the Ripuarian
country was to be judged not according to Ripuarian law but according
to his own law, "sicut lex loci continet ubi natus fuerit sic respondeat"
(just as the law of the place where he was born prescribes, so may he
respond)."' A capitulary of 782 or thereabouts, dealing with the misdeeds
of Frankish and Lombard counts in Italy, invokes penalties imposed by
the Lombard law. 130 The case of the Lombard nun who, on authorization
of her guardian, married a Frank is of interest because the principle of
personality was applied to the extent that the husband was punished in
conformance with the Frankish law, and the nun and her guardian sub-
jected to the penalties of the Lombard law.131 The general principle here
observed seems to be that the law of the defendant must be applied in
criminal matters.
Very gradually the view prevailed that it was the condition and the
law of the victim that was to be consulted rather than the personal law
of the guilty person. A capitulary of Pippin decrees that every crime
which could give rise to private vengeance must be settled by the scale of
composition determined by the law of the victim. 132 In Italy, the principle
thus affirmed was accepted completely. An interesting document of Italian
origin considers the question of compositions in the Roman law. The
author finds Roman precedents for composition in the Law of the Twelve
Tables. Manifest or open theft in the Twelve Tables was punishable by
a payment of four times the value of the stolen article. Non-manifest
theft entailed a double penalty. If a Roman was robbed by a Lombard, the
Lombard would, in accordance with the provisions of the Law of the
Twelve Tables, pay the Roman a composition of double or quadruple.'
The doctrine here accepted conformed to the rule laid down in the
capitulary of Pippin.'34 An Italian capitulary states: "quando corn-
ponunt, iuxta legem cui malum fecerint componant" (when they com-
pound, according to the law of the person to whom they have done injury
let them make composition)."' Another capitulary decrees a threefold
fine for theft and infringement of the domestic peace.1
3
1
129. Lex Ribuaria, XXXI, 3, 4. (XXXV, 3, 4 of Edition of Beyerle and Buchner,
1954).
130. Cap., no. 91, I, MGH, p. 192, C. 7.
131. Muratori, Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, II b, 942 (circ. 874).
132. Pippini Capitulare, no. 95, I, MGH, p. 201, c. 4, cited supra.
133. Quaestiones ac Monita, 7.
134. Cap., no. 105, I, MGH, p. 219, c. 14:
Langobardus vel Romanus si evenerit quod causam inter se habeant, obser-
vamus, et . . . , quando iurant, iuxta suam legem iurent et, quando componunt
iuxta legem, cui malum fuerint, componant ....
135. Besides Cap. Ital., no. 105 cf., Cap. Harist of the year 779, no. 20, Forma Langob.,
I, p. 49, c. 11. See Cap. Pip., 782-786, no. 91, I, p. 193, c. 8. This appears in the Liber
Leg. Lang. Pip., 8, in the form: "... emendetur iuxta ut eius est lex, cui malum ipsum
perpetratum fuerit.
136. Cap., no. 70, I, MGH, p. 160, c. 2.
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The documents of the ninth century contain veiws of the nature
of composition and its incidents of the two types just described. Louis
the Pious in a capitulary provides that a Saxon or a Frisian guilty of a
crime against a Salian Frank was liable for a composition fixed by the
Salic law."3 7 The value of the money was also set by this law, for at this
time the content of the solidus varied considerably from place to place.
On the other hand, the Capitulare de Villis upheld the older principle that
the law of the guilty party determined the amount of the composition." 8
Ducange in the article Legem suam componere cites some charters from
Toulouse identifying violation of contract with delict and making the
person guilty of breach of contract liable for the payment of a fine deter-
mined by his own personal law.
1 39
In addition to the two aspects of the nature of criminal law just
treated two others appear. The law applied in criminal matters is some-
times the lex loci delicti commisi or law of the place of the crime. 40 This
form of criminal justice is applied to the crime of perjury by a Lombard
paraphrase.' 4 ' The Lex Saxonum also decrees the punishment of the
Saxon offender by the law of the place of the crime.'42 The lex fori also
appears as the competent law in the Edictum Pistense.43 This rule
though not entirely consistent with the personal law principle is an out-
growth of it. A fourth aspect under which criminal justice appears is the
public crime. This topic will be treated below.
The treatment of crime during the period of the personality of law
thus shows traces of divergent doctrines as to the nature of offenses
against the public order and individuals. These differences testify to the
heterogeneous character of the society and legal sources of the time. Three
influences other than the territorial may be recognized in the Frankish
period bearing on the definition of crime: (1) The system of composition;
137. Capitula Legi Addita, 816, I, no. 134, MGH, p. 268, c. 3: ". . . ibi volumus ut
quadraginta denariorum quantitatem solidus habeat, quem vel Saxo, vel Frisio ad partem
Salid Frand cum co litigantis solvere debet." The solidus of 12 denarii appears in a capi-
tulary of 743, Cap., I, MGH, p. 28, c. 2.
138. Cap., I, MGH, p. 83, c. 4:
Franci autem qui in fiscis aut villis nostris commanent, quicquid commiserint,
secundum legem eorum emendare studeant.
139. Ducange, Glossarium, s. v. Legem suam componere.
140. Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, vol. I, p. 386.
141. Cap. Haristall., 779, Forma Langobardica, Capitularia. I, MGH, p. 49, c. 10:
.siCut lex loci illus ubi periurium faCtum est, a longo tempore fuit."
142. Karl V. RiChthofen, Zur Lex Saxonum, Berlin, 1868, pp. 2ff.; Lex Saxonum,
c. 36 in MS additions to Spangenberg Codex quoted by Brunner, op. cit. supra note 140, at
vol. I, p. "386, note 19: ". . . seCundum illorum legem ubi factum fuerit." The competent
tribunal, as Brunner points out, is the Saxon one. Hence there is no question in this law
of the lex fori.
143. Edictum Pistense, 864, Cap., no. 273, II, MGH, p. 315, c. 13:
In illis autem regionibus in quibus secundum legem Romanam iudicia termi-
nantur, iuxta ipsam legem culpabilis iudicetur.
See also chapters 16, 20, 23. There is a hint here of the lex tori. The edict will be
treated more fully in a subsequent chapter.
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(2) the principle of the personality of law; (3) the lex loci delicti
commissi and its variant, the lex fori.
The rules of the personal law r~gime for the settlement of conflicts,
inconsistent though they appear at times, reveal clearly the operation of a
principle guiding political and legal affairs: no one may obligate himself,
no one may lose a right except by "due process" of personal law.
IV. THE COMMON LAWS OF THE FRANKISH EMPIRE
A. Territorial Law and Personal Law
Two currents may be distinguished that were transforming Roman
and barbarian law and bringing them into closer union.' One affected the
"public" or administrative law. It consisted of the extension of royal power
over process, the bannitio, or royal summons often replacing the mannitio,
or private "instance"; and of the increasing role of the court in the inves-
tigation and punishment of crime, which often ignored the system of
private composition. The conception of crime was thus advancing at the
expense of tort, and with it that of a uniform procedure.
The other current is more difficult to trace, for its effects must be
sought in legal practice rather than in official enactments. It promoted
a mingling of private law ideas and institutions and produced changes
in the procedure and substance of barbarian and Roman law. If it car-
ried the Gallo-Romans away from the classical conceptions of dominium
(ownership) and of testamentum (testament), it undermined the tradi-
tional barbarian ideas of family solidarity by introducing individual
ownership, female succession to property, and a greater influence of the
Church over marriage and family law.
The common law which thus shows evidence of developing in this
period has a twofold source, one in the capitularies, which are uniform
in application, the other in the national laws themselves as they undergo
fusion and unification. Leaving the second subject for treatment elsewhere,
let us study the relations of the capitularies and the national laws. How
far was the law of the Frankish period territorial, how far personal?
Does the distinction between territorial and personal law correspond
with the difference between public and private law? The answer is that,
in the Frankish period, public and private law are inextricably mingled,
just as they were in the earliest period of Roman history.' The Law of
the Twelve Tables was private law in the sense that it dealt with the
constitution of the family, the patria potestas (paternal authority) and
other matters that today would be classed under civil law; it was "public"
1. P. Imbart de la Tour, Histoire politique, des origines a 1515 (Histoire de la nation
irancaise, III) Paris, 1920, pp. 172-176.
2. Emile Jarriand, Histoire de la Novelle 118 dans les pays de droit Icrit depuis
Justinien jusqu'en 1789, Paris, 1889, pp. 429-431.
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law in the sense that the family shared with the state extensive "political"
powers. Only with the lapse of time, for example, did the rules of succes-
sion based on the agnatic principle give way to rules in which family
sentiment rather than political necessity were allowed to prevail with
the testator.
In the same way the private law of the Frankish period was based on
certain "political" principles, such as the solidarity of the family, or,
when this disappeared, of the social groups that took its place. It is only
on occasion that we can distinguish a notion of public law in the ordinances
and statements of the Frankish emperors. But at best these declarations
are theological rather than political.8 Public and private law are to all
intents linked.4
Lawmaking in this period is still predominantly a judicial process
savoring more of jurisprudence than of legislation.5 Even when impor-
tant changes are introduced into the law of the period the process is
concealed by what Petrau-Gay aptly terms "juridical prestidigitation."'
The dogma or the fiction of the law's immutability is maintained through-
out, and only in matters outside the sphere of the national laws, or rather
through other channels, does the royal will work unopposed. Legislation
in the sense of avowed interference with immemorial rules by an inde-
pendent organ of government issuing general rules does not develop in
the field of public law until the thirteenth century and in the field of
private law until the sixteenth century.7 Therefore, there can be no ques-
tion of using the distinction between law and custom as the basis for the
division between territorial law and personal law in the legal systems of
the Frankish Empire.
Finally the question arises, how far were the national laws of the
period personal and the capitularies territorial? Here one runs into the
familiar distinction made by German scholars between the volksrechte
(national laws) and the reichsrecht (imperial or territorial law). According
to this scheme the national laws were the products of the organic activity
of the national groups in the Frankish Empire and subject to change only
through the initiative of the groups which issued them. The capitularies,
in their turn, were legislative enactments of the Frankish rulers which
did not alter the national laws unless ratified by the national groups for
whom they were intended. Thus, the capitulum legi additum, or capitulary
additional to a national law, dealt with the same matters of private law
3. See L. Halpen, "L'Idie d'itat sous les carolingiens," Revue historique, 1939,
vol. CLXXXV, p. 59 ff.
4. J. P&rau-Gay, La notion de "lex" dans la coutume salienne et ses transformations
dans les capitulaires, Grenoble, 1920, pp. 4-5.
5. J. P~trau-Gay, "La 'Laghsaga' salienne," Revue historique de droit jranvais et
etranger, XIV, 1935, p. 303.
6. Ibid.
7. Id. at 305. For a similar view see McILWAIN, GROWTH OF POLITICAL THOUGHT I
THE WEST 189.
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as the lex to which it was attached. But the capitulum per se scribendum
(capitulary issued by the King alone), as well as the capitulum missorum,
not intended for combination with the personal law, dealt only with ad-
ministrative or "political" matters in the Empire. This in brief is the
view of capitulary law held by Boretius (less so by Seeliger), and others.'
These theories were challenged in a striking manner by Fustel de
Coulanges, who denied the popular character of the national laws, and
insisted on the royal origin of all legislation in the Frankish epoch as well
as on the Roman traditions that inspired it.9 Though containing a great
deal of truth the position of Fustel de Coulanges was too extreme. The
same may be said of the views of Simon Stein, which also represent a
reaction against the conceptions of Boretius and the Germanists. Fustel
de Coulanges made inadequate allowance for the customary character of
the law of the period, whereas Stein failed to note undoubted differences
between the capitulum legi additum and the capitulum per se scriben-
dum.'
0
The balance between these views has been struck by P~trau-Gay,
whose ideas may be summed up as follows: There is a difference between
the capitulum legi additum and the capitulum per se scribendum, but
mainly in the form of emission." In the former the king is the successor
of the laghsaga or law-sayer of German custom; the capitulum legi
additum is therefore equal in authority to the lex it amends. The capitulum
per se scribendum is issued by the king in virtue of the bannum (coercive
authority) possessed by the Germanic ruler and also in virtue of his
authority as successor of the Roman emperors; its duration is, therefore,
limited only to the life of the king.'2 Furthermore, no difference in content
is apparent between the two types of capitulary; they both deal with the
same matters, even of private law.' 8
8. A. Boretius, Beitriige zur Kapitularienkritik, Leipzig, 1874; G. Seeliger, Die Kapitu-
larien der Karolinger, Munich, 1893; M. Th~venin, Lex et capitula (Bibliothique de
1'Ecole des Hautes Etudes, 35th fascicle), Paris, 1878, pp. 37 ff. Seeliger is least extreme
and his study remains valuable. For judgments on this literature see above all F. L.
Ganshof Recherches sur les capitularies, ch. 1. A fundamental work is E. Mayer-Homberg,
Die frdnkischen Volksrechte im Mittelalter, vol. I, Die friinkischen Volksrechte und das
Reichsrecht, Weimar, 1912, especially 1-54, 425 ff. For the oral character of the capitulary
see the important study of Auguste Dumas, "La parole et l'crit dans les capitulaires
carolingiens," in Milanges d'histoire du Moyen Age dedids a la mdmoire de Louis Halphen,
Paris, 1951.
9. Fustel de Coulanges, La monarchic franque, 2nd ed., pp. 63-135, 304-378, 598-648;
idem, Les transformations de la royaute pendant l'dpoque carolingienne, 2nd ed., pp. 356-
411, 453-500.
10. Simon Stein, "Lex und Capitula," Mitteilungen des isterr. Institut fur Geschichts-
jorschung, Innsbruck, vol. 41, 1927, pp. 301 ff.
11. J. P~trau-Gay, La notion de "lex," pp. 295 ff.; idem, "La laghsaga," op. cit. supra
note 5, at 288.
12. Pltrau-Gay, La notion de "lex," pp. 303-304; idem, "La 'Laghsaga' salienne,"
op. cit. supra note 5, at 293 ff.
13. Ptrau-Gay, La notion de "lex," pp. 252-254; idem, "La 'Lagbsaga' salienne,"
op. cit. supra note 5, at 288. The Edictum Pistense, Cap., II, MGH, p. 315 lays down rules
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What emerges from these observations is that it is difficult to classify
one group of law sources as territorial and another as personal. The
capitularies were personal as well as territorial ordinances. The national
laws themselves (the leges), though predominantly personal, were also
territorial in certain respects.
For some matters the Germanic laws established uniformity in legal
procedure which overrode the personal law principle and formed a stock
of territorial legal principles in this period. The Visigoths employed the
Roman method of judicial inquiry against Visigoths as well as Romans. 4
The Salic law imposed compurgation on Romans: "If a Roman is accused
of having despoiled a Frank, and there is no certain proof, this Roman
shall deny the accusation by twenty-five oath helpers."' 5 The Ripuarian
law prescribes compurgation for Roman as well as Ripuarian.'6 The
Burgundian law states: "If a free man, barbarian or Roman, is accused
of a crime, let him swear with his wife, his children, and his relations to
the number of twelve.' 17
As a result of the mutual operation of the national laws and of the
capitularies there was some confusion as to their respective spheres of
application. Hincmar of Rheims describes a "flight to the capitularies"
in one of his letters:
Quando enim sperant aliquid lucrari, ad legem se convertunt:
quando vero per legem non aestimant acquirere, ad Capitula
confugiunt: sicque interdum fit, ut nec Capitula pleniter con-
serventur, sed pro nihilo habeantur, nec lex .... ."
In consequence of the same difficulty a Lombard jurist sought to
define more carefully the two fields of capitulary law and national law.'"
Under this division the personal laws of Lombards and Romans covered
successions, contracts, oaths, and composition. "Concerning all other
matters let us live by the common law which the most excellent master
Charles, the King of the Franks and Lombards, has added to the
[Lombard] edict." As Stouff observes, the "criterion is exact but in-
complete," and he attempts to complete it by distinguishing between
public and private law, the former dominated by territoriality, the latter
of private law as well as "public" law for all persons living outside the "regions where
Roman law prevails." No distinction is otherwise made as to nationality. The edict is
certainly not a capitulum legi additum, though it has some of the characteristics of a
capitulum legibus additum, or capitulary additional to all the national laws. For Petrau-
Gay the appearance of this second type of capitulary marks the decline or at least the
transformation of the personal law system.
14. Leges Visigothorum, VI, 1, 2, MGH, 8* series, p. 176.
15. Lex Salica, XIV, 2, ed. Hessels, Cod. 2, col. 83.
16. Lex Ribuaria, LXVI, 2 MGH, p. 255.
17. Leges Burgundionum, VIII, 1, ed. De Sais, MGH, p. 49.
18. Hincmar, Opera Omnia, ed. Sirmond, Paris, 1645, pp. 217-225, Selection XV en-
titled Ad Episcopos Regni, Admonitio Altera pro Carlomanno Rege apud Sparnacum Facta.
19. Capitula Italica, I, no. 105, MGH, p. 219, c. 14.
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by the principle of personality.2 ° But besides being too precise, this dis-
tinction does not help us to classify the content of the "communi lege"
(common law). The passage really suggests what has been noted above,
that it is impossible to classify the capitularies as public law and the
national laws, or leges mundanae, as private law. The difference between
private and public law, even if recognized in Frankish law, certainly
does not correspond with any classification of the law sources them-
selves. Savigny is at pains to disprove that this statement makes the
capitularies sources of private law.2 But it is certain that the capitularies
"additional to the national laws" include what we may call private law
today. By "common law," as used in the passage, therefore, should be
meant legal doctrines, practices or procedures, whether of public or private
law, originating in the folk law or the royal will, which had been made
common to the empire by the capitularies.
A capitulary of Louis the Pious issued in A.D. 821 is also important
for the distinction between capitularies and national law, which is ex-
presses in its closing words: "But not only are they to be called law but
they are to be held as law." 2 This transforms certain capitula per se
scribenda into capitula legi addita.
We do not find in the Frankish period the clear articulation between
various spheres of law that some modern scholars imagine for us. Keeping
this in mind let us examine the branches of law that were subject to
territorial principles.
The same authorities were imposed in the various districts over
members of all nationalities.28 Marculf gives a formula, referred to in the
previous chapter, containing the act of nomination of a count in the
Merovingian monarchy who governs in the name of the king "men bf
every race, Franks, Burgundians, Romans."24 The court system or
judicial organization, though adapted to the necessities of the personal law
regime, as explained above, was nevertheless organized on a territorial
and a unitary basis.
25
20. Stouff, "Etude," p. 29.
21. Savigny, Geschichte des rdmischen Rechts im Mittelalter, vol. I, p. 174.
22. Capitularia, ed. Boretius and Krause, no. 143, MGH, c. 5:
Generaliter omnes admonemus ut capitula quae praeterito anno legis salicae
per omnium consensum addenda esse consuimus, Jam non ulterius capitula sed
tantum lex dicantur, immo pro lege tencantur.
The importance of this statement for the growth of jurisprudence is indicated by
P~trau-Gay, "La 'Laghsaga,'" op. cit. supra note 5, at 281 ff. Cf., Th~venin, Lex et capitula,
pp. 139-140. See especially Ganshof, Recherches sur les capitulairet, pp. 74-78.
23. Fustel de Coulanges, La monarchie iranque, pp. 274 ff.
24. Marculf, I, 8, discussed supra, Chapter 2, note 126.
25. Stouff, "Etude sur le principe de la personnalit6 des lois depuis les invasions
barbares jusqu'au XII* siecle," Revue bourguignonne de l'enseignement supirieur, vol. IV,
1894, p. 31.
Documents revealing judicial organization based on territorial foundations exist in
large numbers. The following are included in Thvenin, Textes relatils aux institutions
privees et publiques aux epoques merovingienne et carolingienne, Part I, Institutions privies,
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Procedure was also governed in many respects by territorial prin-
ciples. The Frankish kings had inherited from the Romans the advanced
judicial processes of investigation by the judge and laws of evidence, and
from the barbarian tradition the system of composition and individual
self help.26 Both systems were merged in the dominant procedure of the
Frankish period, so that Romans accepted the principle of individual
composition and barbarians adapted themselves to the judicial and in-
quisitorial procedure." The capitularies turned these practices into com-
mon law.
In criminal law there is some question about the extent to which
the personal law applied. This question is taken up elsewhere in con-
nection with conflicts of law, but it seems clear that a distinction must be
made between compositions for private offences due to individuals and
violations involving the public interest which were not subject to the
national law systems. The following statements illustrate the operation
of the "public" law.
Undoubtedly, the Roman system of penal law enjoyed the approval
of the Frankish monarchs. Childebert II in his decree of the year 596
gave the courts the power of life and death over his subjects and ordered
them to hang murderers in the event of their being apprehended in fla-
grante delicto (in the commission of a crime). The rachimburgi (suitors)
were to have no part in this procedure: "The man who has known how to
kill ought to learn to die; we do not wish that he should redeem himself
or compound." 2
The capitularies often fail to make any distinction of race in matters
of criminal law. Most texts of the capitularies prescribing a penalty begin
with the words "si quis" or "si quis ingenuus," "si quis servus," general
expressions implying that in certain respects at least the criminal law was
uniform.29 The fourth article of the Constitution of Clothar first offers
the natives the benefit of Roman law, but only for their private affairs; it
remains silent in regard to crimes. 0 Gregory of Tours does not seem to
nos. 32, 36, 41, 80, 85, 100, 100 bis, 100 ter, 102, 104, 107, 108, 115, 123, 128, 131 (all deal-
ing with the public mallum); nos. 37, 39, 62, 89, 94, 101, 133 (dealing with other pleas).
26. Esmein, Histoire du droit jranfais, pp. 85-90.
27. Fustel de Coulanges, La monarchic franque, pp. 418, 419. The monastery of St.
Denis brought suit against an abbey in 692. In spite of the fact that both parties appear
to have been under Roman law the defendant was adjudged an oath with three oath
helpers, which he did not fulfill, and lost the case, J. M. Pardessus, Diplomata, Paris,
1843, II, no. 424. See P. van Wetter, Droit romain et droit germanique, I, p. 15, note 2
for this as well as other examples of territoriality.
28. Childeberti 11 Regis Decretio, 596 (?), c. 5, Capitularia, I, MGH, pp. 15-16.
29. See, for example, the Edictum Pistense, no. 273, MGH, II, pp. 312 ff. The evi-
dence for a unitary system is marshalled by Fustel de Coulanges, La monarchic jranque,
Ch. XIII, pp. 406 if; idem, Recherches sur quelques problimes d'histoire, 2nd ed., pp. 359
ff. For similar view see L. de Combes, "L'Invasion des barbares, l'glise et le statut per-
sonnel," Revue catholique des institutions et du droit, vol. 22, 1899, p. 419.
30. Cap., I, MGH, p. 18, c. 4, quoted supra Chapter III.
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make any distinctions between Romans and barbarians in regard to
criminal law. The same punishment, as we gather from his accounts,
applies to all."'
The nature of the Constitution of the Frankish Empire is a matter
of dispute. 2 The law sources show the ruler in various positions. Though
the national laws of some of the barbarian peoples are merely statements.
of custom and the legislative power of the king therein revealed practically
a nullity, other codes such as those of the Burgundians and the Visigoths
are almost legislative enactments in our sense of the term. 3 It is in the
capitularies, however, that the legislative power of the King as the suc-
cessor of the Roman Caesars becomes most pronounced.
It seems safe to conclude that important portions of the laws and
capitularies of the Frankish era show territorial as well as personal
features. The distinction between personality and territoriality, however,
must be sought in specific provisions of the laws rather than in any classi-
fication of the law sources themselves.
B. The Fusion of Laws in the Frankish Period
The personal laws borrowed freely from one another. The capit-
ularies and the canons of church councils contributed their share to the
common stockpile of institutions. The result of the process of fusion was
the establishment of a common law, or sometimes of a number of common
laws, overriding the diversity of personal laws and even of regional
customs. The ingredients which entered into the synthesis were pretty
well diffused, but the Roman law enjoyed a marked preponderance in
southern France and many parts of Italy, while the barbarian codes,
newly merged in several territorial laws, predominated in northern France,
the Low Countries, Germany, and, for a time, part of northern Italy. If
the Carolingian Empire had survived, Western Europe might have
31. Fustel de Coulanges, La monarchie franque, pp. 468-471. However, the story of
Vigilius, the archdeacon of Marseille, recorded by Gregory of Tours, Historia Francorum,
ed. R. Poupardin, IV, 43 tends to show the principle of the personality of law in opera-
tion. Though released from the payment of a fine of 4000 solidi, Vigilius obtained against
Albinus the imposition of a fine of quadruple, in accordance with the Roman law. This is
explained by De Combes, op. cit. supra note 29, at 421 as an exceptional case due to the
special position of Provence which at the time preserved some part of its independence
in the empire. The whole account of this episode is hardly clear and cannot be adduced in
defense of personal or territorial principles.
32. Esmein, Histoire de droit franais, p. 57.
33. Esmein, op. cit. supra note 32, at 65, 99, 100. Esmein, Histoire, p. 677 emphasizes
the priority of written law over custom in the Frankish empire. The latter, he claims,
could not be invoked except in the absence of a written text. It appears to this author
that Esmein underestimates the customary character of most of the leges barbarorum.
This notwithstanding capitularies of Pippin, Cap. Ital. 790, c. x, Boretius, Cap., I, 201:
"Ubi lex est, praecellat consuetudinem et nulla consuetudo superponatur legi," and of
Charlemagne (802), Boretius, Cap. I, 96: "Ut judices secundum scriptam legem juste




achieved, on the basis of this partial synthesis, what England later did, a
common system of law and legal administration.84
It would not be within the purview of this study to undertake a
systematic survey of the results of the legal syntheses that were taking
place in the ninth, tenth and eleventh centuries. A brief summary, which
is in danger of becoming a mere catalogue, is all that can be attempted
here.
In no field are the effects of this fusion more marked than in the laws
dealing with the condition of persons. The Roman and Germanic laws
took different views in regard to the surrender of personal liberty. The
Germanic law allowed such alienation,8 the Roman law forbade it.86
The Romani often ended up by accepting the Germanic rule and giving
it a romanic tegument.
There were various methods of manumission, some Roman and some
barbarian.37 The Frankish method was to enfranchise slaves per denar-
ium, (by fictitious purchase). The Roman method of manumission was by
testament, by charter, or per ecclesiam (in the church)." Nevertheless,
the Franks and Lombards freed their slaves by the Roman method, with
the consequence of endowing the freedmen with the personal law cor-
responding to the form of emancipation.8 9
The formalities and the donations connected with marriage belonged
to the realm of personal law. The Germanic laws took a different view
of these matters from that of the Roman law.4 Marriage gifts in Ger-
manic law originated with the husband (e.g., the morgengabe), in Roman
law with the family of the bride (e.g., the dos). Among other changes that
occurred, the Roman dos almost disappeared to give way to the dos ex
marito, a hybrid institution that approximated the morgengabe.41
34. SsT=, THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPFAN LAW 20 (N.Y. 1928).
35. Tacitus, Germania, 24: "Venire se et alligari patitur."
36. Digest, XL, 12, 10; Just. Cod., VII, 16, 10. Several of the formulae deal with sales
of liberty, Formulae Andecavenses, 19 (Zeumer, Formulae, MGH, pp. 10-11; De Roziere,
Formules, no. 45). Cf., Formulae Andecavenses, 25 (Zeumer, MGH, p. 12; De Roziere,
Formules, no. 46); Formulae Turonenses vel Sirmondicae, 10 (Zeumer, MGH, pp. 140-141;
De Roziere, Formules, no. 44). Recueil des chartes de l'Abbaye de Cluny, ed. Bernard and
Bruel, I, 30 (887). Paul, Sententiae, II, 19, 1, ed. Haenel, p. 366.
37. Viollet, Histoire du droit civil jranfais, 2nd ed., pp. 297-302. Ch~non, Histoire de
droit franeais, I, pp. 355-361.
38. Lex Salica, XXVI, 1, 2, ed. Behrend, pp. 45-46; Lex Ribuaria, LVIII, 1; LXI, 3;
LXII, 2; LIV, 2. Thevenin, Textes, nos. 11, 20, 27, 34.
39. Liutprandi Leges, 9, MGH, 8° series, p. 89. Lex Ribuaria, LXI, 1 MGH, p. 252:
"Si quis servum suum lib~rtum fecerit, et civem Romanum portasque apertas conscripserit."
40. Viollet, op. cit. supra note 37, at 774. Ch6non, Histoire du droit fran~ais I, 381 ff.
E.g., Th.venin, Textes, no. 42; van Wetter, Droit romain et droit germanique, Part I, pp.
66-67, note 4.
41. Tacitus, Germania, 18: "Dotem non uxormarito, sed uxori maritus offert." For
morgengabe see Th~venin, Textes, nos. 48, 78. The wife, however, brought to the husband
under the name of faderfium goods which he administered but part of which was probably
treated as his property, Leges Longobardorum, Rotharis, 182, 201; Brissaud, Manuel, pp.
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The rules of legal capacity underwent widespread unification during
the period of the personality of law. The synthesis of the barbarian and
Roman laws of capacity42 led to the acceptance by some of the barbarians
of the Roman principle of guardianship in the interests of the ward; and
on the part of the Romans to the resurrection of the ancient tutela
perpetua, or perpetual guardianship of women, in conformity with bar-
barian legal principles.4" In other words, the Romans acquired the
mundium (paternal and marital authority) over women.
The barbarian rules of prescription gave way gradually to Roman
principles of acquisitive prescription of twenty years and extinctive pre-
scription of thirty years. 44 The dominance of Roman principles was se-
cured though prescription was treated in one of the capitularies of Charle-
magne as within the domain of personality.45
The subject of legal agreements or conventions, though based on
the principle of personality, reveals a fusion of Germanic and Roman
principles but with the Roman ideas becoming dominant.46 Germanic law
did not have a clearly defined notion of contract at the period of the
invasions. The barbarian codes seemed to confound contracts and con-
veyances in the same manner as did the early Roman law in the Code of
the Twelve Tables.47 In general under the influence of the Roman law
the barbarians developed a keener appreciation of the essential elements
of a contract, especially the "mental engagement." Under the influence
of the Roman law they acquired the habit of using writing to consummate
a contract. Vice versa the Romans retreated from the advanced juris-
prudential ideas of the empire and fell back on the greater use of formal-
ities such as the stipulations. Then they went a step further and added
to the typically Roman elements of the contract the barbarian formalities
of the launegild, the wadium (pledge), and the handelanc (hand or
1640 ff. Chfnon, Histoire du droit francais I, 403-404. The confusion is evident in several
documents of Chartes de Cluny, ed. Bernard and Bruel, nos. 7, 88, 105, 189, 358 (Th6venin,
Textes, nos. 175, 176, 177, 178, 179).
42. Brissaud, Manuel, pp. 1143-1147, 1159.
43. Stouff, "Etude," Rev. bourg., 1894, p. 42. Was the Roman patria potestas instituted
in favor of the parent? Was the mundium of Germanic law established in favor of the
dependent? P. van Wetter, Droit romain et droit germanique dans la monarchie franque,
Part I, pp. 37-57, Paris, 1899. A. Heusler, Institutionen des deutschen Privatrechts, II,
Leipzig, 1886, no. 156, 431; Ch~non, Histoire, I, 380, 393. The sale of children was common
and was regulated by the Edictum Pistense, 864, MGH, Capitularia, no. 273, vol. II. c. 34.
See Th~venin, Textes, no. 156, for a typical sale of this kind, and Loersch and Schroder,
Urkunden zur Geschichte des deutschen Privatrechtes, 2nd ed., no. 87 for the sale of wife
and children around the year 1100. For the sale of mundium over a wife see MGH, Leges,
IV, p. 461 (Th~venin, Textes, no. 47).
44. Brissaud, Manuel, pp. 1271-1272; Viollet, Histoire du droir civil franfais, pp. 570-
573. Ch6non, Histoire, I, 440-443.
45. Capitularia, I, 98, MGH, p. 206, c. 8.
46. Brissaud, Manuel, pp. 1377 if; Viollet, Histoire du droit civil iran ais, pp. 594-603;
Stouff, op. cit. supra note 43, at 46 ff.; Ch6non Histoire, I, 436-440.
47. Van Wetter, Droit romain et droit germanique, Part II, p. 10; Stouff, op. cit. supra
note 43, at 46.
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glove).48 The Germans made use of both factors. The result was the
existence of a common law of contract mainly Roman in its origin
employed equally by Roman and barbarian.49
The treatment of wills and testamentary succession in the period of
the personality of law shows tendencies toward unity and territoriality
of law.50 The Germans themselves had no wills at the time of Tacitus,51
and even at the time of the invasions, though they shortly borrowed the
institution from the Romans." This notwithstanding that the Germans
like the Romans of early republican times possessed a will which had the
characteristics of a donatio inter vivos (donation by the living).55 The
old Roman Jamiliae emptor (fictitious purchaser of estate) had his coun-
terpart in the Germanic salmann (trustee) .
4
Intestate succession, though technically a matter for the determina-
tion of the national laws, became subject to rules of the common law
whose growth has been described. 5 The Roman law differed from the
Germanic law in the equality which it recognized among both sexes and
also in the rights of succession granted to the children of a predeceased
parent. The Germanic' laws to a great extent excluded the woman from
the heirs on intestacy and also excluded the grandchildren who were
children of a predeceased son or daughter.56 Roman and barbarian prac-
tices became merged and, if the Romans accepted less often the Roman
rule in regard to equality of inheritance, the barbarians accepted no less
infrequently their own rule in regard to the inferiority of the female in
intestate succession.
The succession of grandchildren by representation in direct line, both
among the Romans and the barbarians underwent some change.57 In
48. E.g. Hist. Patr. Mon., XIII, no. 681:
964. Ego . . . Zachan ... qui habitare videor infra civitate Brixiam.... tibi
vero Andreverga dilecta plurimum sponsa mea . .. promisi tibi dare ipso die quando
te sponsavi, in qua etiam per wadiam firmavi, terciam porcionem secundum lego mea
romana; quod tibi promisi, adimplere desidero. Proinde pro dotis donationem
titulum et propter nupcias dare hac tradero videor . . . tibi iam dicta . . . uncias
quattuor, quod est porcio tercia ex universam omnem meam substantiam.
49. Stouff, "Etude," Rev. bourg., p. 54. M. Lemarignier, "Les Actes de droit priv6
merovingien et carolingien de l'abbaye de Saint-Bertin," Revue du Nord, t. XXIX, 1947, pp.
271-272, points to the confusion in the documents between acts of sale and gifts.
50. Brissaud, Manuel, pp. 1578 ff.; Viollet, Histoire du droit civil jrancais, pp. 862-864;
and 890-891; Chfnon, Histoire, I, 454 ff.
51. Tacitus, Germania, 20.
52. Ch~non, op. cit. supra note 50, at I, 457-458.
53. Brissaud, Manuel, pp. 1583-1584, 1596-1598; Viollet, Histoire du droit civil jranoais,
2nd ed., pp. 890-891.
54. Van Wetter, Droit romain et droit germanique, Part H, pp. 13-14. Th~venin, Textes,
nos. 35, 78, 82, 132 contain examples of donationes; nos. 18, 73, 76, 99 contain wills.
M. Aub~nas, Le Testament en Provence, Aix-en-Provence, 1927, p. 18, notes that most
acts of the 11th century described as testaments are really donations inter vivos.
55. Brissaud, Manuel, pp. 1525 if; Viollet, Histoire du droit civil jrancais, 2nd ed., pp.
817 ff.; Ch~non, Histoire, I, 443-451.
56. Stouff, "Etude," Rev. bourg., pp. 273-274.
57. Brissaud, Manuel, p. 1538; Viollet, Histoire du droit civil francais, 2nd ed., pp.
832 ff.
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general the succession of the grandchildren to the inheritance of the
mother, which was absent in some of the barbarian laws and limited
under the Theodosian Code,58 gained headway.
The common laws which were growing up in various parts of the
Frankish Empire thus show us ingredients of both Germanic and Roman
origin. From the Germanic law came the system of composition, the
method of proof by oath and by compurgators, the perpetual tutelage
of women, the notion of family authority contained in the word mundium,
the vendibility of liberty, the substitution of the dowry on the man's side,
and new forms of wills or succession.
From the Roman law also came important elements of new cus-
tomary laws. Such were some of the forms of manumission, types of
contract, donations in marriage, some types of guardianship, the rules of
long prescription, the clauses found in conventions and in testaments,
forms of intestate succession and the equal division of property among
sons and daughters. It is difficult to assess this Roman influence and to
state definitely that the Roman law was the dorinant influence on the
mixed law of the later Frankish period, as Stouff affirms. 9 It is safer
to treat the Roman ingredient in terms of nomenclature rather than sub-
stance. When all law became customary the only permanent influence
that survived was the memory of attachment to the Roman law, as
Montesquieu had so clearly pointed out.60 These memories of Roman law
will help realize the reception of the Justinian law later on in the pays de
droit ecrit (country of written law).
V. THE DECLINE OF THE PERSONAL LAWS
A. Decline of the Personal Law System: General
The decline of the national laws occurred from the ninth to the
eleventh centuries. In Italy the process of change is easier to follow than
in France. In the first place the personal laws survived for a longer period
here than elsewhere. In the tenth century when mention of the national
laws elsewhere almost disappeared, in Italy the Lombard and Roman laws
continued to be practiced side by side. Italian documents of the tenth and
eleventh centuries abound in professions of law.1 The center for the study
58. Cod. Theod., V, 1, 4 (De Leg. Her.). Grimualdi Leges, 5, MGH, 8* series, p. 75.
Capitularia, I, no. 7, MGH, c. 2.; Ch6non, Histoire, I, 444 ff.
59. Stouff, "Etude," Rev. bourg., p. 278. In this matter Stouff, no doubt, leans toward
the Romanist views of Fustel de Coulanges, G. Blondel, Nouv. rev. hist. de droit franc. et
etran., 1895, p. 120. A philological treatment of the Germanic laws from the same point of
view is Leo Wiener, Commentary to the Germanic Laws and Medieval Documents, Cam-
bridge, Mass., 1915, especially the words, Fredum, Faida, Testibus Idoneis. For a balanced
view, A. von Halban, Das rdmische recht im den germanischen Volksstaaten, II, pp. 313 ff.
For a review of von Halban's work, M. Rintelen, Zeitschrift far Rechtsgeschichte, XXIX,
Germ. Abt., 383-387.
60. SPRIT OF THE LAWS, Bk. XXVIII, Ch. 12.
1. The following professions occur at the turn of the century: Historiae Patriae Monu-
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of Lombard law was Pavia where the systematic arrangement of the
Lombard Edict, known as the Lombarda, originated.2 While the study of
the Roman law was gathering momentum at Bologna and other places,
the Lombard schools were glossing and analyzing the contents of the
Edict, and in the early thirteenth century the Lombarda acquired its
great commentator in Carolus de Tocco.3 Though the Lombard laws
underwent considerable Roman influence as a result of this treatment,
their distinctive character somehow survived, even after the reception of
the Justinian law began to tip the scales against them.' In 1038, if we
may credit the date, the Emperor Conrad II by edict made Roman law
once more the sole law in the Roman territories.'
The survival of the Lombard law side by side with the Roman law
in Italy long after the national laws had ceased to be cited in France is a
curious phenomenon. We witness a struggle comparable to, and yet dif-
fering from, similar ones in France and Germany, between the native
custom and the "learned" law based mainly on the revived study of the
Justinian law books.6 Whether the conflict was between the "moderni"
and the "antiqui" of Pavia, or later on between the Lombardists of Pavia
and the Romanists of Bologna,' or still later between the "mos Italicus"
representing the Bartolist accommodation of Roman and native law, and
the "mos Gallicus" of Cujas and the exponents of a purified Roman
jurisprudence,8 we see an alternation of unyielding antagonism between
them (as with Lucas of Penna) and mutual adjustment (as with Carolus
de Tocco).1 In fact, "not until the introduction of the French codes, in
the legislative period of the early 1800's, can the Lombard law be said
to have quite lost its independent life."' °
The causes of this singular longevity of Lombard law may be found
menta, XIII, anno 1000 no. 986 (bill of sale): Johannes . . . , qui professo sum lege
vivere langobardorum.
Ibid., anno 1000, no. 987 (exchange of goods). There is no question in these documents
of pure Lombard law. Roman influences as well as others are apparent in some of the
provisions.
2. Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, vol. I, p. 563.
3. Savigny, Geschichte des romischen Rechts im, Mittelalter, vol. V, pp. 174-183. It goes
without saying that Carolus was a Romanist by training as well as a Lombardist.
4. The Lombard law became faex as opposed to the Roman law or lex. See in general
K. Neumeyer, Die gemeinrechtliche Entwickelung des internationalen Privat-und Strafrechts
bis Bartolus, Part I, Die Geltung der Stammesrechts in Italien, pp. 217-223. For the ex-
pression "jaex, non lex," p. 61, note 7.
5. Cambridge Medieval History, III (1926), p. 267. See, however, Ch. 2 and note 66,
supra.
6. For France, E. Meynial in Milanges Chabaneau, Erlangen, 1906, pp. 557-584. For
Germany, Stintzing in A General Survey of Events, Sources, Persons and Movements in
Continental Legal History by Various European Authors, Boston, 1912, p. 361 ff.; for Italy
Calisse, op. cit., p. 97 ff.; and F. Calasso, Medio evo del diritto, I, Le Fonti, Milan, 1954, pp.
453 if, 503 ff.
7. Calisse, Id. at 99-100.
8. Id. at 142.
9. Id. at 111-113.
10. Ibid.
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not only in the obvious persistence of Lombard national feeling but, what
is more important, in the development of a juristic tradition promoted
by schools, treatises, and an ordered daily practice. As was the case in
England, "taught law" proved to be "tough law."" In addition Lombard
feudal law, finding a secure lodgment at Bologna with the Libri Feudorum
helped Lombard legal institutions and ideas survive. 2
In France the process of transition from personality to territoriality
is more difficult to follow. The meaning of law undoubtedly underwent
a change during the obscure period between the collapse of the Caro-
lingian Empire and the rise of the Capetian monarchy. For prior to the
tenth century the laws practiced by the members of the various nations
were in part at least based on official compilations valid for members
of the nations throughout the empire. Even the Breviary of Alaric
probably had official validation under Charlemagne and his successors.1 3
But after the ninth century all these laws became simple customs retaining
only in name the character of national laws. Only the Roman law main-
tained more completely its position as a legislative code.
M. Jarriand makes too sharp a distinction between law and custom
in affirming that before the ninth century the national laws were leges
and that after that time they were transformed into mos or mores."4 Lex
and mos are too closely parallel to be distinguished even in the earlier
period. 5 What can be affirmed, however, is that the legislative character
11. Id. at 95-107.
12. Id. at 112.
13. Was there an official confirmation of the Breviary in the reign of Charlemagne? A
manuscript of Cujas, lost today, bears the following legend immediately after the com-
monitorium:
Recognovimus. Dat sub die IV Non. Feb., anno XXII. Alarid regis, Tolosae.
(506)-Et iterum anno XX. Regnante Karolo, rege Francorum et Longobardorum,
et patricio Romanorum.
If this statement were merely the copyist's annotation it would have appeared at the
end of the code. Evidences in support of this view are (1) that many MSS of the law
appear after 788; (2) differences in provisions between one MS and another suggest official
retouching. This squares with what we know about Charlemagne's interest in the revision of
the national laws. The Epitome Aegidii of the eighth century based on the Breviary, for
example, contains some changes from the code. (3) The council of Troyes of 878 received a
request from the Bishop of Narbonne to introduce into the Roman law a more severe
provision in regard to sacrilege; the pope, John VIII, after examining the laws of Justinian
and Charlemagne ordered a constitution of Justinian to be added to the Breviary: ". . . et
praecipimus ut in fine codicis legis mundanae scribatur haec lex." See Jarriand, Histoire de la
Novelle 118 dans les pays de droit ecrit, p. 102. In the same sense see Haenel, Lex Romana
Visigothorum, pp. xxii-xxiii; Tardif, Histoire des sources du droit franvais. Origines romaines,
pp. 135-136; van Wetter, Le Droit romain et le droit germanique dans la monarchie franque,
Part II, pp. 58-60, note 3. Contra, Savigny, Rom. Recht im Mittelalter, II, section 57;
Glasson, Histoire des institutions et du droit de la France, vol. II, p. 154.
14. Jarriand, op. cit. supra note 13, at 176, 180. The author also suggests that custom
would take possession of certain fields of law more quickly than others: for example, the
administrative field and also the formalities accompanying certain acts. The distinction is
specious. The doctrines of the national laws were just as subject to modification by custom.




implied to a certain extent in all the leges in the Carolingian period gave
way in the tenth century to a form of law in which the "customary" char-
acteristic predominated over the legislative.
The documents show the operation of the personal law system during
the tenth and eleventh centuries. They are of several varieties. There are
the reports of judicial processes or pleas, which indicate more or less
accurately whether the personal law system is still operative. There are
also the documents attesting to acts of sale, gifts, wills, which often
indicate the national law by which the formalities are discharged. Still
other legal instruments of the tenth century contain what are obviously
formulae borrowed from the formularies of the Frankish period, and in
their case there is some doubt as to the evidence they offer for the survival
of the personal law system.
Such are pleas at Nimes (898, 902);11 Ausson (918);17 Narbonne
(933);18 the sale of property "in the country of Lyons" (905);19 the
creation of a dowry of land in the "country of Lyons and the country of
Vienne" (905) ;20 the grant of landed property to a prospective bride
(909) ;21 the creation of a morgengabe in the Burgundian country (912) ;22
the transfer of goods to a congregation "in the Salnensian district"
(957) ;23 the gift of goods "in the country of Vienne" to the Monastery
of Cluny (967) ;24 the notice of abandonment of a claim at Arles (967) .21
Formulae in charters of the year 1000, 1015 and 1047 still speak of
the personal laws. 6 Other references to the national laws conceived in a
similar vein occur in documents as late as 1095Y.2 However, it is probable
that these references are conventional phrases bearing no relation to the
national laws, centainly as regards the content of these laws. By the
eleventh century the Salic law doctrines are no longer practiced.
What is true of the formulae just mentioned also applies to several
charters of the twelfth century originating in Brabant in one of which
(1152) a judgment is rendered "iudicio principum et maxime Salico-
rum,) 28 and in the other of which (1151) a legacy to an abbey is made
16. Cartulaire, Notre-Dame de Nimes, ed. E. Germer-Durand, no. VIII (Th~venin,
Textes relatijs aux institutions privees et publiques aux 1poques merovingiens et carolin-
giens. Institutions privies, no. 114, pp. 167-168). Cart. de Nimes, anno 902; Jarriand,
Histoire de la Novelle 118, p. 177.
17. Devic and Vaisste, Histoire ginirale de Languedoc, vol. V, col. 137, no. 43 (XLII).
18. Id. at Vol. V, col. 161, no. 57.
19. Chartes de Cluny, no. 90 (Th~venin, Textes, no. 117).
20. Chartes de Cluny, no. 88 (Th~venin, Textes, no. 176).
21. Chartes de Cluny, no. 105 (Thgvenin, Textes, no. 177).
22. Chartes de Cluny, no. 189 (Thgvenin, Textes, no. 178).
23. Thivenin, Textes, no. 132.
24. Id. at no. 136.
25. Id. at no. 137 (Cartulaire de Saint Victor de Marseille, no. 290).
26. Jarriand, Histoire de la Novelle 118, p. 179.
27. Id. at 179.
28. Aubert Le Mire (Miraeus), Opera Diplomatica et Historica, Louvain, 1723-1748,
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"observata Salicae legis omni cautela 2 9 In the first of these documents
the mere reference to "Salian princes" does not by any means prove the
survival of Salic law. In the Low Countries the franci homines, for
example, were members of a social class rather than Salian Franks."°
The second of the charters citing a "legacy made according to Salic
law" is suspect on several grounds but principally because the Lex Salica
makes no provision for legacies or indeed for any form of will."' The
possibility nevertheless exists that the original Salic custom had under-
gone changes in this region. Several documents invoke the Visigothic
law, especially the provision making gifts to churches irrevocable. 2 The
Burgundian law is cited in a charter in 912,83 and the Frankish law's
authority acknowledged side by side with that of the Roman law in
documents of 1083 and 1096:
scripta est testatio huius scripti per paginam et testamentum,
secundum sanxita legum Romanorum et Francorum (the attesta-
tion of this document has been written by page and testament
according to the sanctity of the Roman and Frankish laws) .84
But again this seems to be a formula without any specific reference to the
national laws. In the tenth century the doctrines of these laws cannot be
directly recognized in the practices of the time.
When Roman law is spoken of in the Frankish period it invariably
refers to the law included in the Breviary. Savigny was undoubtedly
successful in proving that the Justinian law, in part at least, was known
in southern France and Italy from the sixth century on. But it is safe to
say that on the whole it did not penetrate the legal practice of the time.
5
vol. I, p. 698. Eugene Defacqz, Ancien droit belgique. Pricis analytique des lois et coutumes
observees en Belgique avant le code civil, Brussels, vol. I, 1846, p. 133. See also van Wetter,
Le Droit romain et le droit germanique dans la monarchie franque, Part I, p. 19, note.
29. Aubert Le Mire, op. cit. supra note 28, at vol. 1, p. 700; Defacqz, op. cit. supra
note 28, at 133; van Wetter, op. cit. supra note 28, at Part I, p. 19. References to the Salic
law continue in documents up to the fourteenth century. The exclusion of the female line
from the throne of France in the fourteenth century was based on an incorrect interpreta-
tion of the Salic law some time after the event.
30. Meijers, "L'Histoire des principes fondamentaux de droit international priv6 a
partir du Moyen Age," Recueil des cours, p. 570.
31. Van Wetter, op. cit. supra note 28, at Part I, p. 19.
32. A donation made by Adelaide, daughter of Pierre-Raimond, Count of Carcassonne
to the Count of Barcelona uses the following words (Devic and Vaisste, Hist. gAn. de
Languedoc, V, col. 579, no. 295, anno 1070):
Lex Gothorum praecipit in libro V eiusdem legis, titulo II, capitulo VI, "ut res
donatae si in praesenti traditae sint, nullo modo repetantur a donatore. ..
33. Chartes de Cluny, no. 189 (Th6venin, Textes, no. 178): "... secundum lege mea
Gonbada in mergingiva ad integrum tibi dono..."
34. Cartulaire, Saint-Honorat de Lerins, ed. H. Moris and E. Blanc, Paris, 1883, pp. 92,
215 quoted by Jarriand, op. cit. supra note 26, at 194.
35. Savigny, Rom. Recht im Mittelalter, II, sections 37-55. Also Brunner, Deutsche
Rechtsgeschichte, vol. I, p. 562. Jarriand, op. cit. supra note 26, at 78 ff. for a summary of
the controversy; H. Fitting, Die Anfidnge der Rechtsschule zu Bologna, Berlin and Leipzig,
1888, passim; P. Vinogradoff, Roman Law in Medieval Europe, 2nd ed., pp. 37-41. Above
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References to the Roman law, unlike those to the barbarian laws,
bear a closer affinity to their sources. Acts providing for sales, gifts and
wills at least suggest familiarity with the doctrines of the Roman law.
Formulae like "Auctoritas enim iubet ecclesiastica et lex consistit romana
ut quiscumque rem suam alicui transfundere voluerit . . . (For the
ecclesiastical authority orders and the Roman law prescribes that each
person should be willing to transfer goods to another) Legum romanarum
sanctiaria auctoritate novimus . . ." (We have renewed by the sacred
authority of the Roman laws . . .) leave no doubt as to the influence of
Roman law terms.8 6 But more than this it is impossible to affirm. The
law of the Breviary cannot be recognized in documents of the tenth and
eleventh centuries. Roman law, like Germanic law, has become custom
in a hitherto unknown sense.
The conclusion that emerges inevitably from the study of the
documents of the tenth and eleventh centuries is that the national laws
based in part at least in the eighth and ninth centuries on official promulga-
tion and validation have become local customs retaining only occasionally
the national names. The Roman law recurs in documents of the south
of France, though Visigothic law has some hold in the southwest.8 7 The
documents originating in the north of France and the remainder of the
Frankish Empire show the dominance of barbarian laws,"8 or rather of an
amalgam of national laws in which the Roman influence is very small.
Why this decline of the personal law system? The answer is many
sided: (1) Racial assimilation accounts for the decline to a certain extent;
(2) the weakening of the central power explains the collapse of the
Carolingian experiment with private international law; (3) the national
laws themselves became submerged in a number of local laws representing
a mixture of Roman and barbarian elements. Two reasons offered for the
decline do not apply in France: (1) The legal renaissance affected the
personal law system only in Italy; (2) the influence of publicists and
ecclesiastics like Agobard of Lyons favoring a unified legal system was
ineffectual.
In order to trace the disintegration of the personal law principle
and the transformation of law into territorial law it will be helpful to
all, the masterly survey of Paul Koschaker, Europa und das romische Recht, Munich, 1947.
See note 96, infra.
36. Jarriand, op. cit. supra note 26, at 197.
37. Id. at 292. For the geography of the 700 odd French customs, Ch~non, Histoire, I,
p. 500 ff.
38. The customs of northern France have been divided into three geographical groups.
To the north and east of the linguistic frontier there reigned a more or less pure Germanic
custom with its community property, family solidarity and absence of representation. A
second region was that of Picardy and the neighboring areas of romance speech (at least
after the sixth century) where Frankish legal influence was strong but not unalloyed. The
region around Paris shows a Germanic custom greatly infused with Roman elements. See
Yser, "Les Deux groupes de coutumes du nord," Revue du nord, 1953.
1966]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
examine the thought of one publicist, Agobard, and see why his advocacy
of legal unity proved unsuccessful. Then a study of the decline of the
system under two aspects would normally follow: (1) the conversion of
personal laws into the droit 9crit and droit coutumier in France; (2) the
absorption of personal law principles by the feudalism of the tenth and
eleventh centuries and the emergence of a new kind of territorial law.
Only the first of these topics will be examined here; the second must be
left for treatment elsewhere.
B. Agobard of Lyons and the Personal Law System
Agoba'fd of Lyons had a vision of legislative unity that makes his
letter to Louis the Pious, written in the year 817, important for the study
of the political and legal thought and procedure of the time. 9 Of interest
also by way of comparison is Agobard's attack on the ordeals.4" So far
as his thought may be extracted from these documents Agobard seems
to be opposing (1) the system of ordeal and trial by battle; (2) the
separate existence of the Burgundian law, the work of an Arian ruler, in
the Frankish Empire; (3) the whole system of the personality of law.
He urges that the Frankish law of the emperor be applied to all his
subjects. Some of these ideas Agobard may have brought with him from
Spain, his native land, which he quitted after the Saracen invasions.41
In Spain the system of personal laws had given way to territorial law in
the seventh century, and Agobard, in the tradition of the great St. Isidore,
may have sought the establishment of a more closely knit community
in Francia (Frankland).
In order to bring out Agobard's thought on these questions it may
be well to summarize his letter to Louis the Pious.
The diversity of laws in every country, city and even home gainsay
the unity and work of God. "How many times does it happen that five
men walk or are seated together and that no one has the same law as
another of his brothers. . . ." Though otherwise trustworthy witnesses,
the testimony of these Christian men is not valid in a legal action involv-
ing a person subject to the Burgundian law, "so called from the name of
39. Epistolae Karolini Aevi, III, Epistolae, V, MGH, Berlin, 1899, pp. 158-164:
Agobardus Lugdunensis archiepiscopus de unitate legis Christi praejatus Ludovicum impera-
torem exhortatur, ut, lege Gundobadi haeretici propter iudicia Dei perniciosa sublata,
Burgundiones ad legem Francorum transjerat. Text also in Patrologia Latina, CIV, col. 113-
126.
40. Patr. Lat., CIV, col. 249-268. Liber de divinis sententiis digestus cum brevissimis
adnotationibus contra damnabilem opinionem putantium, divini iudicii veritatem igne vel
aquis vel conflictu armorum patefieri.
41. S. Grelewski, La Rdaction contre les ordalies en France depuis le Ixe siecle jusqu'au
Dicret de Gratien-Agobard de Lyon et Yves de Chartres, Rennes, 1924, p. 23 and notes. See
also Mgr. Bressolles, Saint Agobard, Evique de Lyon (760-840), (L'Eglise et l'tat au
moyen age, IX), Paris, 1949, p. 87 ff. A review of the above work by J. Lemarignier,




its author, a great enemy of the Catholics, an adherent of this Arian
heresy of which there are only a few rare partisans left amongst you." 2
It would be desirable for the Emperor to transfer the Burgundians
to the law of the Franks. This would eliminate the practice of judicial
combat which is part of the Burgundian law and which is a "perversion
of all order." "Let no faithful soul come to believe, therefore, that God
reveals on earth the secret actions of men by means of [the ordeal of]
hot water or iron and much less so in bloody combats."43 Perjury and
bribes pervert justice among "the subjects of the Burgundian law, among
whom cases are not settled by discussion and by truthful testimony but
by recourse to arms, which prevents the weak from daring to retain the
goods that are being demanded from them, or from seeking the goods
that are taken from them....
Would that a uniform law governed all the subjects of the Empire.
"But because this is a great undertaking and perhaps impossible to man,
at least may this single law, of which we have just spoken, be removed
from our midst not only as useless but also as harmful. '45
Similar views were expressed by Agobard in another of his works
devoted to the ordeals4" which on the whole adds nothing to the famous
letter to Louis the Pious just summarized.
If the argumentation pursued by Agobard in his treatise may sound
theological to modern ears, it is because the system of ordeals was closely
linked with ecclesiastical activity. The ordines iudiciorum Dei, or the
formulae employed in the judicial proofs contain prayers recited by the
clergy with the participants. Biblical precedents are constantly invoked
to prove the efficacy of the system.47
In fact Agobard's opposition to the ordeals was not unchallenged
among the clergy. The opinion of Hincmar of Rheims ran directly counter
to the views of Agobard. In his treatise De Divortio Lotharii et Tetberge,
Hincmar espoused the cause of the ordeal and cited Biblical examples in
its favor.48 The church in this matter decided to follow Hincmar and
42. MGH, op. cit. supra note 39, at ch. 4, p. 159: "Nam plerumque contingit, ut simul
eant aut sedeant quinque homines, et nullus eorum communes legem cum altero habeat
exterius in rebus transitoris. . ." Ch. 5, p. 160, Ch. 6, p. 160: ". .. cuius auctor extitit homo
hereticus et fidei catholicae vehementer inimicus-cuius legis homines sunt perpauci-non
possit super ilium testificari alter etiam bonus christianus."
43. Id. at ch. 7, pp. 160-161; ch. 9, pp. 161-162.
44. Id. at ch. 10, p. 162.
45. Id. at ch. 14, p. 164.
46. Patr. Lat., op. cit. supra note 40, at CIV, col. 249-268.
47. Formulae Merovinginci et Karolini Aevi, ed. K. Zeumer, MGH, Legum Sectio V,
Hanover, 1886, pp. 715, 604, 605, 614, 617, 619, 623, 629, 632, 633, 638. Grelewski, op. cit.
supra note 41, at 37.
48. Hincmar, Opera Omnia, Patr. Lat., CXXV, col. 625-772, especially lnterrogationes,
IX, X (Opera Omnia, ed. Sirmond, vol. I, pp. 561 ff.).
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the Council of Tribur (895) declared against Agobard's views. 9 In this
matter as well as in his opposition to the personality of law Agobard was
obviously ahead of his time, and it was a long while before the church
took a definite stand against the whole system of iudicia Dei (judgments
of God)."°
In his opposition to the system of proofs, as in other matters,
Agobard was probably inspired by Roman ideas. In the Roman system
proof was a burden on the plaintiff as it is in mature jurisprudence." In
early medieval law, not only barbarian but to a certain extent in the
debased Roman law that grew up in the Middle Ages also, proof was
considered a privilege and an obligation of the defendant.2 Barbarian
legal arrangements differed in detail in regard to the system, such as
in the acceptance of trial by battle. But on the whole they show an
essential uniformity.
Agobard's opposition may well have been based on his knowledge
of the Roman legal system. His opposition to barbarian methods also
had ample precedent in the Visigothic legislation which did not allow
trial by battle and allowed only the proof by hot water.54 Agobard had
a royal precursor in Liutprand, the Lombard ruler, who admitted his
inability to abolish the system among the Lombards.5
The Burgundian laws made much use of ordeals.56 But the same
laws also allowed the use of witnesses, and one may wonder whether
Agobard was not exaggerating the frequency of judicial combats. Fur-
thermore, contrary to the inference one may draw from a reading of
Agobard's tracts, it was the Frankish laws that made the use of the ordeal
popular.58
49. Concilia Aevi Karolini, ed. Werminghoff, MGH, Legum, Sectio III, 2, Hanover and
Leipzig, 1906-1908, c. 15, C. H.
50. Grelewski, op. cit. supra note 47, at 54, 55 ff.
51. Digest, XXII, 3, 2, De probationibus et praesumptionibus.
52. Esmein, Cours 1lmentaire d'histoire du droit franfais, 15th ed., p. 88. But cf.,
P. van Wetter, Droit romain et droit germanique, Part II, p. 35.
53. MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THnE LAWS, Book XXVIII, chs. 13, 14 has interesting
observations on these differences and their consequences, not strictly correct. Was the
obligation imposed by most of the barbarian codes on the defendant to swear or purge
himself of guilt a burden on the accused? van Wetter points out that this procedure con-
stituted a privilege for the defendant as well as an obligation, op. cit. supra note 28, at 35.
Furthermore the Salic law seems to have put the burden of the oath on the accuser, though
later this feature was abandoned. For conflicting views see van Wetter, op. cit. supra note
28, at 32-34. Also see Esmein, Histoire du droit franfais, p. 91 and notes.
54. Leges Visigothorum, Ant. II, I, 21, MGH, 80 series, p. 52 (MGH, 40 series,
Hanover, 1902, ed. K. Zeumer, p. 250); Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, vol. I, 2nd
ed., section 48; Brissaud, Manuel d'histoire du droit Irancais, pp. 81-82.
55. Leges Longobardorum, MGH, Liutprandi Leges, c. 56, p. 129 (p. 106, MGH, 80
series) ; c. 71, p. 136 (p. 112, MGH, 8° series); c. 118, p. 156 (p. 130, MGH, 80 series).
56. Leges Burgundionum, MGH, ed. R. De Sais, VIII, XLV, LXXX.
57. Leg. Burgund., II, VIII, XVII, XIX, XXXIII, XLII, XLV, LXXX, XCIX;
Grelewski, op. cit. supra note 41, at 45.
58. J. Dlclareuil, "Les Preuves judiciaires dans le droit franc, du Ve au VIIIe siecle,"
Nouvelle revue historique de droit franfais et etranger, 1898, p. 472.
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Montesquieu had inferred from Agobard's letter that the Salic law
did not allow trial by battle. There is little doubt, however, that trial by
battle was practiced under the Salic law. 9 If such was the case why did
Agobard advocate the adoption of the Frankish law among the Burgun-
dians? Was he ignorant of the Frankish legal procedure? It does not
appear so, for in his letter against the Jews, Agobard in citing earlier
Frankish decrees on the subject, shows some knowledge of the latter
law. 0
The answer given by Grelewski to the question why Agobard favored
a change to the Frankish law system is that, though Agobard knew that
the latter permitted trial by battle, yet he felt that the introduction of
the Frankish law would help simplify procedure and allow the extension
of proof 'by witnesses throughout the Empire. Agobard felt that the
Burgundian law in its insistence on the iudicia Deioa was the great
stumbling block to this step.6'
The Burgundian law was different from other barbarian laws in
that it settled conflicts between Romans and Burgundians more frequently
on the basis of Burgundian law than on the basis of the rule of per-
sonality. In some respects the Burgundian law was, therefore, territorial."2
How far this territorial application of the law, especially in cases involv-
ing Burgundians and other barbarians, still existed in the ninth century
when the Burgundian kings were nothing but a memory cannot be an-
swered positively. Since the former Burgundian realm retained some
identity and perhaps autonomy it is likely that the provision in question
was still observed. Agobard's diatribe against it would be incompre-
hensible otherwise. Though the question of what law would be applied
in a contest between a Frank, for example, and a Burgundian remains
difficult to answer, yet in the cases, prescribed in the law, of contests be-
tween Romans and Burgundians, it is safe to say that Burgundian law
was applied. In such instances it made no difference, as it did make a
difference in the other national laws, who was the defendant or the plain-
tiff, or whether the thief was caught in the act. The Burgundian law would
have had to apply if one of the parties involved was a Burgundian.
59. SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, Book XXVIII, chs. 13, 19. E. Mayer, Geschworengericht und
Inquisitionsprozess, Munich, 1916, pp. 37 ff.
60. Epistolae Karolini Aevi, MGH, V, pp. 185-199. He also shows knowledge of the
work on Frankish law of a predecessor at Lyons, Leidradus. Remy Ceillier, ed., Histoire des
auteurs sacrds et dcclesiastiques, vol. 12, Paris, 1862, pp. 366-367. B. Blumenkranz, Les
Auteurs chrdtiens latins du Moyen Age sur les Juils et le Judaisme, Paris, 1963, pp. 152-168.
61. Grelewski, op. cit. supra note 41, at 45.
62. Leges Burgundionum, Prima Constitutio, 3, MGH, p. 31. For provisions binding on
both Burgundians and Romans see also VIII, 1; IX, X, 1; XIII; XV, 1; XXVIII, 1;
XXXVIII, 10. Stouff, "Etude sur le principe de la personnalit6 des lois depuis les invasions
barbares jusqu'au XIIe siecle," Revue bourguignonne de l'enseignement superieur, IV, 1894,
pp. 289-290. See Chap. 1, supra. All the barbarian laws possess territorial features to a greater
or lesser extent. The territoriality of the Burgundian law must be understood with this in
mind. See especially A. Coville, Recherches sur l'histoire de Lyon, p. 196 ff.
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It was this eccentric feature of the Burgundian legislation linked to
cumbersome testimonial procedure that made Agobard attack it, though
he was fully aware that the Frankish law permitted the judicial duel.
The number of laws that were practiced at this time in Lyons was
probably considerable. Is there any significance in Agobard's use of the
number five when he describes the multifarious legal situation in the
well known passage on the number of laws in Lyon?63 Since the Empire
contained many more than five national law systems the suggestion has
been made that the number five represented all the personal laws practiced
in Lyons after the Divisio Imperii (Division of the Empire) of 817.64
This is based on the assumption that with every partition of the Empire
the number of laws practiced in each part was reduced automatically.
There are two objections to this view: (1) Agobard's letter was written
in the year 817 which is the year of the Divisio Imperil when Lothar,
the son of the Emperor Louis, received a share of authority in the Empire
and not after the latter event, as De Combes states. (2) Secondly, it is
to be doubted whether the divisions of the Empire affected the number of
personal law systems recognized. Though the Lombard kingdom was
aways treated apart from the rest of the Carolingian Empire, the theo-
retical unity of the rest of the Empire survived all the divisions.65 Fur-
thermore, the deeds and formulae showing the application of the various
personal laws in the empire display no relation whatever to the political
divisions of this period.6" The laws of the Empire were still the laws of
peoples rather than the laws of territories and would, therefore, be little
affected by the splitting up of the Empire. Localization of law was cer-
tainly advancing, as we have seen, and it is sometimes difficult to dis-
tinguish local custom from national personal law as in the Edictum
Pistense, but the private law systems of the Empire were still largely
personal in the ninth century. The use 'by Agobard of the number five
was, therefore, probably accidental.
Agobard's request that the Burgundian law be eliminated was
not heeded, for its continuance is vouchsafed by the legal documents and
by a statement of Hincmar (died 882) to this effect. 7 Agobard's attempt
63. Adversus Legem Gundobadi, MGH, c. 4, p. 159 quoted above in note 42, supra.
64. L. de Combes, "L'Invasion des barbares, l'6glise et le statut personnel," Revue
catholique des institutions et du droit, 1899, vol. 22, p. 417.
65. Brissaud, Manuel, p. 526. See also Flach, Les Origines de l'ancienne France, Paris,
vol. IV, pp. 1, 5 ff. On the Merovingian partitions, H. Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte,
vol. II, 2nd ed. by Cl. von Schwerin, Munich and Leipzig, 1928, p. 33.
66. This fact would emerge from an examination of the documents under the index
heading "Personality" in Th~venin, Textes relatils aux institutions privees et publiques aux
epoques merovingiens et carolingiens. Institutions privies, and in Loersch and Schr6der,
Urkunden zur Geschichte des deutschen Privatrechtes.
67. Hincmar, Opera Omnia, ed. Sirmond, II, p. 234 (Patr. Lat., vol. CXXV, col. 1026),
Communi episcoporum nomine ad regem de coercendo et exstirpando raptu viduarum
puellrum ac sanctimonialium:
Ch. XII. Defendant se quantum volunt qui huiusmod sunt, sive per leges, si ullae
sunt, mundanas, sive per consuetudines humanas, tamen si Christiani sunt, sciant se in




in the letter to the Emperor to raise the specter of Arianism against the
Law of Gundobad does not appear to have been successful. Such an effort
would have been more timely three centuries before his time when the
Burgundians were Arians and the Gallo-Roman population was opposed
to them for this reason if for no other.
Gaul itself during the partitions of the ninth century showed the
emergence of distinct regions each of which developed a sectional and
even a national feeling. For ages such names as Gothia (Septimania),
Provence, Aquitaine, Burgundy, Neustria, and Austrasia testified to the
endurance of this local feeling."8 The growth of the great regions has
received the attention of historians since Thierry's day. Jacques Flach
devoted the third and fourth volumes of his Origines de l'ancienne France
to the movement.69 Departing from the practice of some predecessors,
Flach emphasized the importance of the ethnic and national elements in
the life of these principalities.7 0 In doing so he undoubtedly underes-
timated the role of the vassalic bond.7' But his basic position is sustained
by a recent historian of the period, Dhondt, who concurs in seeing a
national element at the foundation of the territorial principalities in the
ninth and tenth centuries. 72 Burgundy, in particular, that region that
shifts is boundaries constantly throughout history, has retained the name
and perhaps the imprint of its fifth century conquerors. 73 The survival
of Burgundian national feeling is curious in view of the statement of
Agobard about the small number of persons belonging to the Burgundian
law.74 On the other hand it squares well with the influence ascribed to
the Burgundian law by J. Ficker in his remarkable investigations into
the law systems of medieval Europe. 7' Their bearing on the subject will
be noted below.
In view of the strength of this nationalistic current in the region of
68. H. Klimrath, Travaux sur l'histoire du droit franfais, vol. I, pp. 306-307. See in
general E. Sestan, Stato e nazione nell'alto Medioevo: ricerche suite origini nazionali in
Francia, Italia, Germania, Naples, 1952.
69. Vol. III, Paris, 1909; vol. IV, Paris, 1917.
70. Flach, op. cit. supra note 65, at vol. IV, pp. 319 ff. The primary entitities making
up the France of today are recognized as Aquitaine, Burgundy and Francia (the region of
Paris).
71. Lot, Fidiles ou vassaux, Paris, 1903. Esmein, Histoire, p. 310, n.2. Flach also, Vol.
III, p. 161 insists on the preeminence of the Frankish race in Francia over the other terri-
tories. See Esmein, op. cit. supra, at 331, note 1 for a critique.
72. J. Dhondt, Etude sur la naissance des principaut-s territoriales en France (lXe-Xe
siecle), Bruges, 1948, p. 247.
73. E. Freeman, Historical Geography of Europe, vol. I, London, 1882, pp. 93-94; F.
Lot, Les Invasions germaniques, Paris, 1935, pp. 175-177.
74. Agobard, loc. cit., c. 6, p. 160: ". . . cuius legis homines sunt perpaud .... " Cf.,
M. Chaume, "Le Sentiment national bourguisgon de Gondebaud a Charles le Tmfraire,"
Mem. Acad. Sciences, Dijon, 1922.
75. J. Ficker, Untersuchungen zur Erbenfolge der ostgermanischen Rechte, Innsbruck,
1891-1909, I-V, VI (posthumous), nos. 1341, 1342. My own knowledge of these views inso-
far as they concern France is based on R. Caillemer, "La Formation du droit franais
mdikval et les travaux de Julius Ficker," in the Annales des Facultis de Droit et des
Lettres d'Aix, no. 1, (vol. II) 1906, pp. 33-58; and Annales de la Facult-4 de Droit d'Aix,
(vol. I), pp. 1 ff., pp. 207 ff. See especially pp. 6-20 in the latter issue.
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Lyons it is not strange that Agobard should have been unsuccessful in
his attempt to overthrow the legislation of Gundobad. Thus Agobard was
running counter to two forces of the age, regional nationalism and the
principle of the personality of law. His ideas were probably based on
Roman conceptions of universal sovereignty and these ideas, though they
provided a facade for the empire of the Franks after Charlemagne, were
not deeply rooted.76 Was Agobard unaware of this feeling? Apparently
not, for he recognizes the impossibility of ending the regime of the
personality of law. 7
C. The Edictum Pistense and the Transition to Territoriality
in the Pays de Droit Ecrit et Coutumier
The principle of personality demanded two conditions which proved
difficult to meet in the period of the decline of the Frankish Empire. In
the first place the race of the defendant had to be determined. Owing to
a mixture of peoples this became difficult to ascertain. In the second place
the judges had to have knowledge of the laws of the litigants. This know-
ledge became rare.78 Law gradually became localized, attached to regions.
But during the ninth and tenth centuries this change from personality to
territoriality was only partial. The laws of the regions were still known by
the original national designation of a majority of the inhabitants. The
old national laws were cited by name, but their contents had undergone
great change. 79 This is not strange, for we must remember that the old
national laws were themselves nothing but customs, customs declared in
a judicial manner by the laghsaga or his royal successor."0 In the ninth
and tenth centuries the national laws continued to develop in a judicial
manner.
8'
The transition to territoriality appears in a curious fashion in the
ninth century. The first document in which it may be studied is the
Edictum Pistense.2 The Edictum issued in the year 864 by Charles the
76. Jenks, Law and Politics in the Middle Ages, 2nd ed., p. 17. Cf., Halphen, "L'Idie
detat sous les Carolingiens," Rev. hist., CLXXXV (1939) p. 59 ff (cited elsewhere).
77. Agobard, Adversus Legem Gundobadi, MGH, c. 14, p. 164: ". . . Sed quia hoc
grande est et forsitan homini impossibile .... ." Yet his plea may not have completely fallen
on rocky soil, as L. Halphen, Charlemagne et l'empire carolingien, Paris, 1949, pp. 239-241,
points out.
78. Esmein, Cours illmentaire d'histoire du droit jranfais, 15th ed., p. 679.
79. Th~venin, Textes relatifs aux institutions privies et publiques, aux dpoques
merovingienne et carolingienne, Institutions privies p. 241, note 1; p. 202, note 2; Brunner,
Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, vol. I, 2nd, ed., p. 505.
80. J. Petrau-Gay, "La 'Laghsaga' Salienne," Revue historique de droit jranoais et
Itranger, XIV, 1935, pp. 77-85.
81. This point will be more fully developed below.
82. The literature on the pays de droit dcrit et coutumier is not as great as the subject
deserves. Esmein, op. cit. supra note 78, at 680-681; Tardif, Histoire des sources de droit
francais. Origines romaines, pp. 267-280. The division between the two regions was worked
out by Felix Berriat-Saint-Prix, Histoire du droit romain and reproduced by Klimrath,
Travaux sur I'histoire du droit Iranvais, vol. II, pp. 170 ff., 220 ff. See also E. Jarriand,
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Bald for the first time in any document raises the distinction, mainly in
criminal law, between regions in which Roman law is valid and other parts
of the Empire in which the capitularies determine the penalties for
crime."3 The relevant parts of the edict are discussed below.
The criminal and penal law in the edict is largely based on the
capitularies, but provision is made frequently for "judgments according
to the Roman law in those regions in which such judgments are followed."
Remarkable is the statement in Chapter 20 that "in supererogation of that
law [the Roman] or in derogation thereof neither we nor our predecessors
have made any ordinances or determinations."" Though the capitulary
law is largely territorial in its effect, the Roman law still appears to be
considered a personal law if we judge from the words of Chapter 28: "De
illis autem, qui secundum legem Romanam vivunt. . ." (Concerning those
persons moreover who live according to Roman law).'5 Yet in Chapters
13, 16, 20, 23 31 the Roman law is confined to certain "regions."8 Simi-
larly the other, Germanic personal laws included under the head of leges
mundanae, are allowed by Chapter 9 to determine the penalties for
perjury. Confusion is, however, produced by basing this concession on the
capitularies and then by prescribing an ecclesiastical penance for the
offense.8 Chapter 20 also punishes perjury "just as is stated in . . .the
capitularies."8's Chapters 6 (cited), 17 (coinage), 25 (treason), 27 (eva-
sion of military duty) on the other hand make no distinction by region or
national law. 9 Though most parts of the edict are concerned with criminal
Histoire de la Novelle 118 dans les pays de droit Jcrit depuis Justinien jusqu'en 1789, Chaps.
XII, XIII.
83. Capitularia, MGH, ed. Boretius and Krause, II, no. 273, pp. 310-328. The edict has
been analyzed from the point of view of the royal legislative authority by Fustel de
Coulanges, Les Transformations de la royauti pendant l'poque carolingienne, 2nd ed., pp.
480 ff.
84. MGH, II op. cit. supra note 83, at 319:
quia super illam legem vel contra ipsam legem nec antecessores nostri quodcumque
capitulum statuerunt nec nos aliquid constitiuimus.
85. MGH, II, op. cit. supra note 83, at 322.
86. Id. at 315, 316-317, 319, 320, 324. Fugitives from the Norman invasion on settling
in the kingdom and contracting marriages should follow the old custom of the land and
the children should follow the condition of the mother. It is difficult to see how this pro-
vision and what it implies for private law relations are compatible with the principle of the
personality of law. We are dealing in this case with territorial law. It is clear that the royal
power of legislation, based on the Germanic institution of the laghsaga and on Roman
imperial ideas could regulate relations of private law as well as public law. Cf. Fustel de
Coulanges, Les Transformations, 483.
87. Id. at 314.
88. Id. at 319.
89. MGH, II, op. cit. supra note 83, at 313, 317, 321, 322, ch. 6 provides for an oath:
Quia non habent domos, ad quas secundum legem manniri et banniri possint, dicunt
quod de mannitione vel bannitione legibus comprobari et legaiter iudicari non
possunt.
It thus appears that the oath now required of the franci homines is a breach of old pro-
cedure. In order to justify this innovation the edict proceeds to explain "quoniam lex
consensu populi fit et constitutione regis." The meaning of this celebrated phrase is that law
has a twofold origin, popular (or rather judicial, the work of the laghsaga) and royal. The
consensus populi is described by Petrau-Gay, La Notion de "lex," pp. 221 ff. as a survival in
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law a few such as Chapter 6 dealing with procedure and Chapter 28
dealing with gifts to the church and debts to the crown, and Chapter 31
concerning the effect of marriages between Normans and Franks may be
classified as private law. Of these, Chapters 28 and 31 make the usual
distinction between regions subject to capitulary and those subject to
Roman lawY0
The Edictum Pistense reveals the transition from personality to
territoriality of law and also the relation of capitulary to national law.
Law is still personal in the edict, especially the Roman law, but its
practice is confined to certain regions. The criminal law is thus applied
no longer to a large number of members of various national systems, but
is enforced in two regions. In the region of the later droit coutumier, the
edict specifically prescribes penalties. For example, the counterfeiter is
condemned to lose his right hand according to the prescription in the
thirty-third chapter of the fourth book of the Capitularies (of Ansegisus)
which in turn reproduces section 19 of a capitulary of Louis the Pious of
818 or 819."' In this and in other cases the edict pays no heed to the
principle of the personality of law. A Salian Frank under the strict rule
of personality would not have been liable to a penalty other than that
prescribed in the Salic law. Of course, counterfeiting was an offense
against the king and as such a matter of "public" law and, therefore,
the rule of personality would in this case give way to that of territoriality.
However, the facility with which Charles the Bald prescribes penalties
would indicate an affinity between the Capitulary law and the Salic law,
as well as other Germanic legal systems, and would imply great royal
power in the modification of the provisions of the leges barbarorum. Such
a power apparently did not exist vis a vis the Roman law.92
The conclusions thus far reached may be stated as follows: (1) The
criminal law of the Germanic nations is dominated by the capitularies.
Carolingian period of earlier sanction or protection of law by the people. See Fustel de
Coulanges, Les Transformations 488-489.
90. All cited.
91. Capitularia, MGH, I, p. 285. That the law so recognized, however, is not a terri-
torial but a personal law practiced by the majority of inhabitants of a district is clear from
the following excerpts:
regionibus . . . secundum legem Romanam; . . . in terra . . . in qua secundum
legem Romanam; . . . in regionibus in quibus secundum legem Romanam; . . .
De illis qui secundum legem Romanam vivunt; . . . secundum legem nostram
infantes matrem sequantur; . . . salva constitutione legis Romanae in eis qui
secundum illam vivunt ....
92. MGH, Cap., II, 319, c. 20 quoted supra, note 84. It is impossible, as Petrau-Gay
rightly affirms, to distinguish the capitulum legi additum and even the national lex from the
capitulum per se scribendum in content. They cover the same subject matter. It is only in
the form of emission that the difference arises. The Edictum Pistense is undoubtedly a
capitulary per se scribendum. Petrau-Gay, La Notion de "lex" dans la coutume salienne
et ses transformations dans les capitulaires, p. 254; contra, Boretius, Beitrage zur
Kapitularienkritik, pp. 36-53. See especially Ganshof, Recherches sur les capitulaires, pp.




(2) The civil laws of the Germanic nations, the leges mundanae, are
open to modification by the capitularies. (3) The Roman law appears in
the ninth century as the principal personal law. (4) The Roman law
enjoys a criminal as well as a civil application at least for Romans. (5)
The Roman law is also a quasi-territorial law, a lex jori, in southern
France. (6) The capitularies form a territorial law in civil as well as in
criminal fields in the north of France. Out of the union of the various
barbarian laws and the capitularies in this region there developed a type
of common law, which, as we shall see, was known as the "Salic" law."
The edict reflects throughout a dualism in law that is perhaps the
counterpart of the duality of functions of the Germanic king. He is not
merely the expounder of jurisprudence, the lagksaga of his German fol-
lowers and the possessor of the old Germanic bannum, but he is also the
successor of the Roman emperors. Some confusion results from this
multiple position."'
The existence of the pays de droit ecrit and of the pays de droit cou-
tumier is recognized in the eleventh century by the Exceptiones Petri,
which describes differences in procedure between the regions in regard to
collecting debts. The process of judicial condemnation was necessary only
in the country of written law. In the regions in which Roman law did
not apply it was sufficient to offer the capital to the creditor in the pres-
ence of witnesses.
95
The subsequent history of these regions lies outside the scope of this
paper, but at the time of the revival of the Justinian law the regions of
the south could boast a long association with Roman "customary" law
that was of great importance in paving the way for the introduction of
the "learned" law of the thirteenth century. 6 The process by which the
93. Tardif, Histoire des sources de droit franqais. Origines romaines, pp. 269-270. The
capitulary for Aquitaine thus contrasts: "Tam Romani quam et Sand," (Cap., MGH, I, 43,
c. 10). See Ch. I supra and discussion below.
94. It is unfortunate that Petrau-Gay in his illuminating studies has not seen fit to
describe the relations of the royal power to the Roman national law. It is possible that the
imperial crown acquired by Charlemagne gave the ruler the full rights of legislation of the
emperors, but the Edictum Pistense does not reveal this fact clearly.
The two functions, one judicial, one legislative, were distinct under the Merovingians.
The laghsaga or law sayer exercised the first; the king exercised the second. The leges
barbarorum were declarations of custom, the function of the laghsaga. Under the Caro-
lingians, as the capitulary quoted supra Cap., MGH, no. 143, c. 5, "Generaliter omnes
admonemus . . ." makes clear, the ruler combined in himself the two functions of laghsaga
and legislator, Petrau-Gay, "La 'Laghsaga' salienne," loc. cit., pp. 280-285.
95. Book II, c. 31 (Savigny, Geschichte des romischen Rechts im Mittelalter, vol. II,
p. 363). The most recent edition is by Mor, Scritti giuridici preirneriani, vol. II of the
collection Orbis Romanus, no. 10, Milan, 1938. For discussion see J. C. Naber, "De Petri
Exceptionum patria et annis," Melanges Paul Fournier, Paris, 1929, pp. 573-585; H.
Kantorowicz, Studies in the Glossators of Roman Law, Cambridge, 1938, ch. 6, pp. 112-121;
and F. Calasso, Medio evo del diritto, I, Le Fonti, Milan, 1954, p. 297 ff.
96. Calasso, Medio evo del diritto, p. 181 ff., 607 ff.; Chinon, Histoire, I pp. 502-510,
513 ff.; cf., Olivier Martin, La Coutume de Paris, Paris, 1925, pp. 5-13. See Jariand,
Histoire de la Novelle 118 dans les pays de droit ecrit, pp. 204 ff. for a picture of the
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Justinian law was substituted for the Theodosian law including the
Breviary and the Papian, and by which it penetrated legal practice and
instruction, is one that needs more clarification than it has received. When
these substitutions occurred they were treated by the parlements of the
midi as alterations or re-definitions of established custom.97 "It was as
if a country which having lost its codes, had lived for some centuries
on their memory and had one day rediscovered them.""8 Yet when some
of the jurists spoke of the Roman law as a common law, the theory was not
abandoned that it was a customary law enunciated and defined by the
royal courts, not promulgated by past emperors, that was involved."
What is the explanation for the development of two systems of law
in the north and south of France? It was not, as Montesquieu suggested,
a result of either conscious choice by individual inhabitants, for the free
choice of law did not exist, nor of legislative action for the Edictum
Pistense legislated after rather than before the fact. Nor do the Romanist
views of Fustel de Coulanges with their insistence on the survival of
Roman institutions explain the dominance of Germanic law in the north.10 °
If the Frankish elements tended to predominate in northern France it
was not owing to any enforced imposition of their law by the conquerors.
It was owing rather to a gradual transformation of the law of a majority
or of the most influential part of a population into the law of the territory.
This process is revealed in the Edictum Pistense.
The supposed persistence of certain national law systems in various
regions has, however, given rise to several questions. Of the continuous
existence of the Roman law in southern France and in Italy there can
be no question. Of the survival of Lombard law there is also no doubt,
as there is none of a mingling of national elements everywhere. But
extreme diversity among the customs of the south of France. Lyons was pays de droit ecrit
in the fourteenth century but was under droit coutumier in the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries, R. Caillemer, "Les Idees coutumieres et la renaissance du droit romain dans le
sud-est de la France," Essays in Legal History, Oxford, 1915, pp. 175, 200. This shows the
lack of continuity in some regions and also the ease with which "custom" and "Roman law"
blended.
97. Brissaud, in A General Survey of Events, Sources, Persons, p. 206. Cf., Chdnon,
Histoire du droit franCais, I, p. 488; Olivier-Martin, Histoire du droit francais, 2e tirage,
Paris, 1951, p. 122.
98. Esmein, Histoire, p. 682.
99. For the exact application of these terms see Esmein, op. cit. supra note 98, at
683-688 and the literature cited in the notes. The mode of application of Roman law in both
the pays de coutume and the pays de droit dcrit was much disputed. See also Tardif, op. cit.
supra note 93, at 278 ff.
100. Fustel de Coulanges, L'Invasion germanique, p. 549; idem, Recherches sur quelques
probl~mes d'histoire, 2nd ed., p. 402; idem, Nouvelles recherches sur quelques problemes
d'histoire, pp. 361-398, especially pp. 382, 396-398. Fustel de Coulanges admits the existence
of national groups in the Frankish Empire but denies them racial standing; they were
territorial groups. A Ripuarian was resident of the pagus Ribuarius. If he entered a
Burgundian region he was subject, however, to Ripuarian law. The national laws no longer
designated national groups, Nouv. Recherches, pp. 378-379 and note 1. The learned author
antedates the advent of territoriality, but his thesis is valid for the late ninth century,
though it does not sustain a Romanist interpretation of the data.
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precisely which national law or laws survived or predominated in northern
France and in Germany, especially in the pays de droit coutumier?
The theory which has exercised the widest influence and conforms
most completely to the terminology of the laws and customs is that of
Sohm.1' According to Sohm the law that acquired the ascendancy in
northern France and in western Europe in general was the Salic law. The
growth of this law, which had commenced with Clovis, continued under
the Carolingian rulers. The Salic law gradually supplanted the other
Germanic national laws.1 °2 Even the law of the capitularies was based
on Salic custom. The only other national laws that remained after the
ninth century were the Roman law and the Lombard law. The law of
ancient France, therefore, was predominantly Salic law, but with the
juxtaposition of Roman law in the south.'03 The only national law of
Germanic origin that resisted the domination of the Salic law was the
Saxon law. But otherwise Sohm found the Frankish law influence domi-
nant in the whole field of "public law" and in the law of the fiefs. All the
great movements and ideas of the Middle Ages originated in the country
of the Salian Franks. The reform of Cluny and the Crusades originated in
this middle region.'
0 4
The theory of Sohm has been widely accepted but also criticized and
modified in detail. Brunner has followed Sohm in accepting the influence
of the Salic law in France and parts of Germany but has restricted the
extent of the influence in Saxony.'0° Schr6der, while agreeing with Sohm,
is inclined to place more emphasis upon the influence of the Ripuarian
law.' O6 Felix Dahn criticized the part of Sohm's theory which set up a
distinction between Reicttsrecht (King's law) and Volksrecht (Folk law),
and denied the validity of these differences.0 7 Nevertheless, an examina-
tion of the documents of the tenth and eleventh centuries tends to confirm
in the system of Sohm in one respect. In .many documents Germans are
identified as Salici living under the Salic law.0 8
If Sohm's thesis is essentially correct from the point of view of
national law terminology it has nevertheless suffered a searching revision
on the side of doctrine. This has been the work of Julius Ficker. 09 The
latter has emphasized the importance of the laws of the East Germans
101. R. Sohm, "Frankisches Recht und romisches Recht," Zeitschrijt der Savigny-Stif-
tung. Germ. Abt., I, pp. 1 ff.
102. Sohm, op. cit. supra note 101, at 17.
103. Id. at 64.
104. Id. at 69.
105. H. Brunner, Grundziige der deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, 2nd ed., 1903, pp. 32, 95.
106. R. Schroder, Lehrbuch der deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, 5th ed., p. 638.
107. Dahn, Die Konige der Germanen, VII, 2, Leipzig, 1894, pp. 34 ff.; VIII, 3, 1899,
pp. 29 ff.
108. See section A, supra.
109. J. Ficker, Untersuchungen zur Erbenfolge der ostgermanischen Rechte, Innsbruck,
1891-1904.
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rather than of the West Germans in determining the dominant law char-
acteristics of the Middle Ages. He has examined the contents of the vari-
ous Germanic laws singling out what he regarded as fundamental and
stable elements in each and has reclassified the legal customs of the Middle
Ages on this basis. He has found this stable element in the law of the
family and of marriage. Indeed, according to Caillemer, he has exag-
gerated the extent of the stability. ' °
According to Ficker the original family of Germanic law, both among
the West Germans and the East Germans, was the matriarchal rather
than the patriarchal family.111 The West German tribes in their law were
closer to this original matriarchal system than the East German tribes." 2
Using the criterion of family law Ficker recognized three systems of law
among the Franks. Besides the traditional division between Salic and
Ripuarian he included a further classification called the Lorraine law. 13
The Lorraine law shared with the Salic law, called by Ficker the West
Frankish law, the domination of the pays de droit coutumier of northern
France. The principal characteristic of the West Frankish law was the
absence of a legal bond between the father and illegitimate offspring.
This was a survival of the old maternal system which was subsequently
overlaid with patriarchal institutions." 4 The Lorraine law was more
variegated but was characterized in many cases by the custom of devolu-
tion. This was a right of children to landed property in the event of the
death of one of the parents. The right of disposition of the surviving
parent was limited."' Thus the pays de droit coutumier was distinguished
for legal elements of an early maternal system.
To the old Visigothic law, Ficker did not allow a large influence in
France, though its importance in Spain was acknowledged. Character-
istics of the old Visigothic legislation, such as the equality of sexes and
the absence in the code of Euric of a reservation of property in favor of
children, were ascribed to old East German legal traditions rather than,
as commonly supposed, to Roman law influences. Though southern France
was a region of Roman law Ficker recognized the influence of Visigothic
law in Septimania and in Gascony. In these cases, however, the Visigothic
law influence mingled with that of the Lorraine law."'
In the case of the Burgundian law much dispute exists. For Sohm
the Burgundian law in the early Middle Ages had succumbed entirely
110. R. Caillemer, "La Formation du droit franqais medieval et les travaux de Julius
Ficker," Annales des Facult~s de Droit et des Lettres d'Aix, II, 1906, pp. 38-39.
111. Ficker, op. cit. supra note 109, at no. 949; Caillemer, op. cit. supra note 110, at 41.
112. Caillemer, op. cit. supra note 110, at 40; Ficker, op. cit. supra note 109, at V,
part one, on the East German law.
113. Ficker, op. cit. supra note 110, at nos. 810, 811.
114. Id. at nos. 885 ff., 908, 834 ff., 855.
115. Id. at nos. 739, 835.
116. Id. at nos. 1059, 1355; Caillemer, op. cit. supra note 110, at 4, 1907.
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to the Salic law."' In Ficker's view, however, the Burgundian law ex-
ercised the most decisive influence in France. After the defeat of the
Visigoths in 507 the Visigothic law in this theory was replaced by the
Burgundian law which thus shared with the Roman law a vital part in
forming the customs of southern France." 8 A leading attribute of the
law of the region dominated by the Burgundian influence was the absence
of a community of property between husband and wife." 9 The spread of
some doctrines of the Roman law in the south of France, especially of
of Falcidian Fourth, was ascribed by Zeumer to the reception of the
Lex Romana Burgundionum in the valley of the Garonne. 12 ° Ficker
extended this influence of the Burgundians and treated the pays de droit
Jcrit as identical with the pays de droit Burgonde (country of Burgun-
dian law) .121
In all these theories, as Caillemer has remarked,'122 there is much
exaggeration. The classification of Germanic laws on the basis of doctrines
of family law and of survivals of a maternal system is helpful in under-
standing the resemblances and the differences among the various laws but
it can hardly bear the historical superstructure that has been erected
on its foundation. Nevertheless, it calls attention to the fact that the old
national laws ceased to exist in the eleventh century as laws of tribes. The
national laws adapted themselves to the regions in which they were to
become indigenous and many of their doctrines merged in regional law
systems. If the prihciple of the personality of law is sought in the tenth
century it is to be found in new forms of feudal justice.
VI. CONCLUSION
It seems desirable in conclusion to attempt a summation and to
orient it in its historical and legal setting. In doing the former two facts
stand out, one a principle, that of the personality of law, the other a
history, that of the application and extension of personality. If the first of
these is a tribal possession rooted in religious conceptions, the second is a
complex phenomenon which consisted of the grafting on the world-wide
regime of Roman law of several systems of Germanic racial law and of
the substitution for a system of legislation of one of customary jurispru-
dence. What we have traced is more than the unfolding of a primitive
principle, it is in many respects a new development, or rather a series of
new developments.
117. Sohm, op. cit. supra note 101, at 16, 27.
118. Ficker, op. cit. supra note 109, at no. 1342; Caillemer, op. cit. supra note 110, at
1907.
119. Ficker, op. cit. supra note 109, at no. 1305; Caillemer, op. cit. supra note 110, at
8, 1907.
120. K. Zeumer, Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung, Get. Ab., IX, 1888, p. 26.
121. Ficker, op. cit. supra note 109, at no. 1341; Carlemer, op. cit. supra note 110, at
19-20.
122. Caillemer, op. cit. supra note 110, at 37-39, 1906.
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When we try to place the personality of law in the perspective of
European legal and constitutional development we note first of all its
importance for international law. A history of private international law
should embrace at least four periods or stages: (1) the personal law
regime; (2) the territoriality of the feudal law; (3) the age of the
statutes, Italian and French; (4) modern private international law. A
study of any of these stages requires that attention be given to those
preceding and following, for each embodies some elements of the earlier
systems.1
As public international law accepted its basic tenet of territoriality
2
from feudalism, private international law from the fourteenth century
on increasingly emphasized the role of personality. This it did by dis-
tinguishing among personal, real and then mixed statutes. This was the
work principally of Bartolus and his French and Italian students.' It was
not only a result of jurisprudence, of "droit savant," which carries us
back to the twelfth century. It was a product of custom and of practice,
and this takes us back to the early Middle Ages. The continuity denied
by Lain6 has been sustained by Meijers.' As the latter points out, in
France and England succession to real property is governed by the law
of its situation, succession to personal property by the domicile of the
deceased. The first rule goes back to the personal law system, the second
to the feudal regime.5
The double heritage of the western tradition, "Germanic" personal-
ity and feudal territoriality, is recalled in sundry conceptions of modern
public law such as ius sanguinis (right based on descent) and ius soli
(right based on domicile or territory),' and in a distinction made in
modern French law between subjects living under territorial sovereignty
and citizens sharing national sovereignty.
7
1. J. BRISSAUD, A GENERAL SURVEY OF EVENTS, SOURCES, PERSONS & MOVEMENTS IN
CONTINENTAL LEGAL HISTORY 213-216 (Boston, 1912) (Manuel, p. 239 ff.).
2. F. Laurent, Le Droit civil international, I, Paris, 1880, no. 198, p. 272.
3. M. Gutzwiller, "Le Developpement historique du droit international priv6," Recueil
des cours de l'Academie de Droit International, t. 29, (1929) IV, Paris, p. 395 ff.
4. A. Lain6, Introduction au droit international priv6, vol. I, Paris, 1888, pp. 54-74.
Meijers, "Principes fondamentaux," Recueil des cours, op. cit. supra note 3, at 50 ff. The
continuity seems also to be upheld by Laurent, op. cit. supra note 2, at I, no. 168.
5. Meijers, id. at 672.
6. J. Brissaud, Manuel d'histoire generale du droit franoais public et priv6, Paris, 1903,
pp. 1755-1757. J. Mervyn Jones, British Nationality Law, rev. ed., Oxford, 1956, pp. 16, 51,
57 and passim.
Feudal fragmentation obscured the idea of nationality for a long time. Out of this stage
of development came the notion of ius soli. Nationality depended on the place of birth: a
Frenchman was defined as any person born on French soil. English law perhaps went
furthest in this direction. Save for occasional naturalization only birth on English soil
sufficed. English nationality could not be surrendered except with the consent of the
sovereign, I POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 441. It was not until the
eighteenth century that the principle of the ius sanguinis came to be applied in France,
Brissaud, id. at 1756. English law continued to adhere more closely to ius soli.
7. A. Esmein, Elements de droit constitutionnel frangais et comparl, 7th ed., Paris,
1921, vol. 1, p. 2.
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The importance placed on legal practice rather than doctrine in
linking the personal law and feudal periods has important implications
for the theory of the survival of Roman law.' There seems little doubt
that it was as custom rather than as jurisprudence that Roman law sur-
vived in southern France, whatever the case might have been in Italy.
"Le fait triomphe et l'emporte sur le droit."9 Later French kings who
insisted on regarding Roman law in these regions as custom rather than as
legislation were on sound ground historically in doing so, though their
motives were political, for they feared the implication otherwise possible
that the Holy Roman Emperor could legislate in their dominions.' ° The
ability of Roman law in the early Middle Ages to don a personal and
customary husk and then to break it" is as conspicuous as its later
combination with territorial custom to achieve a similar result.1
2
The admission of strangers or of the conquered to legal and political
rights is historically achieved through several methods: personality,
territoriality, a common law of nations (ius gentium), and the system of
statutes. Just as Rome made the most ambitious effort to utilize the third
of these methods, the Franks applied the principle of personality most
extensively. A history of private international law is also a history of
the triumphs and setbacks of liberalism and constitutionalism. 8 The older
age of personality placed rights in a position almost unknown in our day
because it insisted on the divine origin and popular sanction of all law,
and law has been the carrier and safeguard of individual rights through-
out.
If we focus on modern conceptions of constitutionalism it is obvious
that they owe much to the two factors of personality and territoriality.
The Magna Carta is a feudal document, but the earlier age of personality
also placed rights in a privileged position, for it based them not on terri-
torial and contractual ties but on birth and "nationality."' 4 If anything,
the personality of law has been regarded by some modern jurists as a
more secure foundation of individual rights than territoriality. One of the
preparatory studies for the Codex Iuris Canonici (Code of Canon Law)
contributed by a future pope contains a plea for its wider role in the law
of the church.' Considering how much the survival of the Roman law
8. McILwAIN, THE GROWTH Op POLiTIcAL THOUGHT IN THE WEST 169.
9. J. Flach, "Le Droit romain dans les chartes du IXe au XIe siecle en France,"
Milanges Fitting, I, 418.
10. McIlwain, op. cit. supra note 8, at 267, 293.
11. F. Kern, Law and Constitution in the Middle Ages, KINSHIP & LAW IN THE MMDLE
AGES, 77 (S. B. Chrimes transl. Oxford, 1948).
12. Stouff, "Etude," Rev. Bourg., 279.
13. R. Dekkers, Le Droit privi des peuples, Brussels, 1953, 406 ff.
14. C. H. McIlwain, The English Common Law, Barrier against Absolutism, Am. HIST.
REv. 25 (Oct., 1943).
15. E. Pacelli, La Personnaliti et la territorialit- des lois, particulirement dans le droit
canon-Etude historique-juridique, Rome, 1945 (originally published in 1912 in an Italian
version). See especially the introductory notes iii ff. Taking his cue from St. Thomas Aquinas
Mgr. Pacelli wrote in 1912, iii:
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and through it of the canon law-for "ecclesia lege romana vivit" (the
church lives by the Roman law)-owes to the personal law principle this
attitude is understandable. But it is also a recognition of the claim that
the principle of personality is a sound foundation of a just order in human
relations.
Perhaps the principal role of personality has been that of a carrier
of antique tradition. 6 Whether the tradition was attachment to a distant
Roman or Germanic past, or more concretely to rules of family law and
succession, the principle of personality has enabled the customs of
submerged cultures to assert anew an influence on social development. 7
The idea of the territory does not enter as a necessary element in the notion of law
... Several perfect communities, that is, those capable of receiving laws, are purely
personal.
16. Meijers, "Principes Fondamentaux," op. cit. supra note 4, at 672-673.
17. E. M. Meijers, "Le Droit m~diival, source auxiliaire de recherche pour l'ttude de la
diffusion des groupements ethniques en Europe occidentale," Etudes d'histoire du droit, ed.
R. Feenstra and H. J. W. D. Fischer, Leiden, 1956, I, pp. 15-18 (Resume). Idem, "La
Ralite et la personnalit6 dans le droit du Nord de la France et dans le droit anglais,"
Meijers, op. cit. supra, at I, 228-246.
Meijers regards the distinction between "real" and "personal" as pre-feudal in France
and in England, and traces its origin to an organization of the family "qui se perd clans un
pass6 lointain." Id. at 244-245.
